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Abstract 
Presenting evidence from Yeoville, Johannesburg, I argue that community safety 
governance is a field of socio-spatial micro-politics in which the crime, violence and 
safety governance agenda is sometimes superseded by other organisational, 
institutional and social group interests. More often than not, organisational, 
institutional, individual and social group actors compete or coalesce for legitimacy, 
honour, prestige, and economic resources. I observe that ‘ethno-national regionalism’ 
is one of the organising logics in community security initiatives. In Yeoville there was 
criminalising scapegoating and counter-scapegoating between some South African 
and African immigrant groups. Public perceptions, discourses and practices in the 
field of community security governance in Yeoville were territorialised. I argue that 
safety governance at neighbourhood level easily materialises into the discursive 
politics of appropriation, control and (re)ordering of place and space; which at once 
either promote or undermine the production of safety. 
Following my empirical observations of the dynamics associated with community 
safety initiatives, I argue that community security governing organisations should not 
simply be viewed as security producing entities or spaces of creative community 
building micro-politics, but also as spaces and entities of socially debilitating and 
sometimes malicious informal or formal micro-politics. If debilitating or malicious, 
this micro-politics has the potential of undermining safety production and 
neighbourhood development.  
I deploy, test and edify Bourdieusian “thinking tools”, using Yeoville, as my social 
laboratory for thinking the materialities, sensibilities and rationalities of the local 
politics of community safety governance. The testing of Bourdieusian thought in the 
study of urban safety is novel, not only to South Africa, but to elsewhere.   
Methodologically, I employ a qualitative research design aimed at enabling an in-
depth dissection of the anatomy of miniature politics associated with community 
safety governance; and developing a detailed narrative and theoretical account of this 
politics. The research methods utilised include participant observation, unstructured 
and semi-structured interviews and document reviews. 
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1. Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
“Fearfulness appears to have become a way of life in modern society. Many of us – or so we 
are told – are afraid to go out on the streets of our towns, at night certainly, but even during 
daylight hours as well. Yet staying at home carries its own threats: a whole industry 
manufacturing alarms, locks and surveillance mechanisms has been founded on our conviction 
that our homes are wide open to dangerous intruders. We view strangers with suspicion and 
the future with trepidation” (Tudor 2003: 238-239). 
 
1.1. Setting the context                                                                                                                          
Fear of real or imagined violence and crime1 (and other urban disorders) has a huge 
impact on the spatial and social organisation of contemporary cities (Sandercock 
2003; Tudor 2003). Spatial impacts include the creation of gated neighbourhoods, 
road closures and adoption of military technologies by residents seeking to protect 
their spaces (Davis 1998; Landman 2004a; Landman 2004b; Landman 2008; Murray 
2011). Social impacts include the formation of safety governing community 
organisations2, neighbourhood associations, mob justice and other preventive, 
adaptive or reactive individual or social group practices (strategies and tactics) 
(Armstrong, Francis and Totikidis 2005; Haefele 2002; Olima 2006; Totikidis, 
Armstrong and Francis 2005a; Totikidis, Armstrong and Francis 2005b).  
As Sandercock indicates, there are multiple layers of fear affecting different 
categories of city dwellers similarly or differently (Sandercock 2003). For instance, 
unlike the “privileged urbanites”, the urban poor, over and above the fear of crime 
and violence, cumulatively bear the brunt of a myriad of urban problems such as 
joblessness, homelessness, social exclusion and political repression (Myers 2011; 
Sandercock 2003; Wacquant 1999a).  
Fear is a ubiquitous perception of many cities’ residents, visitors, planners, managers 
and politicians, among other stakeholders (Body-Gendrot 2012; Dirsuweit 2002; 
Dirsuweit 2007; Sandercock 2005; Tudor 2003). In Svendsen’s (2008:48) words, “fear 
has become a way of looking at the world” - a “culture” (Svendsen 2008). Bauman 
(2006:2) formulates the concept of “liquid fear” to describe the fearsomeness of 
“diffuse, scattered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, free floating fear”; which has 
“no address” and supersedes rationality in influencing human action (Bauman 2006). 
                                                     
1
 See Appendix A for definitions of the concepts of fear, crime and violence. 
2 For definition of community organisations, see Appendix A. 
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“Fear has become an emotion that controls the public and a number of social 
scientists now claim that today’s society can best be described as a culture of 
violence”, writes Svendsen (2008:12). The view that we are increasingly experiencing 
what Febvre describes as “fear everywhere, fear always” portrays common human 
emotions in many cities (Tudor 2003). Given this background, I argue that fear is a 
liquid institution (cf. Bauman 2004) - formless and permeative. Fear can therefore be 
conceptualised as a social fact  (Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982) - a reality that 
imposes itself on individual conscience3 (Charles 2006). It is against a backdrop of 
rampant fear of violence and crime (and other urban disorders) that community 
organisations emerge to fill gaps in safety production. Safety governing community 
organisations are reactive or proactive expressions of “urbanisms of fear”4. Fear is 
therefore to be conceptualised as a phenomena as old as the city itself. Sandercock 
(2005: 221) observes: 
“Planning and urban management discourses are, and always have been, 
saturated with fear. The history of planning could be rewritten as the attempts 
to manage fear in the city: generically, fear of disorder and fear of disease, 
specifically fear of those bodies thought to produce that disorder and disease - 
women, the working class, immigrants, gays, youth and so on” (Sandercock 
2005). 
Safety governance is therefore an integral aspect of city making and city living in a 
context riddled by fear of crime and violence.  
At the behest of fear and the realisation of limitations of the state in the production 
of security, communities initiate self-help security initiatives (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
Fourchard and Wafer 2012; Schärf and Nina 2001; Schärf, Saban and Hauck 2001; 
van der Spuy and Lever 2010). Some observers indicate that the state is supposedly 
“hollowing out” (Holliday 2000; Rhodes 2005), or “disoriented” (Artz and Lagendijk 
2009) - increasingly disengaging from guaranteeing public safety (Baker 2004b; Baker 
2005; Benit-Gbaffou 2008b; Schärf, Saban and Hauck 2001; Shearing and Wood 
2003a). 
South Africa has been academically, journalistically and publicly represented as a 
crime and violence ridden country (Schönteich 2000; Schönteich and Louw 2001; 
                                                     
3 Reality sui generis in the Durkheimian sense. 
4 I use the concept of ‘urbanisms of fear’ to depict the culture of fear that pervades urban societies. 
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Spinks 2001); and Johannesburg as a “fearful” and “violent” city (Boisteau 2005; 
Dirsuweit 2002; Schönteich and Louw 2001)5. Johannesburg’s imageries as a fearful 
city are mainly driven by (fears about) violence and crime in township and innercity 
neighbourhoods, with (fears of) spill over to middle class suburbs (Spinks 2001). The 
innercity of Johannesburg is particularly perceived as notorious because of increased 
urban decay, habitation by a huge African immigrant population and allegations of 
the existence of a strong “drug culture”, among other forms of socio-economic 
malaise (COHRE 2005; Legget 2002; Simone 2004a).  
From an empirical grounding in Johannesburg’s innercity neighbourhood of 
Yeoville6, I examine the socio-political contradictions associated with community 
organisation for safety governance. Yeoville is of interest because of its pan-African 
outlook - being a host to an African immigrant and South African population 
(Palomares and Quiminal 2012). Although it is noted that Yeoville is a predominantly 
migrant neighbourhood (Benit-Gbaffou 2006), the proportion of African immigrants 
to South Africans and the current population size of Yeoville are not precisely 
known and estimates are not always reliable. The population of Yeoville was 
estimated at 30 000 by the 2001 National Census (Palomares and Quiminal 2012). 
Because of high levels of population mobility, and the evasive nature of some 
immigrants, census data may not give a reliable picture on the demographics of 
Yeoville. 
Given its social diversity, Yeoville presents a potentially interesting case for 
understanding the micro-politics7 of community safety governance in the city of 
Johannesburg. In a context of Yeoville’s co-habitation by a largely fragmented 
African immigrant and South African population (Katsaura 2012; Palomares and 
Quiminal 2012), one can question the efficacy of an invocation of “community” in 
safety governance policy and practice.  
Yet the South African government has officially turned to community8 as a panacea 
to crime and violence confronting South African societies (Pillay 2008). The 
                                                     
5 See Chapter 3 for detailed narrative about crime, violence and safety in Johannesburg. 
6 See Chapter 3; subtitle 3.2.5. 
77 See Appendix A for definition of micro-politics. 
8 See Appendix A for definition of community. 
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government of South Africa, through the Ministry of Safety and Security, has 
observed that “80 per cent of violent contact crime occurs between people who 
know each other” and “that the police cannot solely prevent violent crime since they 
cannot be everywhere all the time …” (Pillay 2008: 147). Pillay (2008:147) states: 
“This realisation has led to the current emphasis on the need to inculcate and 
transform the social norms, values and practices of citizens to reduce violent 
and property related crime. The emphasis is therefore on creating a ‘socially 
cohesive’ community where levels of trust engender more socially harmonious 
relations, and where rights and obligations are practical which are consistent 
with the laws which govern the country” (Pillay 2008).  
However, in this thesis I show that “community” does not refer to a unitary and 
coherent entity as assumed in these invocations, but is rather, a constellation of 
multiple and often competing or coalescing social fragments. To rely on community 
in urban safety governance would require making peace with the socio-political 
fragments that it is.  
 
1.2. The research problem 
While literature examines the effects of fear of violence and crime on the making of 
urban places and communities (Body-Gendrot 2007; Radaelli 2007; Tudor 2003), it 
does not adequately examine the micro socio-spatial politics that ensues when people 
organise in response to fear of crime and violence. There is a need to go beyond 
analyses of trends, causes of fear of crime and violence and variants of safety 
governance practices. An in-depth analysis of the contradictions of the socio-
economic and political consequences of fear of violence and community safety 
governance practices is warranted. 
In this case, I observe that there is a dearth of analysis of i) stakeholder politics, ii) 
ethno-national regionalist politics9 and iii) territorialist politics - discursive and 
practical - characterising the field of community safety governance10 (see Chapter Two; 
Chapter Three). Although I choose to focus on these three aspects of the micro socio-
spatial politics of community safety governance, as informed by my research context, 
there could be other dimensions that I have no space to explore here.  
                                                     
9 See Appendix A 
10 See Appendix A for definition of community safety governance/community security governance 
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Also, the stream of literature that examines community safety governance initiatives 
and practices needs to be alerted to the textures of associated “social”, “political” and 
“moral” economies11 (Arnold 2001; Bouchard, Ferraton and Michau 2006; Sayer 
2000). Below is how I structure the argument of this thesis to fill the identified hiatus 
in literature. 
 
1.3. Research argument and question 
In developing my argument, I begin from the premise that community safety 
governing practices, strategies and tactics are a product and manifestation of the 
habitualisation12, institutionalisation13 and instrumentalisation14 of fear of violence and crime 
(see Chapter Four). This takes the form of safety producing (and associated) socio-
spatial practices that are repeated, formalised or patterned collectively or individually.  
Overall, I argue that insecurity, among other urban disorders, can be institutionalised 
and instrumentalised as and in community organisation(s), creating a platform for a 
simultaneously socially divisive and unifying micro-politics - one in which agents in 
and outside community organisations compete and coalesce for various reasons. In 
this case I conceptualise community safety initiatives as ushering a micro-politics that 
is linked to, but goes beyond the safety production agenda. The field of community 
safety production essentially becomes a field of community power contestations - of 
coalescing or competing organisational, institutional, individual or social group 
interests. This micro-politics has not been given adequate attention in academic 
accounts of community safety governance in South Africa and globally. Following 
this line of thought, my key arguments respond to the main research question below: 
What is the nature and logic of socio-spatial politics concomitant with 
community safety governance?      
In conceptualising this main research question and disaggregating the overall 
argument, I make three specific arguments that community safety governance: i) is a 
                                                     
11 See Appendix A for definitions of the concepts of social economy, political economy, and moral economy as 
used here. 
12 Habitualisation here refers to the reproducibility of a human action or behaviour with an economy of 
effort as a result of it being repeated frequently (see Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
13 Institutionalisation is a concept that describes the habitualisation, patterning and regularisation of 
human practices, customs and behaviours - enhancing the predictability of social life (see Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). 
14 Instrumentalisation depicts the reification and concretisation of fear materially or mentally. 
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field abound with socio-spatial discourses, “practices” and “strategies” (Bourdieu 1990; 
de Certeau 1984) of stakeholders competing for prestige, notability and socio-
economic goods or services; ii) is an arena of ethnopolitics which structures social 
relations therein and; iii) is a field characterised by territorialist and territorialised 
discourses and practices. This three tiered argument is represented in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Three tiered micro-politics of community safety governance 
I disaggregate the main question and key argument by posing the following specific 
research questions:  
i) How do community security governing stakeholders relate to each other and with what logic? 
ii) What are the manifestations and implications of ethno-national politics in community 
security governance?  
iii) How does territorialist politics manifest in and influence community safety governance? 
     
In exploring these research questions (and key argument), I deploy Bourdieusian 
concepts of field, capital, practice, habitus and symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1977; 
Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 1990), amongst others, to understand the social, moral and 
political economies and logics of socio-spatial practices and discourses in the 
community safety governance field (see Chapter Four). Below is a snapshot of research 
methods deployed in answering research questions and developing the research 
argument? 
          
1.4. Preamble on method 
This study is based on a qualitative case study research design. I relied mainly on a 
triangulation of purposive, snowball and availability sampling techniques to reach the 
targeted population (Burgess 1984; Yin 2009). The study is purposively and 
Stakeholder politics: 
Organisational, individual, social group 
Contestations and coalitions for capitals – or? 
Community safety 
governance 
Ethno-national regionalist politics: 
African immigrants versus South Africans 
Ethno-nationalised discourses and practices 
Territorial/ spatial politics: 
Public discourses, practices and tactics of (about) 
safety and its production or lack thereof 
Source: Author 
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conveniently based on the broader case of Johannesburg and anchored in the specific 
context of Yeoville. Such a design was desirable given the need to tap into the 
miniature everyday practices of individuals or social groups in and outside 
community organisations or institutions engaged in the enterprise of safety 
governance (Burgess 1984; Yin 2009). This involved my immersion in the local 
politics and everydayness of Yeoville for a period of two and half years; with 
fieldwork conducted over fifteen months (see Chapter Five; Appendix B). This 
immersion was both complete and precarious as my identity as an African and a 
Zimbabwean in a pan-African (multi-national) South African neighbourhood 
accorded me the tags of “indigene” and “alien” at once (see Chapter Five, subtitle 
5.3.2).  
The bulk of data were obtained through participant observation; complemented by 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews and document reviews (see Chapter Five, 
subtitle 5.2.2; also see Appendix B)15. Participant observation mainly took the form 
of attendance of community meetings and walks in the neighbourhood and in the 
city as both a resident and researcher (de Certeau 1984). Unstructured interviews 
involved conversations with key informants and other actors as initiated during my 
observations in meetings and walks in the neighbourhood (and greater city). Semi-
structured interviews were mainly administered in an opinion and attitude survey 
conducted with the help of research assistants with the aim of capturing the voices of 
the generality of the population to include those not participating in community 
meetings. The collected primary and secondary data were analysed mainly through 
content analysis16 (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993; Tere 2006). I then present this 
thesis in the manner described below. 
 
1.5. Organisation of thesis  
This thesis is composed of nine chapters. The first four chapters (including this one) 
introduce the research, discuss the research gap, set a contextual background and 
explore theoretical issues relating to the socio-spatial politics of community security 
                                                     
15 More than 90 community meetings were attended; 60 key informants interviewed, 40 participants 
were interviewed in an opinion and attitude survey; 2 unstructured group interviews were conducted 
and I benefited from everyday walks in the city neighbourhood. 
16 See Chapter 5; subtitle 5.2.3 
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initiatives. The remaining five chapters mainly present and interpret research 
experiences and findings. 
Chapter 2 discusses the state of knowledge in the field of urban safety governance 
studies, setting the stage for this study. I then offer, in Chapter 3, an examination of 
what is known about safety governance in the South African urban context; further 
exposing the research hiatus that I fill. In Chapter 4 I search for thinking tools to 
understand the micro-politics of community safety governance in South African 
cities. I move on to Chapter 5 in which I narrate and examine my field research 
experiences - with a focus on my positionality in the micro-politics of community 
safety governance as both observer and participant. I present and interpret my 
research findings in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
In Chapter 6, I analyse the manifestations and logics of organisational, institutional 
and individualist politics associated with community safety production. Following 
this, Chapter 7 cascades into an analysis of ethno-national regionalist politics in 
community safety governance. In Chapter 8 I examine the territorialised discourses 
and practices in community safety governance micro-politics. Chapter 9 concludes 
this thesis; identifying openings for further research. 
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2. Chapter Two 
Urban community safety governance: The state of knowledge 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter develops an analysis of community safety governance that enables 
appreciation of the associated micro-politics. I note that while studies of urban 
violence and crime, or fear thereof, show how these are instrumentalised in urban 
spatial forms and institutionalised in urban social organisation (see Figure 7), they rarely, 
if at all, examine the concomitant micro-politics. 
At a global level, scholarship has generally focused on i) describing and analysing 
trends  of urban violence [and crime] (Block and Block 1995; Farrall 2008; UN-
Habitat 2007); ii) explaining and describing its causes [and effects] (Deflem 2011; 
Moller 2004; Muggah 2012; Rodgers, Muggah and Stevenson 2009); and iii) 
describing and analysing strategies of its governance (Acosta and Chavis 2007; Baker 
2004a; Baker 2004b; Baker 2004c; Caldeira 1996a; Caldeira 2000). While this analysis 
is useful, it does not fully engage with the socio-spatial micro-political implications of 
community safety production initiatives. 
The corpus of literature that analyses the role of communities in local safety 
governance glosses over the intricate linkages between community safety initiatives 
and community politics. It largely omits an appreciation of community 
organisational, institutional, social group and spatial or territorial politics 
characterising community safety governance. Some studies that attempt to weave 
community politics into an analysis of neighbourhood safety governance largely 
reduce the enterprise to a comparison between community safety initiatives and 
state-driven local or national safety initiatives (Abrahamsen 2007; Lea and Stenson 
2008; Rodgers and Muggah 2009; Schärf and Nina 2001).  
Here, I examine the contents and shortfalls of contemporary safety governance 
literature; carving out my research agenda. I initiate this by offering a cursor of 
documented trends and causes of urban crime and violence and variants of urban 
safety governance practices. 
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2.2. Scholarly normatives in urban safety studies 
Below, I attempt to unpack the normative themes in urban safety governance, paying 
attention to the literature that describes and analyses trends and causes of violence 
and crime and safety governance practices. I also focus on exposing gaps in this 
knowledge. 
 
2.2.1. Global trends of crime, violence and fear 
As some literature suggest, basically all cities grapple with meeting the security needs 
of residents (Sandercock 2005; Tudor 2003). This is projected as a more serious 
concern in cities of the developing world; which are also considered to be the fastest 
urbanising ones17 (Muggah 2012). However, this is not to suggest that cities in the 
developed world do not experience violence. Body-Gendrot and Wacquant write 
about fearsomeness, violence and crime in the banlieues of France and the ghettos of 
USA; characterising them as spaces supposedly inhabited by problematic, deprived 
populations or urban outcasts (Body-Gendrot 2000; Body-Gendrot 2007; Wacquant 
2008d). In fact, the year 2011 in European countries like Greece, Italy and England, 
was characterised by waves of urban violence as people protested against 
marginalisation in the wake of global economic crisis (Idriss et al. 2010; Swyngedouw 
2011a; Swyngedouw 2011b). Urban insecurity is therefore a global phenomenon, 
with regional and country variations in its gravity, form and repertoires. 
Studies show that, globally, crime and violence have been on the increase in the 
absolute sense (Idriss et al. 2010; Muggah 2012; UN-Habitat 2007; UN-Habitat 2009; 
WB 2012). The UN-Habitat Report (2007: VI) shows that global crime incidences 
increased by 30% (from 2300 to over 3000 per 100,000 people) over the period 1980 
to 2000. There were, however, variations in crime incidences between regions of the 
world. Crime rates in North America and Western Europe fell; whilst rising 
significantly in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Eastern Europe (Ibid: VI). 
These regional variations in crime and violence are more pronounced when specific 
types of crime are examined (UN Habitat Report 2007: VI). For instance, in the case 
of homicide, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean report double-digit rates, while 
                                                     
17 See Figure 2 and Figure 3 
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significantly lower rates are reported for Southeast Asia, Europe, Eastern 
Mediterranean and West Pacific (see Figure 2). 
 
At the national level, Colombia, South Africa, Jamaica, Guatemala and Venezuela 
have very high homicide rates, while Japan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Spain, Cyprus and 
Norway have considerably lower rates (Ibid 2007: VI; see Figure 2).  
 
These global variations in crime and violence reflect the general observation made by 
others that “postcolonies in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America are haunted 
more by unregulated violence, un/civil warfare, and random terror than other 
twenty-first century nation-states” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: vii). Such 
instability is conceived as inherently associated with transitions to democracy 
(Caldeira 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006a; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2006b; Malešević 2010; Roitman 2006; Spyer 2006). How 
are these increasing rates of urban violence and crime explained?  
 
2.2.2. Causalities: a worthwhile or flawed search? 
Some studies attribute the increase in violence and crime to rapid urban growth and 
increasing poverty and inequality (Idriss et al. 2010; Muggah 2012; UN-Habitat 2007; 
UN-Habitat 2009; WB 2012). For instance, in 2007 it was officially recognised that 
the greater proportion of the world’s population was living in cities and rates of 
urbanisation were very high in the developing world (Muggah 2012). One study has 
Figure 2: Homicide rates by Word Health Organisation Region (2000) 
Source: King et al (2002) cited in UN-Habitat Report (2007:55): Adapted and modified by author 
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shown that 60 per cent of urban dwellers in rapidly urbanising developing countries 
have been victims of crime over a five-year period, with victimisation rates reaching 
70 per cent in parts of Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa (UN-Habitat  2007: 
VI). In Latin America, where 80 per cent of the population is urban, the rapidly 
expanding metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Mexico City and Caracas 
account for over half of violent crimes in their respective countries (Ibid 2007: VI). 
Homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro have tripled since the 1970s, while in São Paulo 
they have quadrupled (Ibid 2007: VI). In the Caribbean, Kingston, Jamaica’s capital, 
consistently accounts for the vast majority of the nation’s murders (Ibid 2007: VI).   
Bauman and Wacquant suggest that globalisation and the development of a 
“consumer society” in a context of rising inequality, hyper-poverty and advanced 
marginalisation explain the rising fear of violence and crime (Bauman 1998; Bauman 
2004; Wacquant 2008a; Wacquant 2008d). According to Wacquant, Marcuse and 
others, cities in “developed economies” are seeing the emergence of “advanced 
marginality”, and “extreme ghettoisation” of city spaces inhabited by the “urban 
poor” (urban outcasts18 or precariats) (Marcuse 1997a; Marcuse and van Kempen 2002; 
Wacquant 1993; Wacquant 1996; Wacquant 2008d). Resonating with the notion of 
“urban outcasts”, is the concept of wasted lives used by Bauman (1998) to describe the 
poor and disenfranchised of societies.  
Bauman (1998) indicates that being poor in a “consumer society” is to be a “flawed 
consumer”. Such a consumer may be liable to adopting criminal strategies to access 
resources needed to participate in the “consumer society”. “To be poor is criminal”, 
writes Bauman (1998). While there is a drive to provide the poor with “conditions of 
dignified human existence”, it is overshadowed by the “expulsion of the poor from 
the universe of moral obligation” (Bauman 2004:77-78). Rather, there is a 
“criminalisation of the poor” by some wealthier populations who happen to control 
or influence “state machinery”19 (Bauman 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou 2006; Eick 2003). 
Bauman (2004: 93) notes that poverty is considered “a question of law and order; 
                                                     
18 Urban outcasts (or precariats) are people who are not well integrated into urban economies or 
societies and considered as posing threats of resurgence of extreme forms of violence and criminality 
(see Wacquant 2008c). 
19 “State machinery” here refers to government entities; including the police, correctional services and 
army. 
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and one should respond to it in the way one responds to other kinds of law-
breaking”. The perception that the poor are a threat to social order explains the 
concentration, by the state and other actors, on the policing of spaces of the poor 
and the very identities of the poor (Bauman 1998; Caldeira 2000). Of note is the fact 
that many state-oriented safety production practices target the poor. In this case the 
poor are treated as the problematic and potentially criminal category that has to be 
controlled for the production and maintenance of social order. Bauman (2004: 85) 
argues: 
“The immediate proximity of large and growing agglomerations of ‘wasted 
humans’, likely to become durable or permanent, calls for stricter segregationist 
policies and extraordinary security measures, lest the ‘healthy of society’; the 
‘normal functioning of the social system will be endangered”. 
The prison therefore operates as a “waste disposal industry” or a “dump site” of 
“human waste” that keeps away the “unhealthy” and unwanted of society; or in 
theory aims to benevolently rehabilitate and recycle them back into mainstream 
society (Bauman 2004; Walker 2006). The wealthier members of society, in 
complementing state efforts or in covering up for state failures in producing safety, 
retreat into gated neighbourhoods - taking a distance from the poor (Atkinson and 
Flint 2004; Blakely and Snyder 1997; Clement and Grant 2012; Landman 2008). 
It is also observed that some policing practices criminalise and target poor and 
vulnerable immigrants. Writing about policing in the banlieues of France, Bauman 
(2004: 64) notes: 
“Seeking public Enemy Number One among the hapless immigrants of the 
banlieues and asylum seeker camps is considerably more opportune and 
expedient, but above all less troublesome. With more effect and less expense, 
the immigrant districts teeming with prospective pickpockets and muggers can 
be used as the battlefield of the great war of law and order which governments 
wage with great vigour and even greater publicity while not being averse to 
‘subsidiarising’ and subletting to private security outlets and citizen initiatives” 
(Bauman 2004). 
As observed by Bourdieu in France, as elsewhere, immigrants are targeted by the 
social control machinery of that state, not just  as a security governance strategy, but 
as a populist politicking strategy (Bourdieu 1998b). 
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While the search for causalities of urban violence is potentially profitable, I observe 
that it is very elusive because it is difficult to establish cause-effect relationships with 
precision in our complex contemporary urban contexts. There are so many variables 
that probably account for violence and crime or lack thereof. It is very difficult, for 
instance, to convincingly explain why some societies are more violent than others 
(despite being all poor or being better off than others). In this context of increased 
urban violence and crime, there is literature that has focused on describing and 
analysing various safety governance practices. 
 
2.2.3. Variants of safety governance practices  
At a global level, literature classifies security governance strategies and practices 
according to their form and content. For example, Moser and MacIliwaine (2004: 
186) analytically distinguish between top-down and bottom-up approaches to safety 
governance. Top–down approaches are those that are initiated and implemented by 
government or non-government agencies with little, if any, consultation with the 
public (see Moser and MacIliwaine 2004: 186). Bottom-up approaches are, ideally, 
those that are mooted and implemented by affected communities (Ibid: 186). The 
distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches to security governance 
should not blur the fact that, in actuality, there are commonalities between 
government-driven and non-government initiatives. This is because the government, 
or its shadows, is present in community safety initiatives; while more often than not, 
community considerations are made (to some extent) in government safety 
initiatives. Hence, the distinction between government and non-government safety 
governance initiatives and between state actors and non-state actors can be treated as 
practically elusive and, at worst, fallacious. 
 
While contemporary literature is able to describe and explain trends and causes of 
urban violence and crime and the strategies of safety governance, it has not deeply 
analysed the concomitant institutional consequences. 
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2.3. Fear and the risk society: instrumentalisation, institutionalisation … 
The study of urban safety governance has not yet adequately tapped on literature 
about the “risk society” (Beck 1992b; Wendling 2011). Yet to live in fear and 
uncertainty is to live in a “risk society” (Beck 1992a; Beck 1992b; Beck 1999; 
Hollway and Jefferson 1997). A risk society is one in which fear is instrumentalised; 
one characterised by “security calculations” and a generalised “culture of danger” 
(Hollway and Jefferson 1997; Opitz 2011). Louw et al. (1998:3) indicate that “few 
cities and indeed urban areas […] are without crime and risk of becoming a victim is 
high for residents of most large cities”.  
Reducing fear is integral for promotion of city liveability (Dirsuweit 2002; Shaw 
2007; Skogan 1986b). Fear of crime has generally been identified to be a problem as 
big as crime itself; and Whitzman (2008:40) suggests that it is “as important as 
observable reality” (Whitzman 2008). Because of fear and the need to govern it, we 
see the emergence of collective and individual fear averting strategies. For instance, 
owing to fear, people in some circumstances avoid walking at night (Box 1; Figure 3).  
Box 1: Fear of the night as a global phenomenon 
Comment 
This graph is “based on ICVS20 and United Nations data and depicts the responses of people 
from 35 developing and industrialised nations when asked how safe they felt walking home 
at night. The highest fear was recorded in Brazil (70%) followed by South Africa (65%)” 
(UN Habitat Report 2007: 56). 
                                                     
20
 International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). 
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents indicating that they 'feel unsafe walking home at night': comparative 
international survey (ICVS survey) 
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South Africa features prominently amongst the most violence, crime and fear ridden 
countries in the world (Boisteau 2005; Schönteich 2000); and vulnerability to crime is 
portrayed as an everyday experience and perception, (Harris 2001). In entrenching this, 
Pieterse and Parnell indicate that in numerous studies, safety and security is in the top three 
of concerns by South Africans across class and race boundaries (Parnell and Pieterse 2010). 
Johannesburg alongside Cape Town is considered as one of the South African benchmark of 
a violent city in South Africa and Africa in a non-war zone.   
Source of graph: Nuttall et al (2002) in UN Habitat Report (2007: 56) 
Observing the everyday-ness and normalisation of fear of crime, Caldeira (2000) 
refers to “talk of crime” in Sao Paulo. The notion of “talk of crime” depicts the fact 
that crime has become the subject of everyday public talk, including jokes. 
It is because of fear of the risk of violence and crime that social groups and 
individuals are increasingly securitising (Chapter 1, 4). We are witnessing i) the 
formation and multiplication of safety producing community organisations (Olima 
2006); ii) increased enlisting of private security (Carrier 1999; Shearing and Stenning 
1983); iii) dependence on the insurance sector (Shaw and Gastrow 2001); iv) 
formation of gated residential developments (Morange et al. 2012); and v) 
deployment of surveillance techniques (Koskela 2000); among other strategies. All 
these signal the habitualisation, instrumentalisation and institutionalisation of fear 
(see Figure 7). In this respect, studies of community safety governance call for an 
empirical and theoretical analysis of associated institutional politics as played out at a 
miniature level.  
 
2.4. Institutional politics of community safety governance 
Contemporary literature (such as nodal governance literature) that attempts an 
analysis of relationships between various safety producing institutional agents 
remains rooted in an “anti-state monopoly” neoliberal discourse (Shearing 2011; 
Shearing and Brogden 1993). Nodal governance (also referred to as networked 
governance) literature celebrates the shift from government to governance (Crawford 
2006b; Rhodes 1996) - and in this case a shift from police to policing (Loader 2000). 
This shift denotes the presence of a multiplicity of governance institutions executing 
the functions of governance; with, beyond or below the state (Lea and Stenson 
2008). The shift from police to policing signals a break from state police’s monopoly 
of safety provision to a “pluralisation of security” provisioning players, including 
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community-based agents and the private sector (Shearing and Wood 2003a; Shearing 
and Wood 2003b; Wood and Shearing 2006).  
This nodal governance analysis, useful as it is, remains macro-based and does not pay 
detailed attention to the relational micro-politics (including everyday politics) of 
community safety production. It falls within the trap of a vertical analytical bias that 
juxtaposes state and non-state safety providers - unrelentingly seeking to prove the 
inadequacies of the state in safety production.  
Unpacking the largely ignored micro relational politics of safety production is the 
focus of this endeavour. In examining this relational micro-politics, there is a need 
for more nuanced empirical and theoretical analyses of the positioning of social 
groups in the field of community safety governance (see Figure 9). 
        
2.5. Social group politics in community safety: ethno-nationalism 
Literature shows the significance of social diversity, based on gender, age, race and 
ethnicity amongst other dimensions, in the configuration of community safety 
practices and discourses. The positions of previously ignored social groups, such as 
women, are increasingly being appreciated in contemporary analysis of community 
safety initiatives (Meth 2010; Meth 2011; Shaw 2005; Whitzman 2008; Whitzman et 
al. 2009). Whereas the focus of studies of violence against women has been on 
domestic violence, victim surveys and other studies have shown that women, 
alongside men, are victims of crime and violence in the public sphere (Fernandez 
2008; Shaw 2005; Stanko 1995; Vetten, Dladla and Vetton 2000).  
Also, youth is a critical subaltern social category in community safety governance 
studies - a category that has mainly been studied as a criminal one. Sub-cultural 
theories, as they were proposed by scholars such as Matza and Sykes, emphasise the 
criminality of youth sub-cultures and youth spaces (Matza 1961; Matza 1964; Matza 
and Sykes 1961; Sykes and Matza 1957). Accordingly, discourses that reflect and 
entrench notions of youth criminality pervade policing and urban planning 
discourses. Jacobs (1989) underscores the prevalence of exclusionary city planning 
that separates the youth from the older members of society. Creation of exclusionary 
spaces for the youth and for older people with the purpose of safety enhancement is 
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an old urban planning and governance practice (Fernandez 2008; Katyal 2002). The 
effectiveness of this practice in the generation of public safety is questionable. This is 
because it promotes age-based social discrimination in public spaces; reducing the 
chance for intergenerational social mingling and understanding. 
While youths are perceived as prime perpetrators of crime and violence (Bazemore 
2001; Diouf 2003; Steinberg 2001), they are also viewed as playing a critical role in 
defending neighbourhoods against crime (Barolsky and Pillay 2011; Barowsky and 
Pillay 2011; Bruce 2007a; Bruce 2007b; Burton 2007; Pain 2000). In his studies in 
Chicago, Forman shows that in their interaction with police, young males are likely to 
be disrespected by police and to be stopped and searched illegally (Forman 2004). 
The police also generally focus on policing spaces that are frequented by youths - 
streets, taverns and parks (Malone 2002). The media heightens the criminalisation of 
the youth by representing them as a “mindless and violent cabal” (Pain 2000: 151). 
  
Contemporary literature offers detailed accounts of how ethno-national stereotypes 
and scapegoating inform crime profiling and influence police conduct or discretion. 
This is elaborately shown by literature on policing in the USA (Alderman, Erez and 
Shalhouds-Kavorkian 2003; Dottolo and Stewart 2008; Weitzer and Tuch 2005). 
Such literature indicates that there is crime profiling based on race and age, in which 
young Black males are targeted as (potential) criminals (Howell, Perry and Vile 2004). 
As Dottolo and Stewart (2008) show, in the USA context, Blacks are liable to being 
stopped and searched by police officers as they are suspected to be more likely to 
commit crime than other races. Howell et al (2004) state that criminal statistics in the 
USA feature Blacks as the main perpetrators of crime. These statistics reflect the 
practices and discretions of police officers and not mere fact (Howell, Perry and Vile 
2004). In his studies in German, Albrecht (1997) suggests that police statistics that 
represent ethnic minorities as main perpetrators of crime are not to be trusted, but 
should be treated as reflective of public and police attitudes towards ethnic or racial 
minorities rather than as representative of mere crime facts (Albrecht 1997).    
  
While literature demonstrates the effects of ethnic and racial profiling on official 
public policing, it does not explore how this profiling is incarnated in community-
based safety initiatives and related practices. Contemporary studies also do not give 
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adequate attention to an analysis of the concoction of ethno-nationality, youthfulness 
and gender in the generation of everyday safety production practices and discourses. 
Entwined with ethno-national and organisational or institutional discourses or 
practices in safety governance, are territorialist and territorialised politics.   
 
2.6. Territorial politics of community safety production: missing links? 
The connection between crime and violence and place is well documented - violence 
and crime being conceptualised as spatial problems (Newman 1972; Sherman 1995; 
Spelman 1995; Springer 2011). There is an appreciation of the fact that violence and 
crime are mostly spatially located problems.  Accordingly, there is a body of literature 
that emphasises the importance of governing place as a safety production strategy 
(Jacobs 1989; Jacobs 1995; Newman 1972). This literature stresses the need to 
identify crime hot spots and concentrate policing and crime prevention initiatives on 
these hotspots (Jacobson 1999; Pain 2000; Sherman 1998; Taangin, Flores and 
Emprador 2008).  
Literature on community safety governance has either been bogged by an upholding 
of the social over the physical dimensions of safety initiatives or a reification of the 
physical over the social (Chapter 4). In my examination of the micro-politics of 
community safety governance, I resist the reification of either social or spatial 
dynamics of this politics; choosing to treat the two as mutual and even indivisible. I 
maintain that organisational, institutional or ethno-national regionalist politics in the 
arena of community security governance is, in many ways, sited in territory - in the 
neighbourhood in this case. The neighbourhood is here conceptualised as a political 
entity (Katsaura 2012); a micro-polity which can be defended against crime and 
violence.  
A neighbourhood with a reputation for criminality, social disorder and violence 
scares away property investors, and is also likely to be characterised by flight of some 
residents, high levels of population mobility and reduced interest in community 
affairs by residents (Skogan 1986a; Skogan 1989). It faces socio-spatial decay. Greene 
(1995:45) argues: 
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“Destabilized communities are said to produce an environment of criminality, 
and result in acceleration in the exodus of local businesses and homeowners. 
Moreover, destabilized communities such as residential neighbourhoods are 
seen as places governed by fear and criminal victimization, furthering the spiral 
of decline, particularly in urban areas” (Greene 1998). 
Physical infrastructural decay within a neighbourhood is inextricably linked to the 
decay of the neighbourhood’s social infrastructure (Simone 2004b; Skogan 1986a; 
Skogan 1989). Socio-spatial governance is required to maintain or improve the value 
of a neighbourhood. Lawson states that all urban governance is about spatial 
targeting and place management (Lawson 2007); the neighbourhood being the 
immediate arena of such targeting and management. It is considered as an elementary 
spatio-social unit of the city.      
The process of defending a neighbourhood is, however, imbued with a splintering 
and unifying social politics which is inadequately examined in safety governance 
literature. An examination of this politics is beginning to be appreciated by scholars 
who examine the divisive and progressive role of party politics in community 
policing forums in South Africa (Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-
Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; Fourchard 2012).   
With the hindsight of this review of literature, I conclude this chapter by entrenching 
my research agenda. 
 
2.7. Recapping the research agenda     
As a step towards mapping a research agenda, I identify three generalised weaknesses 
in literature on safety governance. These are i) the failure of contemporary literature 
to adequately examine institutional, organisational (and associated individual) 
instrumentalised micro-politics in the community safety governance field; ii) 
inadequate analysis of ethno-nationalist discourses and practices in the arena of 
community safety governance; and iii) minimal attempts to show how territorial 
politics interlace with community safety governance.   
Responding to these points of weakness, I set out to empirically explore and theorise 
i) the logic of stakeholder (organisational, institutional and individual) micro-political 
dynamics associated with community security governance; ii) the politics of ethno-
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nationalist discourses and practices in community safety governance; and iii) the 
territorialist or spatialist discourses, practices and strategies by social groups and 
individuals engaged in community safety governance. 
In addressing this three-tiered research agenda (see Figure 1); I deploy the concept of 
socio-spatial politics which simultaneously capture the sociological and spatial (or 
geographical) aspects of the micro-politics of community security governance. Socio-
spatial reasoning helps me to overcome both “sociologism” and “spatialism” - 
reifications of either the social or spatial in urban community security governance 
thought. In Chapter 3 I follow up on this generalised review of literature with an 
examination of security governance literature within the context of South African 
cities (with a special focus on Johannesburg).  
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3. Chapter Three 
Urban community safety governance in South Africa 
 
“Crime, and fear of crime, is as old as South Africa itself, and, as unpopular as it is to say this 
around middle class dinner tables, our preoccupation with crime is testimony to how this 
country was stitched together with violence, to how we worry that malevolence is our most 
abiding pedigree. Fear in this country is saturated with politics; it is the product of generations 
of estrangement between races, classes and individuals” (Steinberg 2001: 2). 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As indicated by Steinberg (2001) in above quotation, fear of crime is a ubiquitous 
aspect of South African society - an everyday phenomenon. In fact, post-apartheid 
South Africa is inherently scripted and marked by the signifiers “crime and violence”; 
and the South African academe (or world academe) cannot afford to ignore these 
signifiers.  
Thus, South African literature on violence and crime, like global literature, i) 
describes and explains trends of violence, crime and fear (Dirsuweit 2002; Harris 
2003b; Kupe, Verryn and Worby 2008; Kynoch 2008; Kynoch 2011); ii) causes of 
violence and crime (Cronje 2008; Legget 2003; Legget 2004); and iii) various regimes 
of safety governance practices (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; Benit-Gbaffou 2008a; Benit-
Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; 
Boisteau 2005).  
However, in the same vein as global literature, South African literature misses, or 
marginally addresses i) the positioning of stakeholder (organisational, institutional, 
social group and individual) micro-politics in urban safety governance; ii) ethno-
national regionalist politics in urban community safety discourses, practices and 
strategies; and iii) discursive and performative territorialist or territorialised micro-
politics of community safety initiatives.  
This chapter reviews the state of knowledge on community safety governance in 
South African cities; analysing what is known and not (fully) known. The chapter 
starts by laying out what is known about safety governance in South Africa, 
cascading into the case of Johannesburg and then the specificities of Yeoville. I 
conclude by outlining what we do not (fully) know about safety governance in the 
South African context. 
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3.2. What do we know? 
This section appraises the literature that describes and analyses i) urban violence, fear 
and crime trends; ii) causes of urban violence, crime and fear; and iii) regimes of 
safety governance. 
 
3.2.1. Violence and crime trends: historicity, contemporariness and spatiality 
Literature records and analyses the trends and histories of violence, crime or fear in 
the South African context. South Africa is inundated with high levels of violence and 
crime, which some observers consider to be carry-overs from apartheid (Kynoch 
2008; Kynoch 2005; Kynoch 2011).  
Crime and violence remain some of the biggest challenges facing the post-apartheid 
South African government and people; and has become a part of everyday life 
(Gordon 2006; Harris 2001; Parnell and Pieterse 2010). Insecurity in urban South 
Africa takes many forms, which include fear of armed robberies, homicide, politically 
motivated violence, gender-based violence, intra and inter-gangster fights, rape, 
neighbourhood fights or quarrels and xenophobic violence, among others (Altbeker 
2005; Ashforth 2005; Burger 2007; Chipkin 2004; Harris 2002).  
Violence, particularly violent crime, is considered a “livelihood strategy” and a 
“lifestyle” for some members of South African society who are unemployed, 
misemployed or underemployed. In terms of perpetrators of crime and violence, 
youth of Black and coloured origin are stereotypically viewed as the problematic 
groups (Jensen 2008; Kynoch 2011). The tsotsi label describes young Black (potential) 
thugs or criminals in Johannesburg and elsewhere in South Africa (Bank 2011; 
Kynoch 2001; Kynoch 2011) and the skollie label describes thuggish young coloureds 
in the Cape Flats, Cape Town and elsewhere (Jensen 2008). 
Police officers, who are supposed to be protectors, are also implicated in escalating 
violence, crime and human rights abuses in South Africa (Bruce 2002; Bruce 2007a; 
Bruce and Neild 2005). SAPS21, with the assumption of office by Police 
                                                     
21 South African Police Service (SAPS) 
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Commissioner Bheki Cele in 2009, adopted a “shoot to kill policy” against 
(suspected) violent criminals (Farrell 2011). This policy came in the wake of increased 
killings of police officers by civilians and fear that crime would batter the image of 
South Africa, potentially undermining the hosting of  2010 FIFA world cup. Only 
months after the introduction of the shoot to kill policy, members of SAPS shot 
dead Atlegang Aphane; a three year old toddler for allegedly holding a pipe which 
they mistook for a gun (Smith 2009). This aroused popular public and media outcry 
and denunciation. Questions were raised regarding the observance of human rights 
by police officers and more generally on democracy and constitutionalism in South 
Africa (Bruce 2002). Hornberger raises questions about the efficacy of human rights 
based policing in South Africa, shedding light on the complexities that police officers 
face in simultaneously trying to reduce crime and respect human rights (Hornberger 
2011). Post-apartheid police violence can itself be viewed as a new guise for or carry-
over from military, racialised, political and brutal policing of the apartheid era which 
aimed at quelling dissent and sustaining the apartheid regime (Bruce 2002; Burman 
and Scharf 1990; Pillay 2005; Scharf 1990).  
Security challenges in South African cities are further compounded by the spectre 
and reality of xenophobic violence. Since May 2008, xenophobic violence has stolen 
the limelight in contemporary studies of urban violence in South Africa (Misago 
2011; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Monson 2012; Neocosmos 2008; 
Neocosmos 2010); overshadowing studies of other forms of violence such as violent 
crime, political violence and domestic violence. Threats of violence and real violence 
against African immigrants, as well as xenophobic stigma, are some of the major 
challenges facing contemporary South African society (Nyamnjoh 2010b). The 
xenophobic attacks of May 2008 graphically represent the extremities of “anti-
foreigner” mob violence in South African townships - leaving an estimated 62 people 
dead and approximately over 100 000 people displaced (von Holdt 2011: 6). Having 
erupted in Alexandra (in Johannesburg); xenophobic violence spread to most 
townships in South African cities.  
Violence against African immigrants continues to be a serious threat to local peace. 
In June 2011, a Zimbabwean man called Farai Kujirichita was killed by a mob in 
Diepsloot in unclear circumstances in which there were allegations that he was a 
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criminal (News24 2011)22. On the same note, in October 2011 there were broad-
based threats of violence against African immigrants who were alleged to be staying 
in RDP23 houses that are meant for South Africans in Alexandra Township (Sapa 
2011). The idea of inflicting bodily pain on the socially undesired or suspected 
criminals is therefore a part of public practices of some South Africans (Buur and 
Jensen 2004; Haefele 2002; Hayson 1990; Minaar 2007).  
Of note is that crime and violence are associated with certain places or 
neighbourhoods (at least at the level of public perceptions and discourses). Township 
and innercity areas are considered as the most problematic; with townships like 
Diepsloot and Alexandra (Johannesburg),  Cape Flats and Khayelitsha (Cape Town) 
being labelled as violence and crime hotspots (Kupe, Verryn and Worby 2008); and 
Johannesburg innercity areas considered as places of crime and ruin (Simone 2004b) 
- Hillbrow being branded as a “den of iniquity” (Legget 2002). The grime associated 
with spaces inhabited by poor urban dwellers in Johannesburg has earned them labels 
of zones of hyper criminal activity. Urban security governance in South Africa 
therefore takes the form of “governance of poverty” (Procacci 1991). If not aimed at 
containing the poor in marginal urban spaces, such governance is aimed at alleviating 
pauperism through programmes for social development.  
Why are urban violence and crime such problems in South African cities? 
   
3.2.2. Violence, crime and fear: elusive search for causalities 
Some studies in South Africa labour to search for causalities of urban violence and 
crime. One conclusion reached by such studies is that violence is tied to struggles for 
access to economic resources. According to Cronje’s study, the redistributive failures 
of the South African economy, coupled with slow economic growth, are key causes 
of xenophobic violence (Cronje 2008). Frustrations with the lack of service delivery 
by government, with housing being one of the major challenges, is also cited as one 
of the major causes of xenophobic violence as African immigrants are the easiest 
                                                     
22 To watch video visit: http://www.news24.com/Multimedia/South-Africa/Mob-murder-in-
Diepsloot-20110916  - accessed on 2 April 2012. Be warned that the images are graphic and can be 
offensive to some people. 
23 Reconstruction and Development Programme (South African government policy) 
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scapegoat for housing related challenges (Cronje 2008). The material realities of 
suffering and perceived poor service delivery are blamed on African immigrants in 
South Africa and politicians play a key role in the (re)production of this discourse.  
Studies of urban violence in South Africa pick up sharpened social and spatial 
inequalities as some of the main causes of violence. The politics of access to urban 
social and physical space is amongst some of the drivers of crime and violence. 
Urban social and physical space in South Africa is muddled by fragmentation and 
polarity as reflected in high levels of wealth disparity, which are also configured in 
spatial disparities between rich and poor neighbourhoods (Bremner 2004b; Murray 
2011; Murray 2008a; Murray 2008b). Post-apartheid South Africa inherited this 
divided society; a society which is inherently crime-generating (Gordon 2006; Shaw 
2002).  
An understanding of the history of crime and violence gives insight into their 
contemporary forms and repertoires. Kynoch (2011; 2008) argues that 
Johannesburg’s socio-economic and political histories as a mining town and the 
obtaining racialised relations of production and social control have functioned to 
(re)produce violence and criminality. He notes: 
“The brutalising nature of the gold mining industry that employed the majority 
of Black workers, in concert with the incarceration of African men on a 
massive scale, established the foundations for a violent society in 
Johannesburg’s early decades. African mineworkers were exposed and 
participated in supervisory abuse, faction fights and gang activity” (Kynoch 
2011: 463). 
Founded in a context of legalised and racialised symbolic and physical violence of, on 
and by the bodies of Black mine workers, Johannesburg remains ensnared within a 
cycle of violence which has arguably incrementally taken the form of a “culture of 
violence”. The role of the mining compound and prison in generating a “culture of 
violence” is remarkable (Kynoch 2003; Kynoch 2008; Kynoch 2011).  
The apartheid history of disenfranchisement of a majority of the Black population 
also influences the form of contemporary violence (Kynoch 2003; Kynoch 2008; 
Kynoch 2005). Whereas the violence of apartheid South Africa was associated with 
the repression of anti-apartheid movements by government; contemporary violence 
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is associated with frustrations with unfulfilled post-apartheid promises, widening 
poverty, inequality and marginalisation of the poor who happen to be predominantly 
Black (von Holdt 2011). The South African National Planning Commission points 
out that one of the main challenges facing South Africa is that it is a “divided 
society” - referring to racial, class, ethnic and spatial divisions (NPC 2011).  
In their diagnostic report and national plan, South Africa’s National Planning 
Commission (NPC) singles out the challenge of youth unemployment (especially of 
Black youth) as a time bomb (NPC 2011). Relatedly, Richards (2010: [back cover of 
book]) argues: 
“Crime and growing unemployment remains the Achilles heel of the new 
South Africa. The apartheid government refused to fix it. The democratic 
government seems incapable of doing so. A miracle is desperately needed” 
(Richards 2010). 
The unemployment challenge in South Africa is linked to poor educational outcomes 
mainly undermining the employability and life chances of young people (NPC 2011). 
I argue that, whilst useful, the searches for explanatory causalities of violence and 
crime in South African cities sometimes miss the point. This is because it is 
scientifically difficult to correlate violence to neat causal factors with precision (see 
Chapter 2, subtitle 2.2.2). This literature on causalities is useful, but at best it remains 
quite speculative. What can be noted, with precision is that South Africa is one of the 
most unequal societies in the world24, and that with those inequalities come huge 
socio-economic and political problems; with violence, crime and fear being some of 
them.  
In the next section I review the strategies of producing safety in this context scripted 
by the signifiers “violence and crime”. 
         
                                                     
24 South Africa’s Gini Coefficient was at 0.67 in 2005 (NPC 2011: 8). Johannesburg currently ranks as 
one of the most unequal cities in the Africa and the world, with a Gini Coefficient of 0.75, alongside 
Cape Town with 0.67, and Lagos with 0.65 as documented in the UN Habitat Report (2012:69) – See 
UN-Habitat. 2012. "State of the world's cities 2012/2013: Prosperity of cities ". Nairobi: United 
Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). 
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3.2.3.  Regimes of safety governance: the descriptions and explanations 
Safety governance scholarship shows that the community policing model, which has 
been in circulation across the globe, is officially adopted and transplanted to the 
South African context (Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, 
Fourchard and Wafer 2012). Public policing has historically been regarded as a 
preserve of state authorities, but there has been an increasing global recognition of 
the importance of community (and private players) in policing (Baker 2002; Baker 
2004a; Baker 2004b; Baker 2004c; Baker 2005; Baker 2007; Benit-Gbaffou 2006). 
This is associated with the shift from “military policing”25 to “community policing”26 
(Benit-Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Bénit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 
2012).  
Community policing in South Africa involves creation of a partnership between the 
police service and communities (through representatives) (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; 
Bénit-Gbaffou 2006). The end of apartheid called for a reform (symbolic at least) of 
the South African Police Force (SAPF) to South Africa Police Service (SAPS); 
signifying abandonment of military policing and adoption of community policing 
(Benit-Gbaffou 2008b; Jensen 2008). The thrust of the apartheid police force was on 
policing government’s political opponents, including anti-apartheid activists (Brown 
1993; Woods 1993) and this had to be changed with the onset of post-apartheid 
“political dispensation”. The adoption of community policing in South Africa has 
therefore, in part, also aimed to redress historical injustices embedded in the policing 
system.  
It is in response to the need to restructure safety governance in South Africa that the 
government rolled out the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in 1996 to 
redress apartheid policing and security governance (van der Spuy 1990). Through the 
1995 Police Act, and reinforced in 1996 through the NCPS, the government 
statutorily institutionalised the establishment of Community-Police Forums (CPFs). 
Following the provision of NCPS, there was, in some instances, the establishment of 
                                                     
25
 Military policing is characterised by the use of force by police officers who deploy excessive force 
and reified as professionals capable of reducing crime on their own through their expertise (with little 
or no wilful cooperation of members of the community) 
26 Community policing is a policing system that is premised on the principle of community 
participation in providing policing solutions Anderson, Jessica. 2005. "Community policing - working 
together to prevent crime." in Engaging communities. Brisbane, 14 - 17 August 2005.. 
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Community Safety Forums (CSFs), with early experiments in the Eastern Cape and 
Western Cape provinces (Griggs 2003).  
In 1998 the government of South Africa unveiled a White Paper on Safety and 
Security (WPSS), which entrenched the need for promotion of social crime 
prevention in South Africa (Palmary 2001; WPSS 1998). According to the White 
Paper on Safety and Security: 
“Social crime prevention aims to reduce the social, economic and 
environmental factors conducive to particular types of crime”. (1998:12) 
In the same vein, social crime prevention is defined by the International Crime 
Prevention Commission (ICPC) as any initiative or activity that reduces crime, 
violence and insecurity by tackling identified causal factors (paraphrased) (Waller, 
Welsh and Sansfacon 1997)27. In some circles, social crime prevention is referred to 
as crime prevention through social development (UNODC 2010). Crime prevention 
through social development (CPTSD) involves a range of social, educational and 
health training programmes targeting groups that are vulnerable to fall into the trap 
of criminality (UNODC 2010: 9); thereby preventing crime in the long run. The 
South African government deliberately seek to promote social development and this 
is epitomised in the 1996 national constitution. The 1996 constitution, thus, places 
the responsibility for social development with local government (Ndlela 2008; 
Parnell, Swilling and van Donk 2008); yet local government neglects crime 
prevention (Louw et al. 1998), which should also be at the core of local social 
development initiatives.  
This is in a context where the South African government is under pressure for 
immediate delivery in terms of crime reduction and other development challenges 
considered to be urgent (Louw et al. 1998; Parnell and Pieterse 2010). Increased 
pressure derails the long term social crime prevention approach as it prompts the 
government to pump out resources for immediate solutions; including the re-
adoption of military policing practices. The focus on military policing entails a 
deployment of lesser resources towards addressing the major crime generating socio-
economic problems such as poverty and inequality, poor education and 
                                                     
27 Waller et al on behalf of ICPC. 
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unemployment amongst others (Samara 2011). Politicians specifically focus on 
getting immediate results because of pressure to win over the electorate and 
consolidate their political positions. Owing to these challenges, South Africa has 
been trapped in a cycle of a really never-easing crime and violence burden.   
At city levels, there have been efforts to deal with urban crime by rolling our 
programmes of urban renewal and regeneration. In Johannesburg examples of efforts 
at urban renewal include the Alexandra Renewal Project and continuous efforts to 
revamp the innercity neighbourhoods such as Joubert Park, Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville 
and Bellevue, amongst others. Inner city neighbourhoods have been targeted for 
creation of City Improvements Districts (CIDs)28 (Benit-Gbaffou 2008b). In Cape 
Town, under the auspices of neoliberal redevelopment, the CBD was redeveloped 
and renewed (Samara 2011). Urban renewal efforts, while improving the city 
environment and reducing crime, tend to drive out the poor due to increases in rent 
and create exclusive spaces occupied by the middle class in the renewed city - thereby 
creating another social challenge (Samara 2011). 
While the government at national, provincial, city and local levels has tried to adopt a 
variety of social and spatial initiatives for crime governance; there was also a turn 
towards attempts to promote moral regeneration as a crime management and 
prevention initiative. This is because high levels of crime and violence in South 
African society are attributed to deep-seated moral breakdown dating back to the 
apartheid era (Rauch 2005; Rauch 2011). Social entrepreneurs, including politicians, 
religious leaders and social commentators, came together in 1997 to find ways of 
addressing the breakdown of morality as a panacea to the violence and crime 
problems (Rauch 2005; Rauch 2011). This meeting culminated in the launch of the 
Moral Regeneration Movement in April 2002 (Rauch 2005; Rauch 2011). The output 
of this campaign is however difficult to evaluate given the elusive nature of issues of 
morality and their linkages with crime prevention. All that can be stated is that moral 
regeneration was ideally geared to improve social solidarity and social control; and 
reduce “anomie and normlessness” (Rauch 2005).  
                                                     
28 CIDs are city zones that are improved with the aim of (re)attracting business and creating liveable 
spaces (see Samara 2011) 
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In line with the multilateralisation of security provision, associated with neoliberal 
order (Loader 2000), South African cities have enrolled non-governmental players 
into crime prevention initiatives through metropolitan council safer cities 
programmes (Louw et al. 1998). In Johannesburg for example, the Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Safer Cities Programme was initiated in March 1997, 
with international support (Louw et al. 1998). It aimed to bring together local 
government, the police, non-government organisations and community groups in 
responding to crime and violence (Louw et al. 1998). While it was ideally desirable, 
the safer cities programme is criticised as “running the risk of being nothing more 
than window dressing” in practice (Ibid: 4). The programme, like other crime 
prevention programmes in Johannesburg and South Africa at large, suffered from a 
lack of crime information and accurate data (Ibid). Data from crime statistics 
recorded by SAPS have historically been questioned for accuracy as people’s 
experiences and perceptions tend not to tally with these statistics (Shaw 2002). 
Although their accuracy is limited, these crime statistics cannot be unilaterally 
dismissed.    
Given the continued failure of government at national, provincial and city levels to 
deliver the promise of creating safer cities, people devise atomised and collectivised 
responses to crime and insecurity. In this case, the poor have historically responded 
to crime and fear through various means including mob justice, vigilantism and 
community courts (Harris 2001; Schärf and Nina 2001). Wealthier citizens have 
embarked on road closures and gating of their neighbourhoods, employed private 
security and use of surveillance technologies, among other initiatives (Benit-Gbaffou 
2008b; Harrison and Mabin 2006; Landman 2004a; Landman 2008).  
Now I zoom into an understanding of safety issues and safety governance practices 
within the specific context of Johannesburg, against a background of the above 
discussion of the broader South African case.  
 
3.2.4. Johannesburg in safety governance studies 
Johannesburg is conceptualised as a city of contradictions; one epitomising the 
bifurcated nature of South African society and its ills (Mbembe 2004; Metileni 2011; 
Murray 2011; Nuttall and Mbembe 2007). There is a common perception that 
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Johannesburg is a violence, crime and fear ridden city (Dirsuweit 2002; Dirsuweit 
2007; Hook and Vrdoljak 2001) - one where the imminence of “terror” or 
“catastrophe” hovers (Bremner 2004a). The city therefore battles with labels such as 
“crime capital of the world” (Boisteau 2005; Schönteich 2000), “the most violent city 
in the world” (Louw et al. 1998) and “fearful city” (Dirsuweit 2002). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Johannesburg is considered as South Africa’s “test case for 
controlling and preventing urban crime”; one in which success would “boost the 
confidence of both the public and police in the attempt to reduce crime” (Louw et al. 
1998:4).  
The negative image of Johannesburg has driven the city administrators to consider 
crime as a development issue. In a policy document entitled Joburg 2030, the City of 
Johannesburg states: 
“First, one must accept the fact that the perception of Johannesburg citizens is 
that their city is not safe. Second, one must accept […] that a culture of 
violence and contempt for the law has been entrenched and […] crime has 
become a typical non-linear problem. This implies that a critical mass of 
interventions is the only method of substantially challenging the problem and 
that piecemeal approaches will only displace crime. Thirdly, one must 
understand that different groups in Johannesburg perceive and are victims of 
very different safety and security experiences” (CoJ 2000: 20) [sic]. 
This is a direct acknowledgement of the dire security situation and liveability 
challenges within the city. The aspirations of City of Johannesburg toward a “World 
Class City” status are seriously dented by the negative perception of the city as a city 
of crime, violence and all kinds of horror. While Johannesburg grapples with the 
challenge of violence, cities the world over are burdened by the same challenge 
(Mabin 1999);  albeit in varying degrees, proportions and forms.  
As observed by Shaw (2002:9), “crime has probably prevented some investors from 
bringing their money to the country (South Africa), although this may have much to 
do with a package of factors including labour market flexibility”. Shaw (2002:9) goes 
on to state that “crime has almost certainly prevented the growth of tourist trade to 
its fullest potential given the society’s reputation for violence”. Crime reduction is 
one of the policy priorities of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ 2000). The Joburg 2030 
document outlines:  
  33 
 
“In 2000, the World Bank published a report on international constraints to 
private sector business growth in 100 countries. None of the surveyed 
countries listed crime as a category of constraints to doing business. However, 
in a survey of 360 Johannesburg firms (2000), 70 per cent mentioned crime as 
a major obstacle to growth. Twenty five per cent said it was a moderate 
constraint and 5 per cent said it was no constraint at all. Sixty two per cent of 
all firms interviewed said that addressing crime is the biggest contribution the 
Johannesburg Council could make to growing the local economy. Thus South 
Africa appears to be unique in seeing crime as a negative determinant of 
business growth” (CoJ 2000: 20). 
The security and safety issue is therefore a big challenge for the image of the city, its 
prospects for economic growth and its “World Class City” aspirations. Attempts at 
effective crime governance at city level are therefore driven by economic logic; the 
desire to attract and retain foreign investment (Shaw 2002).   
The major “crime and violence problem areas” in Johannesburg are “high density 
and poor areas” such of the township and innercity (CoJ 2000: 20). The innercity 
presents a complex challenge of urban decay, street and commercial crime. It has 
seen capital flight and relocation to “relatively secure” shopping complexes and 
business security villages (Murray 2011). Beavon shows that the settlement of Blacks 
in the innercity starting during the apartheid era and intensifying in the post-
apartheid era resulted in the area being labelled as a “grey area” (Beavon 2001); 
signifying the official perception which problematised such settlement.29 Murray 
(2011: 148) describes the innercity of Johannesburg as an “outcast ghetto”; “a 
temporary sanctuary for refugees fleeing war and political repression, and for 
undocumented immigrants escaping famine, socio-economic deprivation, and 
oppression in their countries of origin”.   
The correlation of the “invasion” of the innercity by Black South Africans and 
African immigrants with “urban decay” is common in discourses about 
Johannesburg (Beavon 2004; Beavon 2001; Crankshaw and White 1995). It is 
obviously a problematic and potentially fragile discourse - a racially and ethnically 
driven one for that matter. What is of note here, however, is that over the years, 
innercity neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow, Berea, Betrams, Yeoville and Bellevue 
                                                     
29
 This perception shows the racial politics that characterise South Africa’s social fabric; a racial 
politics that problematises and at worst criminalises blackness; especially when it comes along with 
poverty. 
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have been rocked by rampant social ills including prostitution, drug dealing and 
violence - with Hillbrow being considered as one of the most notorious places 
(Legget 2002; Simone 2004b). Unless the city addresses the underlying causes of 
crime and violence in township and innercity spaces, the “World Class City” 
aspirations will remain “unlikely” as Mabin (2007) puts it. The innercity, which is the 
focus of this study, is therefore an important locus of attention for the City of 
Johannesburg’s image management or rebuilding drives.   
The neighbourhood of Yeoville is the social laboratory from which I write about 
Johannesburg and the world. I describe, in the section below, the crime and violence 
histories and trends as well as socio-economic conditions of Yeoville.  
 
3.2.5. Research site(s):  reading Johannesburg and the world from Yeoville 
The area loosely referred to as Yeoville in this thesis incorporates the 
neighbourhoods of Yeoville (proper), Bellevue and Bellevue East30. Yeoville is an 
innercity neighbourhood located peri-centrally to the eastern side of Johannesburg 
City Centre (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Map of Johannesburg showing case study area 
                                                     
30 Yeoville, Bellevue and Bellevue East geographically and politically constitute a single entity as they 
have a common economic hub in Rockey-Raleigh Street. Unless clearly indicated, this study shall refer 
to the area comprising Yeoville, Bellevue and Bellevue East as Yeoville as is the tradition. 
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It is a low-income neighbourhood characterised by a long history of community 
activism, local and international migrancy and a vibrant, and yet “problematic”31, 
micro-economy of street trade (Benit-Gbaffou 2006; Harrison 2002). Observatory, 
which is a middle income area adjacent to Yeoville, is part of this study given that it 
falls in the same policing zone as Yeoville; being served by the Yeoville Police Station 
and by the Yeoville Community Policing Forum (see Figure 5). Although not the 
primary thrust of my study, I find fruitful a reflective relational analysis of the politics 
of community safety initiatives in an inner-city area (Yeoville) and a middle income 
suburb (Observatory). For a view of the study area, see Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Map of Yeoville and surrounding areas: study area shaded in dark grey 
Yeoville was selected because it typifies the ethno-national diversity, “socio-spatial 
deprivation” and socio-economic “fractality” characterising socio-spatial cityscapes 
of Johannesburg. What is so particular about violence, crime, fear and socio-spatial 
organisation in Yeoville? 
       
                                                     
31
 “Problematic” in that the city tries to stop street trade in Yeoville, generating tension with the 
traders. Street trade is also considered in many circles as criminogenic and contradicting the 
designated use of public space. 
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3.2.6. Yeoville’s socio-economic, crime, violence and fear histories 
Yeoville is a suburb whose history coincides with the early history of the founding of 
Johannesburg and is only 4 years younger than Johannesburg (YBCDT undated). 
“Yeoville was proclaimed a suburb in 1890 by Yeo Sherwell who came from Yeovil 
in the United Kingdom” (Ibid: unpaged). According to the YBCDT: 
“The area was advertised as a 'sanitarium for the rich' in which the air was 
purer because it was up on a ridge overlooking the dirty, smoke-filled mining 
town that had sprung from nothing out of the (then) Transvaal bushveld. 
However, the rich did not buy into the suburb. Instead it became a multiclass 
area, one to which many poorer people living below the ridge in Doornfontein 
aspired. It was also a place which attracted many of the waves of migrants 
from abroad that came to South Africa seeking a new life” (YBCDT undated).  
Being an apartheid suburb, Yeoville was created to accommodate a mainly white, 
middle class population (Ibid). In the 1970s, Yeoville became a mainly Jewish suburb 
and an epitome of Jewish culture. At that particular time, Yeoville was designated as 
a “white only” area (Ibid). Over the years, Yeoville metamorphosed into a 
cosmopolitan suburb where racial mixing became acceptable despite apartheid (Ibid). 
In the 1980s Yeoville is shown to have shifted into a cosmopolitan suburb where 
Blacks and whites co-resided; and it has largely retained this cosmopolitan urbanism 
as it hosts a largely migrant population from different parts of Africa and South 
Africa. Yeoville’s population shifted from being 85% White in 1990 into being 90% 
Black by 1998 (Ibid). 
Also, Yeoville is a suburb with a long history of activism against apartheid and the 
activist culture has been carried over to the post-apartheid era (Benit-Gbaffou 2006). 
Benit-Gbaffou (2006:303) observes that Yeoville is known to have quite a “vocal and 
energetic” Community Policing Forum because of the long history of political 
activism in the area.      
Accentuating the representation of Yeoville as a lively neighbourhood is its history of 
conviviality. Yeoville has lively public spaces and elaborate drinking cultures; being 
host to many taverns and night clubs. Although now tainted by an element of 
criminality, the streets and public spaces of Yeoville remain spaces of conviviality and 
public connectivity; judging from the crowds that throng Rockey-Raleigh Street 
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everyday (my observation). The YBCDT (undated) describes the emerging convivial 
culture in Yeoville in the early 1990s as follows: 
“The establishment of a small, discreet club by a well-known music producer 
called Patric van Blerk resulted in the main business street through the two 
suburbs, named Raleigh St in Yeoville and Rockey St in Bellevue, becoming 
the bohemian cultural centre of South Africa, with a number of night spots 
and restaurants moving from nearby Hillbrow, till then the night-time 
entertainment Mecca of Johannesburg. Within two years, the high street was 
transformed from a quiet community street serving the local residents to an 
internationally-known cultural centre with restaurants, jazz bars, bookshops, 
arts and crafts outlets, trendy clothing outlets and record shops. On the down 
side, drug dealers and a criminal element also moved into the area, taking 
advantage of the opportunities arising out of the almost 24 hour buzz of 
activity in the street”.  
The history of fear of violence and crime in Yeoville is sometimes co-related to white 
flight in the 1990 and the concomitant occupation of the neighbourhood by a largely 
Black population (cf. Beavon 2004). White flight and associated fears of violence 
were justified on events that took place during the 1990-1994 period of political 
transition from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa (YBCDT undated). This 
period marked changing perceptions of Yeoville from one of a safe haven to one of a 
troubled space. The YBCDT notes: 
“The death knell for that period was, ironically, the death of a Black Jamaican. 
Ridley Wright had married a South African exile and returned with her after 
1990. He was owner of Crackers Deli, a popular cafe, and head of the Yeoville 
Trader's Association. In an altercation in which he attempted to protect a street 
corner drug dealer's wife from being abused by the drug dealer, he was fatally 
stabbed. It was downhill from there and by 2000, all of the shops and 
restaurants that gained fame in the 1980s were gone or transformed 
unrecognisably” (YBCDT undated). 
Perceptions of Yeoville as a violent and crime ridden area have resulted 
neighbourhood disinvestment and urban decay (Ibid). Increasingly, Yeoville, 
alongside other Johannesburg innercity areas like Hillbrow, Berea, Joubert Park and 
Betrams, has come to resemble what Murray (2011) describes as an outcast ghetto.   
Crime statistics of Yeoville reflect the neighbourhood as inundated with violent 
crime. Table 1 shows the crime and violence situation in Yeoville by analysing 
statistics for murder, attempted murder, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm (GBH) and common assault.  
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Table 1: Yeoville crime statistics 
Selected crime Average number of victims per 
annum from April 2003 – March 
2011 
Number of victims from April 
2010 – March 2011 
Murder 20 21 
Attempted Murder 35 16 
Assault with intent to 
cause grievous bodily 
harm (GBH) 
555 596 
Common assault 497 477 
 
These crime incidences are quite high, given that they took place in an area of 10 km2 
with an estimated population of 40 000 people as of 2011.    
The image of post-apartheid Yeoville is connected to the general image of 
Johannesburg, Gauteng and more generally, South Africa as places suffused by 
crime, violence and fear. The April 2010 to March 2011 security situation in Yeoville 
in relation to the situation in the Gauteng province sheds more light on the extent of 
violence (Table 2).  
Table 2: Yeoville crime statistics versus Gauteng province crime statistics 
Selected crime Yeoville’s contribution to Gauteng province total 
(percentage) 
Murder 0.4% 
Assault with attempt to cause grievous 
bodily harm (GBH) 
1.3% 
Common assault 0.9% 
 
As a neighbourhood, Yeoville is arguably disproportionately visible in statistics on 
contact crime in the Gauteng province. For the size of its area and population, 
Yeoville arguably contributes a lot towards violence and crime in Gauteng. While 
Yeoville is only 10km2, Gauteng province is 18 179 km2.32 While Yeoville has an 
estimated population of 40 000, Gauteng province has a population estimated at 
11 191 700 by Stats SA in 2010. Yeoville therefore contains a population of about 
0.4% of the population of Gauteng.33 The statistical significance of the situation of 
violent crime in Yeoville is not only for the Gauteng province, but for South Africa, 
given that Gauteng has the biggest provincial population in South Africa, 
                                                     
32
 See Recent GCRO report - Everrat, David, Graeme Gotz, Annsilla Nyar, Sizwe Phakathi, and Chris 
Wray. 2011. "Gauteng City Region Observatory: The city-region review 2011." edited by Maryn Storie: 
City of Johannesburg; University of Johannesburg; University of the Witwatersrand.  
33 See GCRO report - ibid. 
Analysed from SAPS crime statistics 
Analysed from SAPS crime statistics 
  39 
 
contributing 22.4% to the national population.34 These statistics qualify Yeoville as a 
crime and violence ridden area. Given this, it is urgent to examine community 
responses to fear of crime and violence in the neighbourhood.  
 
3.3. What do we not know? 
As hinted in Chapter 2 and detailed in this chapter; contemporary South African 
literature successfully examines trends in urban violence, crime and fear, attempts an 
exploration of causalities and describes variants of safety governance initiatives. What 
this literature misses, or marginally addresses is: i) the link between community safety 
governance and community politics; ii) the role of local ethno-nationalist politics in 
community safety governance; and iii) the discursive and practical territorial or spatial 
politics of community security governance.   
I build into few recent attempts to examine the role of party politics and leadership 
politics in community security initiatives in urban South African contexts (Benit-
Gbaffou, Didier and Peyroux 2012; Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer 2012; 
Fourchard 2011; Fourchard 2012). These recent attempts crave for an approach that 
goes beyond party and leadership politics; to explore organisational, institutional, 
individual and ethno-national regionalist micro-politics concomitant with community 
safety governance.  
On ethno-nationalist politics of community security governance, contemporary 
South African studies have mainly shown the entrenchment of xenophobic 
sentiments and their expressions in “anti-foreigner” violence (Misago 2009; Misago 
2011; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009). Yet, what has been missed is how ethno-
nationalist sentiments, discourses and practices manifest in the organisational, 
institutional, individualist politics of community safety governance. And, through a 
case study of Yeoville, which is a multinational neighbourhood, I show how this 
politics is entrenched (Chapter 7).  
The micro-level territorial or spatial discourses, practices and strategies associated 
with community safety governance and their link to organisational, institutional, 
individualist and ethno-nationalist politics also deserve academic attention. In a quest 
                                                     
34 See GCRO report - ibid. 
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to explain the micro-politics of community safety governance, I develop my thoughts 
by conversing with Bourdieu’s social thought, amongst other thoughts (Chapter 4).   
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4. Chapter Four 
Understanding socio-spatial politics of urban community safety 
governance 
 
“Bourdieu is primarily a theorist of order and its production. We confront this Bourdieu with 
the argumentative, unruly and violence-laden social realities of South Africa – with, precisely 
the Johannesburg moment” (von Holdt 2012b: 5). 
“…Bourdieu’s concerns with symbolic domination seemed far removed from the South 
African situation where physical violence seemed far more salient – something about which 
Bourdieu has little to say beyond some of his early writings in Algeria. My original intention 
was to try and show the significance of Bourdieu to the new South Africa …” (Burawoy 2012: 
x). 
 
4.1. Introduction        
This chapter discusses my search for “thinking tools” to understand the socio-spatial 
politics of urban community safety governance. I propose to apply and test 
Bourdieusian thinking tools; setting a stage for the development of novel thoughts. 
I briefly review theoretical ancestry to community safety governance thought, from 
the Chicago School to place-based theories. I then introduce Bourdieusian thinking 
tools; defining them and highlighting their utility in my quest to unpack the micro-
politics of community safety governance. I move on to explain why it is important to 
think community safety governance “with”, “against” and “beyond” Bourdieu 
(Brubaker 1985; King 2000). Briefly, I show the status of Bourdieusian thought in 
South Africa, setting up a snapshot conversation with Burawoy and von Holdt 
(Burawoy and von Holdt 2012).  
This chapter elaborates on the utility of Bourdieusian and other thinking tools in the 
understanding of socio-spatial micro-political dynamics in the community safety 
governance field. My argument starts from the premise that fear of crime and 
violence, amongst other urban disorders, is institutionalised and instrumentalised in 
community organisation and other safety producing collective or individual practices 
(strategies and tactics) - ushering an arena for a concurrently socially divisive and 
unifying micro-politics.  
My view is that this micro-politics takes the form of stakeholder, ethno-national and 
territorial politics, among other manifestations. I show how Bourdieusian and other 
“thinking tools” fare in light of the argument that the community safety governance 
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field is; i) one of stakeholder (organisational, social group and individual) 
contestations and coalitions; ii) an arena of ethno-national regionalist politics; iii) 
abound with discursive and practical territorialist politics (see Figure 1). In my 
discussion, I tweak in a myriad of Bourdieusian thinking tools including field, habitus, 
practice, symbolic violence, social space; inviting other thinkers to this thinking enterprise. 
By necessity, my theoretical approach strives to be interdisciplinary, although 
drawing mainly on urban thought in the sociological, geographical, urban planning 
and criminological sense.   
I inductively deploy “open concepts”35 (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) by putting 
them to work empirically. My position is anchored in Bourdieu’s view that “concepts 
have no definition other than systemic ones, and are designed to be put to work 
empirically in systemic fashion” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96).  
I start my search for “thinking tools” to understand the socio-spatial politics of 
community safety governance by i) briefly reviewing theoretical ancestry to urban 
safety governance studies; ii) and positioning Bourdieusian thought therefrom.   
 
4.2. From social disorganisation to place-based theories to Bourdieu  
Theories of social disorganisation, commonly known as the “Chicago School” are some 
of the early attempts to understand urban crime and deviance. This, of course, came 
after early sociological attempts by Durkheim, Merton and others to analyse urban 
social challenges - using concepts such as “normlessness” and “anomie” (Hilbert 
1989). Using the City of Chicago as a research laboratory, Sociologists such as 
William Foot Whyte (Whyte 1943) observed that levels of social disorganisation are 
diametrically linked to crime modes and frequencies. In this regard, those unstable 
areas with a poor sense of community (of collective efficacy) are regarded as more 
prone to crime than those in which the inhabitants have a sense of community 
(Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997).  
                                                     
35 My use of “open concepts” is a way of rejecting deterministic reasoning and over-positivism in 
which empirical reality is made subservient to theoretical constructs (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
Rather, theoretical constructs are to be deployed as just “thinking tools” to be put to be put through 
the empirical grinder. 
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Another stream of thought has generally been place-based - rooted in the idea of 
defensible space36. This scholarship borrows significantly from Jane Jacobs’ classical 
work - The Life and Death of Great American Cities (Jacobs 1989). In this work, Jacobs 
explores the importance of having many eyes on the streets in the creation of safe 
cities or neighbourhoods in which vulnerability to crime is minimal.  
Connected to the concept of defensible space is the notion of crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED). CPTED proposes that it is important to design the 
physical environment to prevent crime. Related to CPTED is the concept of 
situational crime prevention, which focuses on reduction of the rationale for criminal 
acts deploying the environment in ways that  make it these acts riskier (Gronlund 
2000). In a similar vein, broken windows theory is premised on the view that the 
generalised degeneration of the physical environment creates an environment that 
favours the flourishing of civil incivilities, including more serious crimes, illegalities 
and violence (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Wilson 2000). Environmental rehabilitation, 
referred to as “fixing broken windows” (Crawford 2006a), is considered essential for 
successful crime prevention.      
While I appreciate place-based and social disorganisation theories, I am concerned 
about harmonising and edifying social and spatial elements within these respective 
ways of thinking - a pursuit I attempt through the notion of socio-spatial politics. The 
spatial determinism of place-based theories and the sociologism of the social 
disorganisation theories obstruct them from appreciating the indivisibility of the 
spatial from the social and vice versa (Simmel 1997). Social relations (including fear of 
violence and criminal others) can author the configuration of place, while place has 
the propensity to contain, anchor and channel social relations. In my approach, I 
resist falling into the trap of over-spatialism and over-sociologism; hence I compact the two 
ways of thinking through the concept of socio-spatial politics.  
Mike Davis attempts to bridge the artificial binary between the social and spatial in his 
analysis of crime in Los Angeles. He used  Burgess’ concentric zone model to map 
out crime in the city of Los Angeles; coming up with the concept of “ecology of 
fear” (Davis 1998; Tonkiss 2005). In this mapping, Davis depicted a “spatial 
                                                     
36 The concept of defensible space is based on the view that space, in the physical sense, should allow 
for natural surveillance to prevent crime (Newman 1972). 
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economy of no-go-areas, highly administered and policed spaces, edge cities and the 
fortified zones of gated neighbourhoods and ex-urban gulags” (Tonkiss 2005: 36). 
Davis’ analysis entrenches the idea that urban problems of crime, violence and fear 
have spatial configurations and manifestations.  
From here I move on to introduce Bourdieu’s thinking tools, hinting on their 
potential significance to urban safety governance studies.  
 
4.3. Preamble: sifting through Bourdieu’s theoretical toolbox 
In thinking about the micro-politics of community safety governance, key 
Bourdieusian thinking tools I can immediately pick are those of field, capital, practice, 
habitus and symbolic violence. A field, according to Bourdieu, is a system of “social 
positions” and a “social arena of struggles” in which agents, institutions or 
stakeholders compete over the “appropriation” of “certain species of capital” 
(Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1990). The suppleness of the concept of 
field calls for flexibility in defining and conceptualising it, as it “does not provide 
ready answers but has to be rethought anew every time” when one puts it to work 
empirically (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 109). In this regard, it is not just an 
abstract concept (Benson 1999).  
As an entry point to my analysis I conceptualise community security governance as a 
field containing various sought-after capitals, for which various stakeholders 
strategically position themselves. Capital is what is taken to be significant or what is at 
stake within any particular field (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986). Species of capital at 
stake in the community safety governance field include political, symbolic, social, economic, 
cultural, moral and spatial capitals (Bourdieu 1986; Casey 2005; Lars 2008) [see 
definitions of these forms of capital in Appendix A]. These forms of capital are 
mutually convertible and cannot be treated as isolated from each other (Bourdieu 
1986).  
Struggles for acquirement of various capitals in the field are influenced by the habitus 
of competing, coalescing and struggling stakeholders. Habitus according to Bourdieu 
is a concept that describes mental dispositions of people - a kind of cognitive map 
that informs behaviour. Bourdieu states: 
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“The habitus, the durably installed generative principle or regulated 
improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities 
immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative 
principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in 
the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up 
the habitus” (Bourdieu 1977: 28). 
Bourdieu argues that there is a dialectical relationship between habitus and field, and 
it is the interface of the field and habitus that produces practice (Bourdieu 1990). The 
habitus is a structured structure; that is a product of the field; and it is also a structuring 
structure, meaning that it configures the field (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1990). The 
habitus, like the field, is lithe and transposable (Bourdieu 1990). The concept of 
habitus helps to explain stakeholder practices and strategies in the community safety 
governance field. 
Practices are actions, behaviours or attitudes of agents which are repeated over time to 
the extent that they become habitualised (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 1990; 
Burger and Luckmann 1966). Often, practices take the form of strategies and tactics 
through which stakeholders navigate their spatial and social environment (Bourdieu 
1990; de Certeau 1984) - in this case navigating and responding to fear of crime and 
violence. Practices (strategies and tactics) of stakeholders in the community safety 
governance field can be simultaneously socio-politically contentious and unifying. I 
propose that they may take the form of symbolic violence committed by organisational, 
institutional, social groups and individual agents with, on and against one another. 
Symbolic violence, according to Bourdieu “is the process whereby in all societies, order 
and social restraint are produced by indirect, cultural mechanisms rather than by 
direct, coercive social control” (Jenkins 1992: 104). This definition is rather 
conventional, and I use it to also describe and explain symbolic dimensions of 
organisational, institutional, individual and social group relations in the course of 
competition and coalition in the community safety governance field. “Like many of 
Bourdieu’s ideas, the notions of symbolic power and symbolic violence are rather flexible 
notions which were worked out in specific research contexts, and hence they are best 
explained by reference to his more concrete anthropological and sociological studies” 
(Thompson 1991: 23).  
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I argue that contestations and coalitions within the community safety governance 
field are influenced by unwritten (and sometimes written) rules, constituting what 
could be described as doxa. Doxa refers to aspects of social existence that are taken 
for granted or generally viewed as self-evident (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1984). It is 
doxa which enables habitualisation (and is also a product of it) and makes social 
reproduction possible (Throop and Murphy 2002). 
Why appropriate and apply Bourdieu’s thinking tools in trying to understand the 
socio-spatial politics of urban community security governance in South Africa? 
 
4.4. Why Bourdieu? 
One of my biggest motivation in applying Bourdieu’s thinking tools is that his 
thought is scarcely deployed in urban studies and urban safety governance studies; 
not only in South Africa, but globally. Bourdieu, although generally considered a 
French and Western theorist, is not foreign to Africa. His key thinking tools of 
practice and habitus were born out of research in Africa; in Kabylia, Algeria (Grenfell 
2006). My endeavour to converse with Bourdieu, about an African city, should 
therefore not really be considered awkward or as simply falling into the trap of 
Westocentrism; as is the charge with most western theories imported to South Africa 
and Africa in general. One, however, should note that the conditions in colonial 
Algeria cannot be considered as akin to the social conditions in post-apartheid South 
African cities. Let it be noted that the idea is to critically test and edify Bourdieusian 
thinking tools in the context of a South African city that is bedevilled by anxieties 
about safety; rather than to impose these thinking tools on South African realities in 
a suffocative manner.  
Besides, urban studies have not contended adequately with Bourdieusian thought; 
hence, it is profitable to posthumously bring Bourdieu to urban studies in South 
Africa and hopefully into the world through my own understanding of him. Mike 
Savage rightly characterises the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu as “the lost urban 
sociology” (Savage 2012). Amongst the few scholars who have tried to invigorate the 
urban sociology in Bourdieu’s work, is Loic Wacquant in his studies of urban 
challenges in the USA, France and Brazil (Wacquant 1998; Wacquant 2008b; 
Wacquant 2008c; Wacquant 2008d; Wacquant 2009). Yet more can be done to 
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engage Bourdieu’s sociology in urban studies. The theoretical tools developed by 
Bourdieu can be useful for understanding our cities; and in this particular case, South 
African cities.   
Bourdieu’s concept of field is particularly relevant to an analysis of modern and 
differentiated societies which are configured around “semi-autonomous fields” 
(Burawoy and von Holdt 2012; Thompson 1991). Which societies are more modern 
and differentiated than urban ones? Which city in Africa and South Africa is more 
modern and differentiated than Johannesburg? Since Bourdieu’s conversation with 
place (in the spatial sense) is considered inadequate, will it not be a worthwhile 
endeavour to spatialise his “thinking tools”?  
Bourdieu was concerned with unpacking the reproduction of social order and 
domination (Bourdieu 1991a). Why not put him to use in understanding the 
contradictions, fractalities and utilities of institutions or instruments of social order? 
Surely, one would wonder how Bourdieu’s thinking tools of habitus, field, and capital; 
and associated concepts of practice; symbolic violence or symbolic domination, amongst 
others, would fare in the context of Johannesburg, South Africa.  
As an initiation of my attempts to converse with and utilise Bourdieu’s thinking 
tools, I highlight the positioning of Bourdieu’s thoughts in the South African context 
in section below.  
 
4.5. Bourdieu in South Africa: thinking with and against Burawoy and von 
Holdt 
Bourdieusian thinking tools are new to community safety governance studies, and 
relatively but not entirely new to the South African context (Sitas 2012). The first 
fairly extensive official attempt to think South Africa through a conversation with 
Bourdieu was done by Michael Burawoy and Karl von Holdt (Burawoy and von 
Holdt 2012). Whereas Burawoy and von Holdt usefully interpret Bourdieu as a 
theorist of order and question his applicability to the South African situation that 
they describe as characterised by “unruly and violence-laden social realities”37 
(Burawoy and von Holdt 2012; von Holdt 2012a; von Holdt 2012b; von Holdt 
                                                     
37 See von Holdt (2012b:5) 
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2012c; von Holdt 2012d; von Holdt 2012e), I find his thinking tools applicable in 
explaining how the institutions of social order in South Africa work and in 
unravelling the contradictions in and logics of operation of these institutions. I also 
find the interpretation of South African societies as characterised by “unruly and 
violence laden social realities” as providing an “alarmist” version of South African 
societies, as there are considerable levels of social order. If anything, the unruly-ness 
and violence laden-ness of South African societies can be conceptualised as episodic; 
albeit with a higher frequency in comparison to other societies across the world. In 
the South African context, as elsewhere, understanding the production of violence 
and disorder is as important as understanding the production of social order. 
While Bourdieusian thought may have limitations in the analysis of the broader 
South African social conditions characterised by violence and crime, its focus on the 
reproduction of order  is useful in enabling an understanding of the functionality of 
agents of social control. This study is both an answer to Burawoy and von Holdt’s 
questions regarding the applicability of Bourdieu in South Africa, and an attempt to 
show how the struggle to generate social order is as fragmented and contradictory as 
South African society itself.  
How applicable are Bourdieu’s concepts in understanding the socio-spatial dynamics 
of community safety governance? Although some of Bourdieu’s concepts were 
developed in the French context and some in the Algerian context, Bourdieu had a 
dream of universalising these concepts elsewhere. He notes: 
“Situations where I have attempted to show foreign publics the universal 
validity of models constructed in relation to the specific case of France have 
perhaps allowed me to address, in these lectures, what I believe to be the most 
essential in my work, that is, its most elementary and fundamental 
characteristics, which, no doubt through my own fault, often escape even the 
most well-intentioned readers and commentators” (Bourdieu 1998a: vii). 
In many ways, this thesis advances and questions this Bourdieusian project, testing 
Bourdieu’s concepts in contexts outside France or Algeria. 
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4.6. Understanding community safety governance by reading Bourdieu 
and others 
In the following section I seek ways of thinking the socio-spatial micro-politics of 
community safety governance “with”, “against” and “beyond” Bourdieu (Brubaker 
1985). I find it profitable to converse with Bourdieu, given his commitment to the 
use of “open concepts” and his rejection of inflexible theoreticism (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992; Jenkins 1992).  
A critical theoretical move that I take in deploying Bourdieusian thinking tools is to 
conceptualise community security governance as a field. Figure 6 shows my thoughts 
about stakes and dynamics in the community security governance field.  
 
Figure 6: Thinking the community security governance field 
Partly deriving from thoughts displayed in Figure 6, I make a series of hypothetical 
propositions about the micro-politics of community safety governance. I start by 
analysing how fear of violence and crime (and other urban disorders) materialise into 
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community organisation, contentious social group relations (ethnopolitics) and 
territorialism - generating a space for urban micro-politics.  
 
4.6.1. Institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of fear: consequences  
Can Bourdieu’s thinking tools explain the institutionalisation and instrumentalisation 
(Burger and Luckmann 1966) of fear in the city? Figure 7 suggests that fear of crime 
and violence (and responses thereto) is institutionalised or instrumentalised in the 
form of community organisations, everyday practices or rituals (spatial or social), 
ethno-national regionalist politics and territorialist or territorialised practices and 
discourses. Instrumentalisation of fear and responses to violence and crime has to do 
with how these are concretised or habitualised into observable material reality; taking 
the form of institutions, organisations and everyday practices. Burger and Luckmann 
(1966: 70-71) argue: 
“All human activity is subject to habitualisation. Any action that is repeated 
frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an 
economy of effort and which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as that 
pattern. Habitualisation further implies that the action in question may be 
performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same 
economical effort. This is true of non-social as well as of social activity” 
(Burger and Luckmann 1966). 
Showing the connection between habitualisation and institutionalisation, Burger and 
Luckmann (1966: 72) further argue: 
“Institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of 
habitualised actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is 
an institution. What must be stressed are the reciprocity of institutional 
typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but also the actors in 
institutions. The typifications of habitualised actions that constitute institutions 
are always shared ones. They are available to all members of the particular 
social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors as 
well as individual actions” (Burger and Luckmann 1966). 
The argument that I make (as represented in Figure 7) is that fear, among other 
urban socio-economic challenges, is institutionalised and instrumentalised in the 
form of community organisations and institutions (government and non-
government) and galvanises and polarises social groups. I argue that the 
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institutionalisation of fear ushers an environment conducive for a simultaneously 
progressive and retrogressive micro-politics (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Institutionalisation of fear and associated micro-politics 
Collective and individual practices that are evoked by fear (of violence and crime) 
take a particular pattern, including organising, and in many other cases collective 
action such as road closures, gating neighbourhoods and vigilante justice amongst 
others. Due to their typification, fear and violence can be conceptualised as social 
institutions in their own right (Burger and Luckmann 1966). Following Figure 7, I 
find it profitable to think of the city as a social and territorial field of fear because 
perceptions of risk, fear and danger are so common in the city; with the nights being 
dreaded more (Body-Gendrot 2012; Tudor 2003).  
The institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of fear in cities justifies the 
description of the city as a fearopolis and securopolis. I formulate the concept of fearopolis 
to describe the city as a space of fear. Adaptation to life in a fearopolis is constituted by 
attempts at governing and minimising risk and danger. I coin the concept of 
securopolis to capture the city as a securitised and increasingly securitising space; a space 
where citizens and residents are obsessed with aversion of danger and risk. The 
securitisation of the city of Johannesburg takes place in a context where residents’ 
lives are ordered around perceptions of the imminency of danger, violence and 
crime. Johannesburg dualises as a fearopolis and a securopolis in that it is a “fearful city”38 
and a “secure city” at once. The concept of fearopolis depicts fear as a ubiquitous 
                                                     
38
 See Dirsuweit, Teresa. 2002. "Johannesburg: A fearful City?" Urban Forum 13(3):4 - 19. 
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collective/individual social and spatial practices, strategies and tactics 
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emotion in the urban landscape, while that of securopolis describes the increased 
securitisation of cities and of the minds (habitus) and practices of urbanites as a 
response to fear of imagined or real violence and crime.  
Life in a fearopolis or securopolis is characterised by a fear-ridden public habitus and a 
consciousness about security - what I refer to as habitus of fear or securitised habitus 
respectively. My account of adaptation to life in a fearopolis or securopolis is not rooted 
in an Afro-pessimistic tradition. I seek to avoid unnecessarily projecting 
Johannesburg, as a space of chaos, savagery, anachronism and catastrophe - as is the 
tradition in many studies of African cities (Davis 2006; Mbembe and Nuttall 2004; 
Mbembe and Nuttall 2008; Oldfield, Parnell and Mabin 2004; Pieterse 2008). Rather, 
I show that urban Africans have their ways, problematic as they can be, around fear 
of crime and violence - as much as they flexibly adjust to many other exigencies of 
urban life (Simone 2005; Simone 2008).  
Johannesburg has been described as “fearful city” (Dirsuweit 2002), “city of 
fragments” (Murray 2008a), and “city of ruins” (Simone 2004a). In all these 
representations, Johannesburg, like many other cities of the South, is depicted as an 
apocalyptic city - a city of catastrophe and disaster where citizens and residents live in 
fear (Myers and Murray 2007; Pieterse 2008). However, Johannesburg is  also 
projected as a city of opportunity, a city full of prospects for a good life given its 
promising economic base and relatively better economic opportunities within South 
Africa and the African continent (Mabin 2007; Mbembe 2004; Todes 2011).   
The main weight of conceptualising Johannesburg as a fearolopolis is in that fear tends 
to be a key element that defines its history (Kynoch 2011),  influences the form, 
content and organisation of everyday life (Dirsuweit 2002; Dirsuweit 2007; Dirsuweit 
and Wafer 2006), and is inscribed into its built environment (Landman 2004a; 
Landman 2008; Landman 2009; Landman and Liebermann 2005). This is, of course, 
not unique to Johannesburg as similar observations are made in Los Angeles (Davis 
1992; Davis 1998), Sao Paulo (Caldeira 2000), California (Blakely and Snyder 1997), 
London (Atkinson and Flint 2004) and many other cities. Fear is therefore 
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habitualised, institutionalised and instrumentalised – becoming what I refer to as a 
liquid institution (following Baumanian reasoning39).  
My main interest is in analysing the socially contentious-unifying stakeholder, ethno-
national regionalist and discursive or practical territorial politics associated with the 
institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of fear of violence and crime. I unpack 
my argument through a conversation with Bourdieu, myself and other thinkers. I 
start off by conceptualising the argument that community safety governance is a field 
of stakeholder (organisational, individual or social group) contestations and coalitions 
for acquirement of various forms of capital - a field of power and micro-politics. 
  
4.6.2. Field of power: stakeholder politics in community safety governance 
I make two arguments here. The first argument is that community safety governance 
is a field of power (De Nooy 2003) or, specifically, of micro-politics. Stakeholders 
(organisations, institutions, social groups and individuals) in the field of community 
security governance compete and coalesce for notability (recognition, honour and 
prestige), economic resources, power, local knowledgeability, local and translocal 
support amongst other profits or capitals to be found in or brought to the 
community safety governance field. In essence, I view the field of community safety 
production as an arena of contestation and coalition for political, social, economic, 
cultural, and moral; amongst other capitals deemed important (see Appendix A). 
However, “action is not always an outcome of conscious calculation” or profit 
seeking (Thompson 1991: 16). 
Bourdieu argues that the field is “the locus of relations of force – and not only of 
meaning - and of struggles aimed at transforming it, and therefore of endless change” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 103). The community safety governance field can 
therefore be conceptualised as a battlefield for access to various kinds of capital or 
profits and as a space for agents’ positioning for various types of interest and stakes.  
The field of community safety production, while it is to be conceptualised as a field 
in its own right, is positioned in relationships (of power - competition and 
complementarity) with other fields. Importantly, Bourdieu conceptualises society as 
                                                     
39 See Bauman, Zygmunt. 2006. Liquid fear. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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differentiated into a number of semi-autonomous fields (Benson 1999). He uses the 
concept of homology to denote and analyse connections and similarities between 
different fields (Bourdieu 1991a; Thompson 1991). He conceives society as “made 
up of relatively autonomous but homologous fields: interrelated social systems with 
competition for accumulation and monopolisation of field-specific forms of 
symbolic capital” (Stokke and Selboe 2009: 62). In this case, Bourdieu emphasises the 
homology between fields, arguing that there is a broad correspondence between 
power constellations and practices in different fields (Ibid: 63). For instance, there 
are general “homologies” across fields where those who are in dominant positions in 
one field also dominate other fields (Ibid: 63). The boundaries between various fields 
interlace, such that the community security governance field intersects with the 
political, economic, juridical, religious and other fields; and struggles and capitals 
have potential to circulate between fields.  
I conceive the community safety field as intrinsically linked to the political field, or as a 
subfield of the political field. If one is sensitive to geographical or sociological scale 
they can, for example, refer to the concept of community security field when describing 
dynamics related to peace and stability within a neighbourhood and to security field 
when describing higher levels of security governance or when being deliberately 
oblivious of scale.  
Analysing the form of struggles in the community safety governance field, I argue 
that as stakeholders therein compete and coalesce for the various kinds of capitals, 
interests or stakes, they engage in multiple economic, social, political, cultural, moral 
and spatial practices. The field of community safety governance can on its own be 
viewed as a miniature of political, social and moral economies (Arnold 2001; 
Bouchard, Ferraton and Michau 2006; Sayer 2000). It is therefore an arena for the 
economy of practices (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992); a space for a 
constellation and juxtaposition of interests and stakes. Relatedly, Warde (2004: 12) 
expresses that “the field operates like a game”, wherein agents adopt strategies (and 
tactics) in competition for status. These strategies and tactics include the exercise of 
symbolic violence by competing and coalescing stakeholders.  
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Central to the idea of practice is the notion of strategising. The concept of strategising 
encompasses the assumption that actors have “goals” and “interests”. The idea of 
strategy in Bourdieu’s view is designated to locate the source of actors’ “practices in 
their own experience of reality – their practical sense or logic - rather than in the 
analytical models which social scientists construct to explain that practice” (Jenkins 
1992: 72). The practitioners and strategists in the community safety governance field 
are community organisations, social groups, individuals and institutions such as the 
state and private sector amongst others (Figure 6).  
Practices in the field are informed by some rules (unwritten and written) - what 
Bourdieu refers to as doxa. I argue that the micro-politics of community safety 
production follows a particular logic informed by the habitus of involved 
stakeholders. In making this argument I indicate that the collective or individual 
behaviours of actors in the community security governance field are informed by 
their histories and cultural grounding - that is their habitus. The habitus of individuals 
and collectivities structure socio-political and spatial practices, habits, perceptions 
and relations between agents in the community security governance field.  
In fact, public participation is central to drama (practices and strategies) in the 
community safety governance field. Micro-politics of community safety governance is 
playable in spaces of participation. How can Bourdieusian “thinking tools” help us 
understand participatory safety governance? What is the link between public 
participation in community security governance and symbolic domination? I maintain 
that participatory safety governance is fraught with concealed and explicit power 
dynamics that undermine its very purpose and essence. Following Bourdieu’s 
concept of symbolic domination; I argue that participatory safety governance is an arena 
of subtle and outright domination of weaker social institutions or organisations, 
social groups and individuals by the more powerful (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Participatory safety governance and relational politics 
In this case I analyse two heuristically distinguished spaces of participation in 
community safety governance - that is the invited and invented spaces. Invited spaces of 
participation are those whose setting up is sponsored or mandated by government or 
private agents (Bourdieu 1977; Lefebvre 1991), while invented spaces of participation 
are those that are spontaneously created or claimed by people at the grassroots levels 
(Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Gaventa 2004; Gaventa 2006; Gaventa and Valderrama 
1999).40 At its practical level, participatory security governance is considered as 
“deliberative” or “communicative” (Barnes 2011; Dryzek 2003) - in this case 
involving meetings by neighbourhood residents for discussions and debates on 
matters concerning neighbourhood safety.  
As observed elsewhere and reinforced here, participation is sometimes, if not often 
times, a fallacy. This is because of the dynamics of (symbolic) domination (by the elite 
or state agents) of the citizenry that are weaved into its processes (Arnstein 2011; 
Katsaura 2012; Swyngedouw 2011a). Using the concept of misrecognition, Bourdieu 
argues that the dominated are (actively) complicit in their own domination because 
they tend to misunderstand the system that dominates them; thereby perpetuating 
their very domination (Bourdieu 1991a; Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2002). It is 
                                                     
40 In my view, the distinction between invented and invited spaces of participation is only heuristic 
and the issue of grassrooted-ness is a myth. This is because there is always a power behind the 
invitation of people to participate in these spaces. 
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possible therefore, in reading Bourdieu, to argue that participatory safety governance 
is an instrument for domination of the citizenry; an arrangement which reproduces 
socio-political domination (and repression) rather than liberate the citizenry (Ruteere 
and Pommerolle 2003).    
By sharing the thought of participatory democracy and being habitualised 
(subconsciously or consciously) to evaluate society through the lenses of lay or 
intellectual democratic thought, it is possible that subaltern groups “share a system of 
organising and evaluating society that works against them” (Thompson 1991: 23). 
The habitus which is a product of accumulated history, a history of domination in this 
case, can produce and reproduce practices that sustain the citizenry’s submission to 
the established order (reproducing habitus of submission) (Bourdieu 1991a; von Holdt 
2012a). However, “dominated individuals are not passive bodies to which symbolic 
power is applied, as it were, like a scalpel to a corpse” (Bourdieu 1991a: 23). “The 
dominated can exert a certain force of resistance to domination” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 81). Von Holdt shows that this resistance is encapsulated in bodies of 
defiance - defiance against authority (von Holdt 2012a). Such “bodies of defiance” 
operate in the realm of insurgent citizenship (cf. Holston 2008). I use the concept of 
“insurgent citizenship” to describe community security governance initiatives that 
operate outside the prescribed state arena, in opposition to or alongside it (Holston 
2008). This means that communities have potentials to create their own local moral 
orders which may be insurgent (von Holdt 2010).  
At a micro-level, there is a possibility of the elite to accumulate, concentrate and 
pocket the means of local social influence (Katsaura 2012); thereby domination the 
community safety governance field. This can undermine the values of democracy, 
generating what I conceptualise as an “anti-democracy of democracy” - a democracy 
that unwittingly or wittingly undermine the very democratic intent as stakeholder 
interests takes precedence over the common good. Similarly, writing about the 
decline of urban politics and role of civil society, Swyngedouw (2011) and Ferguson 
(2006) suggest that civil society, which is generally celebrated as creating and 
nurturing democratic space, should be viewed through lenses that unpack “anti-
democratic” tendencies within it (Ferguson 2006; Katsaura 2012; Swyngedouw 
  58 
 
2011a). Spaces for the community governance of security can therefore be analysed 
as epitomising the “contradictions” of democracy (Holston 2008).  
Further undermining the democratic intent in the community safety governance field 
is the possibility of political dispossession of masses. This happens because the 
articulation of the collective agenda is sometimes done by or through delegates. Such 
individuals (delegates), if elected, are considered to possess delegated political capital and 
if they lead out of their heroism or charisma, are considered to possess personal 
political capital (Bourdieu 1991a). As they claim to speak for the collective, some 
delegates may also engage in double dealings (Bourdieu 1991a) or multiple dealings (Benit-
Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012); pursuing personal interests, sometimes at the expense 
of collective interests, in the process (Wacquant 2004). In some or many cases, 
leaders (delegates) are complicit in state activities. Because they are the power behind 
the mobilisation of people to participate in community safety governance, leaders 
articulate agendas that may be pro-state, sometimes to the detriment of the citizenry. 
The state, multifarious as it is, has a tendency to dominate spaces of participatory 
safety governance (directly or at a distance); sometimes undermining the very 
intentions of safety production or the core goals (articulated goals) of these 
participatory spaces. I am sceptical that the state, being inscribed in human minds 
and habitualised in human practices, always finds its way into spaces of deliberative 
community safety governance; symbolically or outrightly dominating these spaces. The 
symbolic domination of the state is buttressed by its attempt to monopolise the 
capital of physical force (for example, through the police, army and intelligence) 
(Bourdieu 1998a). Of the state, Bourdieu writes: 
“The state is a culmination of a process of concentration of different species of 
capital: capital of physical force or instrument of coercion (army, police), 
economic capital, cultural capital or (better) informational capital, and symbolic 
capital. It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder 
of a sort of metacapital granting power over other species of capital and over 
their holders” (Bourdieu 1998a: 41). 
The state’s presence and influence in the field of community safety governance 
should therefore not be a surprise. Being a bank41 of symbolic capital, a centre of meta-
                                                     
41 Not necessarily the ‘central bank’ that Bourdieu makes of it. 
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capital or statist capital; the state has the propensity to dominate the socio-political 
world - influencing people’s thought patterns, social worlds and their everyday 
practices. Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of that state entrenches the idea that the state 
does not exist only “out there” in the guise of bureaucracies and authorities; it also 
lives “in here” (in people’s habitus and daily encounters). It is ineffaceably engraved 
in persons in the form of state-oriented mental categories acquired via schooling and 
different mechanisms of socialisation through which “humans cognitively construct 
the social world”, so that they already “consent to its dictates prior to committing 
any political act” (Wacquant 2004: 8). However, in some circumstances, rather than 
think “through” and “with” the state, residents think “against” it, viewing it as a 
dangerous presence – kleptocratic, criminal and violent (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2006a; Voronin 1997).  
As my presupposition goes, like schooling, participatory safety governance bonds 
human beings to the state, inculcating the state into them. This is because the 
modalities, content and form of participatory safety governance are influenced, if not 
shaped, by the state or the “thought of the state” (Bourdieu 1998a). It is not 
surprising that when it comes to community security governance, citizens tend to 
“think through the state”42, “with the state” (Bourdieu 1998a) and sometimes against 
the state. They possess a statised or statist habitus - evaluating their safety and other 
situations in terms of the failures, successes and obligations of the state. The state is 
therefore “fetishised” (Bourdieu 1991a).  
Theoretically exploring the positioning of social groups in the community security 
governance field, I focus, through deploying Bourdieusian thought, on unpacking 
dynamics of urban ethno-national regionalist politics?  
 
4.6.3. Ethno-national regionalist politics and community safety governance  
Social groups, based on their ethnic and national origins, could be excluded from 
participating in community organisations and be accused of causing anomie and 
disorder (Barry 1998; Brubaker 1992; Elias and Scotson 1994; Kymlicka 2001; 
Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Nyamnjoh 2010b). I argue that ethno-nationality (and 
                                                     
42 See Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998a. Practical reason: On the theory of action. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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stereotypes thereof) constitutes a rule (or doxa) (mainly unwritten and sometimes 
written) for inclusion or exclusion in spaces of participation in community safety 
governance activities and discourses (see Figure 6, Figure 8).  
If not deliberately excluded, ethno-national minorities can choose to isolate 
themselves due to their (acceptance of the) perception that they are different and do 
not belong (Barry 1998; Brubaker 1992; Kymlicka 2001). Ethno-national minorities, if 
poor, easily occupy the status of margizens (Schuilenburg 2008), urban outcasts 
(Wacquant 2008d) or pariahs (Goffman 1963b) - people with no or limited access to 
public goods or services (including safety), suffer isolation, rejection and vilification 
by mainstream society. This typifies what Comaroff and Comaroff (2009:118) refer 
to as “the identity economy” – a socio-economy in which ethnic identity becomes a 
rule for access to economic, social and political resources. In referring to the status 
of African immigrants in South Africa, I deploy the concept of the other other43 to 
depict their multilayered social isolation or exclusion based on the stitched notions of 
ethnicity, nationality, race, class and gender, amongst others. 
Processes of other othering and, imaginary or real, group making or unmaking and ethno-
national “boundary maintenance” (Barth 1970) are akin to what Bourdieu 
conceptualises as regionalisation (Bourdieu 1991a). Regionalisation is characterised by 
struggles over classifications and definitions of regional and ethnic identity and the 
properties (stigmata or emblems) linked to ethno-national origin (Bourdieu 1991a). 
In the community security field, this is played out in ethno-national regionalist discourses 
and practices – otherwise construed as “ethno-talks”, “ethno-practices” or “ethno-
consciousness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). Such discourses name, divide and 
rally social groups (Bourdieu 1991a) – creating divisions between “the established” 
(insiders) and the “outsiders”44 (Elias and Scotson 1994; Nyamnjoh 2006). The 
                                                     
43
 The concept of “other other” is used by Susan van Zyl to show the persistence of a differentiating and 
differentiated citizenship in postcolonial or post-apartheid South Africa despite attempts to wish away 
racism, classism sexism and other discriminatory classifications.  I therefore develop this concept to 
analyse the exclusion or discrimination of non-South African blacks in South African public life, 
including participation in civic bodies like the CPF. See van Zyl, Susan. 1998. "The other and other 
others: Post-colonialism, Psychoanalysis and the South African Question." American Imago 55(1):77-
100. 
44 The “established” are those neighbourhood residents that have been there for a long time and in 
this case, being South African citizens, while “outsiders” are the non-citizens (the African immigrants) 
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discourse of Kwere Kwere45 is a typical example in the case of South Africa (Landau 
2010; Landau and Freemantle 2010). The linguistic market of the security governance 
field, where such discourses are fermented, serves to generate and perpetuate 
stereotypes about crime and violence - its perpetrators, victims, spatialities and 
everyday-ness. This is reflected in what Caldeira, based on her studies in Sao Paulo, 
refers to as “talk of crime”46 (Caldeira 2000).  
Ethno-national regionalist politics takes place in social space and the task of mapping its 
form and content on paper (and in reality) is one that the social scientist should be 
able to do without gratuitously concretising or reifying the imagined or probable 
(Bourdieu 1985). To this end, Bourdieu classifies sociology as a “social typology” 
(Bourdieu 1991a: 229). He states:  
“Apparently, directly visible beings, whether individuals or groups, exist and 
subsist in and through difference, that is, they occupy relative positions in a 
space of relations which although invisible and always difficult to show 
empirically, is the most real reality (the ens realissimum, as scholasticism would 
say) and the real principle of the behaviour of individuals and groups” 
(Bourdieu 1998a: 31). 
Faced with ethno-nationalist othering, social groups are likely to engage collective 
and individual strategies of protecting themselves. I refer to these as counter-otherisation 
tactics and strategies.  
Overall, I suggest that the community safety governance field in multi-national 
settings is pregnant with what Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) refer to as “ethno-
discourses”, “ethno-talks” and “ethno-practices”47 – as aspects of its everydayness 
and structure. 
In the section below, I make a case for thinking about the territorial (of spatial) 
politics of and in community safety governance. The next section opens a theoretical 
minefield from which I try to dig out Bourdieu’s spatial sociology in a bid to 
understand the socio-spatial politics of community safety governance.  
                                                     
45 The phrase Kwere Kwere is a South African derogatory term referring to people considered to look 
foreign and strange and to speak languages that one cannot decipher. 
46 That is everyday talks and legends about crime. 
47 Ethno-discourses – ideas or debates informed by ethnicity or perceptions thereof/ ethno-talks – 
speeches informed by ethnicity or perceptions thereof/ ethno-practices – actions and rituals informed 
by ethnicity or perceptions thereof. 
  62 
 
 
4.6.4. Spatio-social politics of community safety governance: what can 
Bourdieu offer? 
Bourdieu rarely wrote about physical space and took minimal effort to show the 
connection of his notion of social space to physical space. It is only later in his career in 
his books The Weight of the World and The Social Structures of the Economy that he makes 
statements about the importance of place in the organisation of society and human 
action (Bourdieu et al. 1999). According to Bourdieu, “the social world can be 
represented as a space (with several dimensions) constructed on the basis of 
principles of differentiation or distribution …” (Bourdieu 1985:723-24)48. Bourdieu 
(2000a: 134) maintains that social space is defined by the mutual exclusion or 
distinction of the positions which constitute it. These positions can be construed as 
constituting a structure of distribution of various kinds of capital. He writes, “In this 
way and in the most diverse contexts the structure of social space shows up as spatial 
oppositions, in which the inhabited (or appropriated) space functions as a sort of 
spontaneous symbolisation of social space” (Bourdieu 1999c: 124).    
It suffices to argue that there is a dialectical relationship between the spatiality and 
sociality of the genesis or governance of crime and violence in the city (Figure 9). 
Citing Jameson and Soja, Daylight (Daylight 2008:7) states that “mutations in built 
form have a more than independent relationship with social forms” (Daylight 2008). 
The concept of socio-spatial politics suggests that physical space and social space are 
important shapers of community security governance (Figure 9). 
Following what is presented in Figure 9, I make two arguments here. Firstly, I argue 
that social space intersects with physical space in influencing the genesis of violence, 
crime and fear and the community governance thereof. Secondly, I maintain that 
social agents’ location in social space is concretised in their location in physical 
spaces of the city. This has implications on the social agents’ vulnerability to fear, 
crime and violence as well as their capacities for and modes of safety governance. 
Figure 9 below graphically represents the intersections of social space and physical 
space in the community safety field. 
                                                     
48 See Bourdieu, Pierre. 1985. "The social space and the genesis of power." Theory and Society 14(6):723 
- 44. 
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Elaborating the first argument, I observe that the spatiality of the genesis of crime, 
violence and fear makes a case for the employment of community interventions 
focusing on the reorganisation of physical space as a way of reorganising society for 
effective safety governance. The common view that the decay of physical space or 
spatial malfunctionality49 in the city results in the decay of the social fabric or “social 
infrastructure” (Simone 2004a) and increase crime makes a case for the importance 
of place governance in the maintenance of social order (Power and Wilson 2000; 
Wilson and Kelling 1982).  
Attempts at place governance for safety promotion can become the epitome of 
urban struggles over place; as communities or social groups or individuals try to 
(re)claim streets, parks and their residential places in a context of fear of crime and 
violence. These struggles are repeated to the extent that they become habitualised into 
the cognitive maps (habitus) of individuals and collectives; and are reflected in the 
(individuals and collectives) trajectories of spatial traversal or habitation of the city. I 
conceptualise the everyday practices (strategies and tactics) of actors engaged in the 
governance of places for fear, violence or crime aversion as constituting socio-spatial 
practices. In coining the concept of socio-spatial practice I merge Bourdieu’s concept of 
                                                     
49 Malfunctional spaces are those that are ‘abandoned’, ‘condemned’ or ‘ruined’  
Figure 9: Socio-spatial politics: territorial, institutional and ethno-nationalist politics in 
community safety governance 
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“social practice” (Bourdieu 1977) with de Certeau’s concept of “spatial practice” (de 
Certeau 1984).  
Spatial practices are the everyday strategies and tactics employed by people as they 
transect and transit through space (de Certeau 1984). Spatial practices are reflective 
of residents’ structuring of the perceptions (or images) of the city into “recurring 
elements such as paths (along which movements flow) and edges (which differentiate 
one part of the urban fabric from another)” (Lynch 1960:98). Violence and other 
urban disorders configure such images – images about dangerous or safe paths, 
spaces or neighbourhoods which create mental maps influencing individuals or social 
groups’ navigation and classification of city spaces. Some spaces of the city are 
therefore feared, avoided or disowned, while others are claimed and owned by 
individuals and social groups (as reflected in territorialist discourses and practices). 
Security (or lack thereof) is conceptualised as related to space and territory (Bigo 
2008). For instance, Yarwood (2007) argues that a better understanding of policing 
contributes to a better understanding of the ways in which power shapes space. That 
is, an understanding of dynamics of spatial governance. The control and sanction of 
human behaviour (including violence and crime prevention) is increasingly being 
done through spatial regulation or governance. Spatial governance is meant to control 
human bodies (populations) and other objects transecting through city spaces - a 
form of “bio-power” (Agamben 1998; Fassin 2001; Lemke 2011; Reid 2006).  
The urban environment, in many cities, is endowed with liquid surveillance (at symbolic 
and physical levels) given the increased fear of crime (Lyon 2010). City spaces are 
abound with symbolic and real panoptic idioms which constantly remind law 
breakers and anti-socials about the possibility of detection and punishment. 
Surveillance technologies such as CCTV are therefore part of what Foucault refers to 
as the “technologies of government” or “apparatuses (dispositifs) of security” (Saar 
2011); playing a role in spatial governance (Foucault 1991; Foucault 2007; Robins 
2002).  
Physical space has to be treated as an embodied site (Low 2011) of social relations and 
generation of socio-spatial activity including violence, crime and governance thereof 
(cf. Bourdieu 1999a). These technologies of government are vividly represented and 
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framed in urban architecture as demonstrated by Kim Dovey (Dovey 1999). In this 
case architecture is viewed as capable of restricting and enabling human action, acting 
as a social control mechanism or creating behaviour-slackening environments; 
thereby producing and reproducing place-acclimatised social practices within city 
spaces (Dovey 1999).  
The political geography and built form of a neighbourhood is here considered 
important in the governance of crime and violence. Urban architecture frames 
human behaviour in ways that discourage or cover-up criminality and violence 
(Dovey 1999). The physical space of an urban locality is considered as intertwined 
with the social space and in essence, with its social infrastructure (Simone 2004a). 
This social infrastructure is responsible for shaping and or regulating human 
interaction and therefore plays a major role in normatively reducing crime and 
violence and the fear thereof. It is acceptable, as Bourdieu (1999a) observes, to view 
human beings as inherently “situated in a site(s)” and occupying places; meaning that 
their behaviours are authored (and can be governed) in site or place.  
Spatial governance sometimes operates antithetically to spatial freedom and spatial 
democracy; especially in cases where human beings are increasingly subjected to 
intrusive surveillance. This is true in cases in which individuals and groups seek 
security through spatial enclosures and use of surveillance technologies; undermining 
the rights of other individuals and social groups (Madanipour 2010). This generates 
what Lehnen describes as “disjunctive urbanisms” (Lehnen 2012) - ones that spatially 
separate citizens on the basis of social differences including class, race, ethnicity, 
creed and gender.  
Following the foregoing demonstration of the arbitrary surveillance of place; I argue 
that place can be used as an instrument of symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1991a). Urban 
planning and policing practices can foster social domination rather than real freedom 
if they serve sectoral interests of the wealthier at the expense of the poor. Whatever 
benefits accrue to the poor can be viewed as mere “nurofen”; addressing challenges 
of the poor just at a superficial level (Baeten 2001). 
Taking on the second argument, I observe that physical space is a concretisation of 
socio-structural factors that position people in different localities of the city, with 
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implications on their safety. Bourdieu stresses that social agents are constituted in 
(relationships to) social space; concretised as positions sites or places (Bourdieu 
1999a; Bourdieu 2012). The positioning of individuals or social groups or institutions 
in the field of community security governance (and in the fields of politics, 
economics and cultural production etc.) is therefore concretised in physical space. 
Every site or place occupies a position in social space that is relative to other places 
(above, below, between), and has a (social, political, cultural or economic) distance 
from those other places (Bourdieu 2000b; Bourdieu 2012).   
Physical space can therefore be considered as constituting the localisation and 
materialisation of the being, positioning and rank of social agents (collective, 
institutional or individual) in a social or spatial order (Bourdieu 1999a: 123). For 
instance, certain places in a city could be occupied by specific ethnic groups or 
classes separated from and competing with each other (Bourdieu 1999a; Bourdieu 
2000b; Wacquant 2007; Wacquant 2008d). Bourdieu (1998a: 6) notes that “spatial 
distances on paper are equivalent to social distances”. Relatedly, he points out that 
“social space tends to be translated with more or less distortion, into physical space, 
in the form of certain spatial arrangements of agents and properties” (Bourdieu 2000: 
134). It follows then that all divisions and distinctions in social space are really and 
symbolically expressed in the organisation of physical space; as in the distinctions 
between smart upper class residential or commercial areas from the working class 
ones (Bourdieu 1999a; Bourdieu 2000b; Bourdieu 2012).    
In elaborating this, Bourdieu makes the argument that the poor, those with no or less 
capital, “are chained to place” (Bourdieu 1999a: 127); meaning that their positioning 
in social space is represented and reproduced in their positioning in physical space. 
Possession of capital enables individuals or social groups to appropriate certain 
physical space, whereas those who possess poor capital have a diminished capacity 
for appropriating physical spaces of the city (Bourdieu 1999a); becoming objects of 
spatial control as they traverse the city. Spatial governance in cities expectedly targets 
bodies of the (rejected) poor; who are often treated as wasted lives (Bauman 2004) and 
find themselves occupying peripheral social, economic and spatial positions in the 
socio-physical spaces of the city.   
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In line with this Bourdieusian analysis, I state that the socio-spatial location of the 
poor in urban spaces arguably influences their reaction to crime within the limitations 
of available resources, capacities and capabilities. Urban public spaces and the built 
environment as well as the urbanites’ socio-spatial location therein are reflective of the 
politics of identity and the social representation of citizenship and belonging. In this 
case, different locations in the city have different socio-economic values - what Lars 
refers to as spatial capital. Positioning in the economic field, as determined by and 
reflective of capital possessed by individuals or groups, allocates them to different 
physical spaces; that is housing estates, offices or shopping malls. This generates 
different levels and forms of security and fear for those with more capital (the 
wealthier) and those with lesser capital (the poorer) (Bourdieu 1999a). Physical spaces 
of the city, in turn, confer either positive or negative symbolic and social capitals on their 
occupants; with those in deprived spaces becoming liable to negative criminalising 
labels, while those from advantaged physical spaces gain honour, prestige and access 
to economic and social opportunities and privileges (for example privileges in the 
labour market). That is why some areas, due to concentrations of either positive (eg. 
wealth) or negative (stigmatising [eg. poverty, vice, crime, violence) properties, are 
considered affluent or problematic respectively (Bourdieu 1999a; Marcuse 1997b; 
Murray 2011; Wacquant 2007). Bourdieu, in his own words, refers to this as an 
outcome, influence or constitution of spatial profit, profits of occupation, profits of position or 
rank (in and of social and physical spaces) or locational capital (Bourdieu 1999a). 
Physical space, the neighbourhood or city in this case, is to be conceptualised as both 
an economic and social commodity.  
Having outlined my conversation with Bourdieu and other invited thinkers, I briefly 
discuss the advantages and a disadvantage of Bourdieu’s thinking tools.  
 
4.7. Some merits and demerits of Bourdieu’s thinking tools 
Bourdieu’s thinking tools meet substantive criticism on a number of grounds. For 
instance, Bourdieu is criticised for not adequately showing the empirical connection 
between the concept of practice and field (Warde 2004). It was only later in his career 
that he attempted to show the link between field and practice in his book Distinction and 
the Social Judgement of Taste; where he offers a formula showing the interconnection of 
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these concepts. The formula goes: [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu 1984). 
Yet, this formula presents an over simplistic view of his thinking tools. This is 
because as much as habitus, capital and field are structured by practice, they also 
structure practice and therefore practice is not solely just an outcome of the interplay 
of habitus, field and capital; but also actively produces them. The relationship 
between these concepts, as one tries to pin them down, is not linear or formulaic but 
a mishmash that should be unpacked with due consideration of contextual 
contingencies.  
On the lack of clarity on the connection between practice and field, Warde (2004:4) 
notes that Bourdieu “does not make it clear if there are many practices in each field, 
or one practice per field” and “it is not clear whether it is practices or fields which 
have logics; whether they are similar or different logics”. What Bourdieu only makes 
clear is that “practices are performed in fields and that many diverse practices and 
fields are part of a process whereby profits are realised” (Warde 2004:4). The merit of 
my thinking is that I bring together Bourdieu’s seemingly disparate, but highly 
connected concepts of field and practice, in explaining behaviours and actions in 
community safety initiatives.     
Citing Calhoun (1995), Warde (2004: 9) questions the applicability of the concept of 
practice in the analysis of the operation of social affairs in an “industrialised and highly 
differentiated society”; citing that it is more applicable in “analysis of comparatively 
undifferentiated societies where understandings of appropriate conduct are shared”. 
Warde (2004) then designates the concept of practice as one attuned to an analysis of 
aspects of traditional societies such as rites, rituals, gifts and honour. In my view, 
although it may have limitations, like any other concept, the concept of practice is 
still useful in explaining behaviour even in industrialised societies. In my particular 
study, analysis of the activities and behaviours of collectivities and individuals within 
the field of community security governance is a worthwhile endeavour.  
The idea of habitus as a structured structure has invoked a criticism of the concept and of 
Bourdieusian thought as mechanistic, tautological and tantamount to sociological 
objectivism or reductionism; one that limits the agency of humans and sidesteps social 
change (Atkinson 2010; King 2000; Noble and Watkins 2003; Throop and Murphy 
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2002). Bourdieu is also charged with removing consciousness from the acquisition of 
the habitus (Noble and Watkins 2003); rendering humans passive recipients of 
mental and social dispositions imposed by social structures. Defending the concept 
of habitus, Bourdieu emphasises that it is supple and transposable (Bourdieu 1990; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Explaining the litheness of habitus, Bourdieu 
highlights: 
“Habitus is not the fate that some people read into it. Being the product of 
history, it is an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to 
experiences; and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either 
reinforces or modifies its structures. It is durable but not eternal. Having said 
this, I must immediately add that there is a probability, inscribed in the social 
destiny associated with definite social conditions that experiences will confirm 
habitus, because most people are statistically bound to encounter 
circumstances that tend to agree with those that originally fashioned their 
habitus” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 133). 
Despite these noted weaknesses, “the habitus provides a convincing account of 
social reproduction” (King 2000: 427) - a reproduction of order and power. Perhaps 
it is Bourdieu’s formal definition of habitus in his book Outline of a Theory of Practice 
which invites the criticism of the concept as deterministic and mechanistic (King 
2000). In light of this criticism, Bourdieu emphasises that the concept of habitus, like 
his other concepts, is an open one and therefore one that cannot be pinned down by 
professorial definitions; but can only be tested by being put to work empirically 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In fact, in his numerous writings, Bourdieu offers 
“countless definitions” of the concept (Throop and Murphy 2002). The habitus 
should therefore not be condemned to circular and mechanistic reasoning as it is 
quite supple and adaptive. Any static interpretation of the concept of habitus is 
considered to be tantamount to misinterpretation (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 
135). 
Although Bourdieu’s thinking tools have singularly and aggregately come under 
criticism from various perspectives, some of which are highlighted in the foregoing 
discussion, I indicate here that some of the criticisms are flawed as they engage with 
the legacy of Bourdieu in a sectorial, and sometimes myopic, way. Any appropriation, 
understanding, application or testing of Bourdieu’s thinking tools that separates the 
habitus from field would be fundamentally flawed, as the habitus cannot be 
  70 
 
understood or assessed without an appreciation of its relationship to field or the field 
without an appreciation of the habitus. In fact, on their own, the concepts of habitus 
and field are rendered theoretically obsolete. In fact, Bourdieu himself emphasises 
that what he offers through his thinking tools is a relational philosophy; and to rid it of 
relationalism would be to undermine its essence and potency for proffering an 
acceptable account of social reality. Separating the habitus from the field or 
downplaying one of the two in any analysis that thinks with or against Bourdieu is to 
de-relationalise Bourdieu’s thinking tools and social reality as well.  
In fact, some critics of Bourdieu have committed the fallacious act of separating 
these “key thinking tools”; thereby carrying with them a toolbox with missing tools 
into the critical scientific voyage to discover social reality with, against or beyond 
Bourdieu. This kind of fallacious act would be tantamount to what I call theoretical 
Bourdieucide50. Although I do not charge them with theoretical Bourdieucide, Burawoy and 
von Holdt (2012), for example, engage an “overplay” of the concepts of habitus and 
symbolic domination in a fashion that largely technically ruptures them from the very key 
concepts of field and capital. To avoid unwarranted undermining of Bourdieusian 
thinking tools, one ought to employ a socio-genetic reading of Bourdieu (Grenfell 
2011); that is reading Bourdieu with due regard to the context in which he developed 
his thinking tools. It is therefore important to engage in constructive criticism of 
Bourdieusian thinking tools with due consideration of the relational indivisibility of 
the key concepts of field, habitus and capital.  
The cluster of issues relating to urban community security governance discussed in 
this thesis are the “empirical grinder” into which the Bourdieusian concepts are made 
to go through with the hope of critically testing, edifying or complementing them 
(Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9). In my empirical deployment, testing and review of 
Bourdieusian thinking tools, I heed Bourdieu’s advice that “concepts such as habitus, 
field, and capital can be defined only within the theoretical system they constitute, 
not in isolation” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96)51. These three concepts work 
like a theoretical machine and cannot be separated from one another if one is to 
                                                     
50
 I use the notion of theoretical Bourdieucide to denote a situation or condition in which Bourdieu’s 
thinking tools are undermined or distorted unwarrantedly.  
51
 Bourdieu himself did not believe in rigid definitions of concepts, what he referred to as professorial 
definitions, but in customised empirical definitions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
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avoid gross misinterpretations of Bourdieu’s work or of social reality. In this thesis, 
Bourdieusian “thinking tools” are set up in conversations with other relevant 
theoretical tools in the field of local safety governance studies. Below, I wrap up my 
theoretical propositions, here made. 
  
4.8. Fusing Bourdieusian thinking into urban safety studies: a conclusion 
This theoretical search settles on the view that an application and testing of 
Bourdieusian thinking tools to understand the socio-spatial micro-politics of urban 
community safety governance is a worthwhile endeavour. It departs from the 
premise that that fear of violence and crime, among other urban fears, is 
institutionalised and instrumentalised in the form of community organisations, local 
institutions and collective or individual socio-spatial practices (strategies and tactics) 
working (genuinely or pretentiously) in the service of safety and security production. 
However, this creates an avenue for the practice of a micro-politics that goes beyond 
and supplants safety production. Firstly, I argue that community security governance 
is a field of micro-politics in which stakeholders (organisations, institutions, 
individuals and social groups) compete and coalesce for various species of capital - 
profits, stakes and interests. Secondly, I make the hypothesis that the arena of 
community safety activism in the South African context can degenerate into a field of 
ethno-national regionalist practices and discourses. Thirdly, I propose that organisational, 
institutional, and ethno-national politics of community safety governance is also 
played out as territorialist politics. 
Committing to deploy and test Bourdieusian thinking tools in this study, I get myself 
into the project of redeeming Bourdieu’s urban and political sociologies (Savage 
2012; Wacquant 2004). I seek to enrich Bourdieusian thinking tools by testing them 
against empirical reality, developing novel ways of thinking in the process. Chapter 5, 
which follows, details my emersion into the everyday realities in a context of fear 
(and governance) of crime and violence in Yeoville and more broadly in 
Johannesburg – it is a reflection on my methodological and research experiences and 
an acknowledgement of the role of my social and intellectual habitus in the course of 
engaging “the field”. The chapter is rooted in attempts to learn from and develop the 
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Bourdieusian notion of reflexive sociology or reflexive research (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992; Wacquant 1989).  
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5. Chapter Five 
Experiences of conducting community-oriented research 
 
“… Basic to the conduct of field research is the development of relationships between the 
researcher and those who are researched. Field researchers have, therefore, to take roles, 
handle relationships, and enter into the commerce and conflict of everyday life” (Burgess 1984: 
5). 
 
5.1. Introduction 
There is a wide body of literature, from the classical to the contemporary, which 
discusses the political nature of fieldwork; especially the everyday politics of 
ethnography. This literature is both theoretical and empirical - it is based on 
researchers’ theoretical orientations and their accounts of real, sometimes fabricated, 
experiences in the field. Despite the existence of this literature, there is still need for 
more accounts of fieldwork experiences. This is because researchers, research 
experiences and research settings differ. Every story is unique and is worth being 
told. While the handbooks of social research that we read warn us about the 
complexities of field research, they blatantly lack a clearer emphasis on the role of the 
researcher’s intuition, and the effects of realpolitiks of everyday life on the conduct 
of fieldwork. Existent theoretical literature basically offers organised, even step by 
step accounts, of how fieldwork ought to be conducted; which are useful, but tend to 
oversimplify a very complex and amorphous process. 
Based on my own fieldwork story, I make three arguments that: i) the methods of 
field research, that are taken to be technical and scientific in the strict sense of the 
notions, are also in fact very political; ii) fieldwork in communities is intricately 
immersed into the realpolitiks characterising everyday life in those given communities 
or settings; iii) while the commitment to science is cherishable, balancing it with a 
commitment to humanity and positive social transformation is enviable.  
These three claims are informed by political challenges, social dilemmas and thrills of 
conducting community-oriented research. I analyse, in sections below, the strategies 
and practices I employed to navigate a politically charged research environment.  
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5.2. Who said the scientific is not political?    
Like some who have written before me, I dismiss the idea of casting politics off the 
discourses on research methods and processes, as is normally done under the banner 
of objectivity. Despite the position I am selectively taking here, I note that other than 
being political, research methods also ought to be treated with due regard to the 
technicalities and values of validity, reliability or representation. In this particular 
instance, however, I argue that the choices of sampling techniques and approaches, 
data collection methods and data collection processes, are all socio-spatially political; 
especially in the context of community-oriented research.   
         
5.2.1. The politics of sampling: place, institutions, people … 
Firstly, the choice of a research site or case study is a reflection of socio-spatial 
politics, at the level of the researcher’s intellectual habitus or spatial cognitive map; which is 
his/her stock of knowledge about places and what they could mean. In this research, 
I depended on a single case study. Why? My choice was informed by the need to 
consistently focus on the everyday-ness and minute dynamics of community safety 
governance “within a real life context” over a prolonged period of time (cf. Yin 
2009). This could not have been doable had I taken many field sites. As observed by 
Burgess (1984: 59 - 60): 
“Many field studies appear to be located in a single site: a factory, a hospital, a 
school or a town. Yet each of these sites may include numerous sub-sites 
whose choice may influence data collection”. 
Whereas Yeoville is my main unit of analysis (see Chapter 3, subtitle 3.2.5), 
Johannesburg, community organisations, sub-territories, individual stakeholders are 
also important units of analysis. Delimiting a unit of analysis is complex. Yin (2009: 
50) points out: 
“The same single-case study may involve more than one unit of analysis. This 
occurs, when, within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or 
subunits”. 
Yeoville is a socio-spatially complex place which called for sub-sampling to capture 
this complexity. On the significance of single cases, Bourdieu stated his experiences 
and views as follows: 
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“My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest 
logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the 
particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the 
objective of constructing it as a “special case of what is possible”, as Bachelard 
puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a finite world of possible 
configurations” (Bourdieu 1998a: 2).52 
Consistently focusing on the specific locality of Yeoville and “plunging” myself 
therein over an extended period of time allowed me to obtain a deeper understanding 
of the particular “social rhythm, the pattern of events” (Burgess 1984: 60), local 
social routines, behaviours and local challenges. Rather than aiming at statistical 
generalisation of my findings to populations and universes, my aim was to make 
particularistic empirical explorations and make theoretical statements or 
generalisations about them (Flyvbjerg 2011; Yin 2009).  
 Why Yeoville? I invite Burgess to this question: 
“The selection of research sites is, therefore, more complex than might at first 
appear. Five criteria can be identified in the selection of a research site 
(Spradley 1980). First, simplicity; that is a research site that allows researchers 
to move from studying simple situations to those which are more complex. 
Secondly, accessibility; that is the degree of access and entry that is given the 
researcher. Thirdly, unobtrusiveness; that is situations that allow the researcher 
to take an unobtrusive role. Fourthly, permissibleness; that is situations that 
allow the researcher free or limited or restricted entry. Fifthly, participation; 
that is the possibility for researchers to participate in a series of ongoing 
activities. However it is impossible for the researcher to be able to meet all 
these criteria in selecting a social setting and therefore some compromise is 
essential, depending on the substantive and theoretical interest of the 
researcher together with the constraints on his or her work” (Burgess 1984: 
61). 
Selecting Yeoville as my research site was indeed a complex and subjective process. I 
selected Yeoville because it provides a “typical case” (Yin 2009) for understanding 
local organisational and multinational dynamics in the community safety governance 
field (see Chapter 3, subtitle 3.2.5). Also, Yeoville was convenient because the School 
of Architecture and Planning at University of Witwatersrand, where I was enrolled 
for my doctoral studies, was officially engaged in research in Yeoville under the 
banner of Yeoville Studio when I started my studies there in 2010. It was relatively 
easier to obtain useful contacts for my study, and to be accepted as a researcher 
                                                     
52 Indeed, Bourdieu depended on the single case study method in his studies of the Kabylia in Algeria 
and in the village of Béarn in South-western France. 
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within the community. More so, being an African immigrant in South Africa, 
Yeoville which is inhabited by a huge cohort of African immigrants made me feel at 
home within a broader context marred by the imminent danger of xenophobic 
violence or treatment.   
I initially wanted to conduct field research in Diepsloot, Johannesburg. However, my 
interest in Diepsloot was overshadowed by fear, especially after learning of the killing 
of John, a Zimbabwean I had earlier met in Yeoville in June 2010. According to my 
housemate, John was killed by a group of people in Diepsloot after he drove there 
and accidentally scratched a parked car. This resulted in an altercation and his assault, 
leading to his injury and death. This story coupled with many other incidences of 
anti-foreigner violence, dissuaded me from venturing into Diepsloot for a prolonged 
period to conduct field research. Diepsloot also struck me as an area overloaded by 
research on violence, being one of the focuses of attention for many researchers. 
Hence, I found it profitable to focus on Yeoville to avoid parroting and duplicating 
already existing research efforts in Diepsloot. 
Yeoville became my social laboratory and my home, in which intensive observation 
took place. When I came to Johannesburg, Yeoville was my port of entry and 
became my place of residence during the entire period of field research and thesis 
writing. In essence, here I am writing Johannesburg, South Africa and the world 
from Yeoville. 
And now, I turn to the politics of spatially mapping out the study area. The mapping 
of Yeoville, Bellevue and Bellevue East (commonly referred to as Yeoville) is not 
standardised (see Figure 5). There are different maps produced for different reasons. 
For policing reasons, Yeoville incorporates Bellevue, Bellevue East and Observatory 
(see Chapter 3, subtitle 3.2.5). The fluidity of the mapping of Yeoville posed some 
challenges on the physical delimitations of my study. I therefore mainly focused on 
the area incorporating Yeoville and Bellevue, while remaining interested in 
understanding the effects of the relationship of this area to Observatory (a middle 
income suburb) on the local geopolitics of community safety governance. Coming 
with spatial complexities of delimiting the neighbourhood, were the social 
complexities influencing sampling and research processes.  
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I observe, from my experience, that the sampling of research participants is a 
political process, rather than a simply objective process. In this research I depended 
mainly on a mix of purposive, availability and snowball sampling, which are non-
probability sampling techniques to gain access to research participants (Durrheim 
and Painter 2006)53. The delicate operation of entering the field, locating suitable 
observation sites and making fruitful contacts necessitated non-random selection of 
participants (Durrheim and Painter 2006; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). The 
choice of non-probability sampling techniques was informed by the observation that 
the fluid and haphazard nature of human behaviour and interaction makes 
conventional probability sampling a sophisticated, if not impossible endeavour in this 
case. Also, my goal was not to seek universal generalisations but to excavate 
particularistic narratives and only make analytical generalisations; and so probability 
sampling was neither really necessary nor mandatory.  
Furthermore, purposive sampling was preferred because it allowed me to conduct 
research with informants or participants who were actively involved in community-
based security governance and could provide rich information on the subject matter. 
I complemented purposive sampling with availability sampling, which is a technique 
that allowed me to focus on those participants who were not only present, but also 
willing to participate. Key informants enhanced the application of the referral 
sampling technique of snowballing, allowing me to further access information rich 
cases (Durrheim and Painter 2006; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Thus, the non-
probability sampling approach adopted was multi-stage and acclimatised to the 
dictates of the research environment. 
Institutional mapping - identifying key local safety governing organisations, was also 
a political process. In my initial plan, I had a wide array of organisations that I 
wanted to include in the study, but when I initiated fieldwork the number of these 
organisations narrowed down as new unanticipated organisations and dynamics were 
discovered in the field. Yeoville is a politically vibrant neighbourhood, characterised 
by the presence of multiple community organisations, most of which are 
stakeholders in the community security field. There were quite a number of 
challenges in properly mapping out the relevant institutions for the study. 
                                                     
53
 A community case study is one in which the community is the unit of analysis. 
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Community based organisations and institutions noted to be important in the 
security governance field of Yeoville are presented and briefly described in Table 3 
below.  
Table 3: Safety governing organisations or institutions in Yeoville 
Organisation or 
institution 
Brief description 
Community organisations/ non-government organisations 
1. YCPF – Yeoville 
Community 
Policing Forum / 
CPF – Community 
Policing Forum 
It is a partnership between elected community members and South 
African Police Service. The main focus of YCPF is to help reduce 
crime in Yeoville.  
 
YCPF holds monthly meetings with members of the police to 
discuss the local crime challenges in Yeoville. They also hold 
occasional public meetings as and when necessary. They are the 
link between the police and the community, facilitating 
communication between the two. They also co-supervise and co-
organise the street patrollers in conjunction with the police. 
I use abbreviations YCPF and CPF interchangeably in this thesis, 
the former being used where there is a need for specificity of the 
CPF being referred to and the latter is used in general terms. 
2. SCFs – Sector 
Crime Forums 
Sector Crime Forums are sub-forums of the CPF. There are 3 
sectors in the Yeoville poling precinct – Sectors 1 (Yeoville), 
Sector 2 (Bellevue) and Sector 3 (Observatory). Conducting 
monthly meetings at grassroots levels in policing sectors. 
3. YSF - Yeoville 
Stakeholders 
Forum 
It is an affiliation of 22 community organisations in Yeoville, 
operating as an umbrella body of these organisations. It was 
formed in 2004 at the behest of the Johannesburg Development 
Agency (JDA) as a contact community organisation during the 
period when JDA was implementing an infrastructural 
development programme in Yeoville’s Rockey – Raleigh Streets. 
YSF conducts monthly meetings bringing together representatives 
of community organisations and other stakeholders in Yeoville.  It 
is a platform for information sharing and solution seeking about 
and on local challenges in Yeoville. 
4. YBCDT – Yeoville 
Bellevue 
Community 
Development Trust 
It is a local non-governmental organisation working on community 
projects aimed at socio-economic development in Yeoville.  
YBCDT facilitates African festivals to bring people together in a 
convivial environment so that they learn each other’s cultures. This 
is hoped to contribute toward attempts to reduce xenophobia (eg 
Africa Week Festival 2010, 2011). 
Runs a community newsletter (Yeovue News) to inform and educate 
people about many issues including crime and violence (rates) in 
the neighbourhood. 
It lobbies against the granting of new liquor selling licences in 
Yeoville and against illegal liquor outlets and shebeens which are 
blamed by the local population and police for increased violence 
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and crime in the area. 
5. Street patrollers They initiate education programmes and awareness campaigns to 
improve tolerance and co-living between South Africans and non-
South Africans. 
6. YCF – Yeoville 
Community Forum 
It is an organisation created by a group of South Africans living in 
Yeoville to respond to the housing situation by lobbying the 
municipality and government to address the challenge of lack of 
housing, high rentals and the issue of hijacked buildings54. During 
the early days of its inception in 2010, the YCF threatened 
militancy and violence in responding to the issue of hijacked 
houses.  
7. ADF – African 
Diaspora Forum 
ADF was formed in 2008 to respond to respond to the 
xenophobic violence that rocked South African in May 2012. The 
ADF claims to have about 23 migrant organisations affiliated to it 
and claims a membership of over 1000 members. The knowledge 
base of ADF relates to the challenges faced by international 
(mainly African) immigrants living in South Africa. It initiates 
education programmes and awareness campaigns to improve 
tolerance and co-living between South Africans and non-South 
Africans. 
8. YBCEC – Yeoville-
Bellevue 
Community 
Advocacy 
Committee 
YBCEC is a community-based lobby group aiming at dealing with 
issues of urban governance revolving around the governance or 
liquor outlets and land rezoning in Yeoville.  
9. YS – Yeoville 
Studio 
Yeoville studio is a community-based research initiative of the 
School of Architecture and Planning, University of the 
Witwatersrand. YS claims possession of academic knowledge on 
urban issues and also seek to influence social transformation in 
Yeoville. 
10. VEC – Victim 
Empowerment 
Centre 
The Victim Empowerment Centre is a body that is supposed to be 
co-managed by the CPF and the police. VEC deals with cases in 
which victims of crime are traumatised. They mostly deal with 
cases of domestic violence and other traumatic criminal cases. 
They mainly deal with counselling matters. Most of the personnel 
at Victim Empowerment Centres are volunteers from the 
community. 
11. Ward Committee  Ward committee is headed by the ward councillor. The focus of 
ward committee is to promote participatory local development; 
including public safety.  
12. Youth Desk The Youth Desk is a youth organisation mainly housed at police 
stations. The Youth Desk deals with youths as a way of promoting 
social crime prevention. Youth Desks respond to challenges 
affecting the youth and are and educative arm of the CPF that 
specifically targets the youth. 
13. Street Committees Street committees are the most elementary structure of community 
policing. In Yeoville, the only street committee that was known to 
be functional is the Muller Street committee. The establishment of 
                                                     
54
 Hijacked houses are those houses that have been unlawfully occupied and are under the unlawful 
control of an individual or group without the consent or approval of the owner. 
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street committees in Yeoville has been a matter bedevilled not only 
by procrastination but also by lack of political will by community 
stakeholders. Street committee formation has been a subject of lip-
service in most Sector Crime Forum meetings and CPF meeting 
that I attended during my more than one year of fieldwork. 
14. RHD - Refugee 
Help Desk 
It is a Refugee/ Migrant service centre dealing with challenges 
faced by refugees in South Africa. It was stationed in Yeoville at 
the time of research.  
State entities 
15. SAPS – South 
African Police 
Services 
SAPS are the state policing agents. They are stationed in Yeoville 
at the Yeoville Police Station. 
16. Gauteng 
Department of 
Community Safety 
It is a Gauteng Provincial Government department in charge of 
community policing forums and of helping the generation of 
government policies that promote public safety. 
 
The processes of sampling were therefore complex and defied the logical and 
bookish step by step sampling techniques. Real sampling, on the ground, signifies a 
move from the ivory tower into the realpolitiks of social, political, economic, cultural 
and spatial organisation of the world. 
My early fieldwork experiences created a need for me to revise my schedule of the 
research process as documented in my research proposal. For instance, I had to drop 
the use of focus group discussions in favour of community meeting attendance; as 
doing both could have been a duplication of efforts. In the process of doing 
research, I also understood that it was not possible for me to pretend to be a neutral 
observer, but better to acknowledge the activeness and politics of my presence in a 
community. With all these complexities of social research I had to contend with, I 
employed specific research methods to get the job done and these are presented and 
discussed below. 
   
5.2.2. Research methods and realpolitiks of fieldwork    
  
The choice of particular research methods over others, although it is to be justified, 
is a heavily subjective and even political process. The processes of deploying specific 
methods to obtain data are also highly political. Regarding this, Burgess points out: 
“Accounts by researchers have revealed that social research is not just a 
question of neat procedures but social processes whereby interaction between 
Source: Fieldwork, Katsaura (2010 - 2012) 
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researcher and researched will directly influence the course which a research 
programme takes …” (Burgess 1984: 31). 
I briefly consider, below, the methods of data collection I deployed. I relied mainly 
on primary sources of data based on participant and direct observation techniques, 
unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews. I also relied on a review of 
existing documents, which included local newsletter, city and government 
documents.  
i. Participant observation      
A key research technique that I mainly relied on is participant observation. 
Participant observation entails being involved for an extended period of time in the 
daily lives of people (or social groups) under study (Singleton, Straits and Straits 
1993). In this study, participant observation was based on the sustained attendance at 
and participation in community meetings, such as those of Yeoville Community 
Policing Forum, Yeoville Stakeholders Forum, Ward Committee, African Diaspora 
Forum, and Sector Crime Forum over a period of more than 15 months (see Table 3 
& Appendix B). This was possible because I stayed in the area where my research was 
anchored.  
In meetings I attended I was largely an observer as participant, although I shifted 
between continuums of complete observer - observer as participant - participant as 
observer, depending on the dictates of the situation at hand and relationships 
established with stakeholders and members in community organisations. My primary 
aim was to observe and record proceedings in such meetings within the social milieu 
in which they occurred. I therefore participated in and observed ninety meetings of 
community organisations during the course of this research (see Appendix B). 
Observation of meetings is a method that is time consuming and requires patience, 
listening and recording skills. Being present in people’s meetings can be an 
uncomfortable arrangement. Sometimes holding papers and a pen, recording 
proceedings, raised eye brows of participants some of whom would mistake me for a 
journalist. In this case I always had to explain that I was a researcher from Wits 
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University55. Mentioning Wits University generally made the participants not ask 
further questions, perhaps because of the respected local profile of the University.  
An important aspect of participant observation is direct observation. I directly 
observed human activities in public spaces of neighbourhoods of Yeoville. Direct 
observation also involved “walking in the city”56 as a research method and not just an 
aspect of everyday practices. “Walking in the city” enabled me to observe, listen and 
identify different zones of criminal and violent activity and moulds of community 
responses thereto. Related to and entwined with observation are unstructured, semi-
structured and group interviews. 
 
ii. Unstructured interviews     
I carried out unstructured interviews with key informants and ordinary community 
members so as to elicit their experiences, perceptions about community-based 
community safety governance. Sixty unstructured key informant interviews and 
conversations were conducted with participants who are strategically positioned 
within the community organisations engaged in crime and violence governance (see 
Appendix B). Such informants provided rich information on the subject matter. Two 
unstructured group interviews were conducted to further introspect into group 
dynamics and their influences on community safety governance. Group interviews 
complemented meeting observation by allowing me to influence discussions and 
freely pose questions, a privilege that I did not necessarily enjoy during observation 
of meetings of community organisations. I conducted group interviews with street 
patrollers and selected migrants so as to explore their collective experiences and 
perceptions.     
Unstructured interviews are defined by Minichiello et al (1990) as interviews in which 
neither the question nor the answer categories are predetermined (Minichiello et al. 
1990). Patton (2002) describes unstructured interviews as a natural extension of 
participant observation, because they so often occur as part of ongoing participant 
                                                     
55 Commonly used shorthand for University of the Witwatersrand 
56
 This is a notion used by De Certeau. See de Certeau, Michael. 1984. The practice of everyday life. 
Berkeley CA: California; University of California Press. 
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observation fieldwork (Patton 2002). In my case, many of my unstructured 
interviews initiated as informal conversations with both key informants and ordinary 
community members. Unstructured interviews are hailed for exposing the researcher 
to unanticipated themes and thus enabling a better understanding of the interviewees’ 
social realities from the interviewees’ perspectives (Seidman 2006). The fact that 
unstructured interviews do not use predefined questions and answers does not mean 
that they are random and directionless. In conducting unstructured interviews, I kept 
in mind the purpose and general scope of issues under study and probed issues that 
were important to my study. Complementing unstructured interviews were semi-
structured interviews. 
 
iii. Semi-structured interviews       
In cases where research assistants were employed, I commissioned them to conduct 
semi-structured interviews so that I could influence the flow of the interviews even 
in my absence. This is because the research assistants may not have been as 
conversant with my research as I was; hence the need to guide them by way of a 
detailed aide memoire (interview guide or agenda). An aide memoire is a broad guide to 
issues that might be covered in the interview and is supposed to be open-ended and 
flexible (Briggs 1983; Burgess 1984). The use of an aide memoire enabled consistency 
of questions asked by employed research assistants during the qualitative opinion and 
attitude survey. The qualitative opinion survey accessed 40 participants with whom 
long qualitative interviews were conducted (see Appendix B). The logic was that the 
qualitative opinion and attitude survey could reduce the biases of researching people 
who deliberately participated in community security governing organisations. The 
opinion and attitude survey was done in the public domain with people randomly 
and purposively picked from the streets, public spaces or their homes.  
To complement primary data from participant and direct observation and 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews, I conducted document reviews. 
 
iv. Document reviews  
The review of existing documents involved an analysis of the academic publications, 
local newsletter, minutes of community organisations’ meetings, non-governmental 
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organisations and city or national government departments. Document reviews relied 
on the technique of content analysis; which is used to analyse the “symbolic content” 
of any communication (Singleton et al 1993: 381). In the section below, I discuss the 
(politics) of the techniques and processes of analysing research data. 
 
5.2.3. Field politics behind the laptop: data analysis and interpretation 
In the analysis of both primary and secondary data, I employed thematic content 
analysis techniques. According to Singleton et al (1993: 381), “the basic idea in 
content analysis is to reduce the total content of a communication to a set of 
categories that represent some characteristic of the population under study”. Content 
analysis involves an analysis of visual, verbal and non-verbal documents (Ibid). It 
calls for engagement in a critical selection and definition of content categories. The 
categories that were thematically relevant to my study were analysed based on 
frequency and intensity of appearance in a text and there deemed significant for the 
study (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Through content analysis, I examined 
narratives collected from participant observation, direct observation, unstructured 
interviews, structured interviews and secondary documents. In deploying content 
analysis, I took into cognisance the socio-political context within which the 
observations and recordings were made.        
Thematic content analysis aggregately and singularly employed a series of qualitative 
analysis techniques such as: context analysis, conversational or discourse analysis, 
semiotic analysis and quasi statistics or ethno-statistics. Context analysis involves the 
scrutiny of micro and macro social environments of human interaction. It involves 
the interpretation of the situational meaning(s) of texts; the environment in which 
the pieces of information are produced and recorded (van Manen 1990). In this way 
it seeks to describe a social situation and the cultural patterns surrounding it. All 
community security governance practices learnt during interviews were weighed 
against their socio-political, cultural, institutional and historical contexts during 
analysis (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993).  
Discourse or conversation analysis involves a linguistic analysis of the flow of 
communication (Gee 1992). It calls for an interpretation of the competing 
perspectives portrayed in communication, be they written or tape-recorded. 
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Conversation analysis was more suitable for the analysis of material from observed 
meetings, group interviews, structured and unstructured interviews. The frequency of 
competing stand points could indicate the pattern of interaction and reflect on the 
strength or significance of particular themes in the data. Semiotic analysis involves an 
analysis of written as well as acted signs or texts (Manning 1987). It was useful in the 
analysis of spatial practices and socio-spatial emblems observed during “walkings in 
the city”. Quasi statistics or ethno-statistics use the approach of counting the number 
of times something is mentioned in field notes as a very rough estimate of frequency 
(Gephart 1988). This kind of enumeration is used to provide evidence for categories 
created or determine if observations are contaminated (Gephart 1988). High 
frequency of occurrence of a theme suggests its strength as a matter of concern for 
participants, while staggered and erratic occurrence of a theme would justify its 
rejection during analysis. This method was particularly useful in extrapolating and 
interpreting data from the qualitative opinion and attitude survey.    
In analysing collecting, collating and presenting data, I tried to consistently demarcate 
the voices of my participants from my voice? Since this is both an empirical and 
theoretical endeavour, I needed to make sure I do not suffocate the voices of my 
participants in the service of pursuing a theoretical agenda. I learnt from Clifford 
Geetz in this regard. Clifford Geetz differentiates between experience-near concepts and 
experience-distant concepts (Geetz 1974). An experience-near concept, according to 
Geetz is one that research participants can naturally and effortless use to define what 
they feel, think, imagine and can readily understand when similarly applied to others 
(Geetz 1974: 28). Therefore, experience-near concepts constitute the everyday 
language of research participants. On the other hand, experience-distant concepts are 
ones used by the researcher or the scientist in his or her intellectual or academic 
practice - that is his/her theoretical or conceptual lenses (Geetz 1974: 28). In 
analysing, interpreting and discussing my research findings, I make extensive use of 
boxes to present primary data (mainly extracts of community meetings; demarcating 
the voices of the participants from my voice (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In this way I 
endeavour to present the voices of my participants as “discourses that speak for 
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themselves”57 (Bourdieu 1999c); although I acknowledge my influences in arranging, 
formatting and presenting them following a particular logic.     
The extent to which discourses of research participants speak for themselves can be 
questioned on the basis that the transcription of interviews or meeting proceedings 
from oral to written form entail a loss of meaning, “the voice, pronunciation (notably 
in its socially significant variations), intonation, and rhythm” in one way or another 
(Bourdieu 1999e: 622). Transcription is therefore a political process that can be 
tantamount to appropriation of meaning or what Bourdieu (1999) calls “rewriting”; 
with potentials for loss of originality. Perhaps that is an issue that all written field 
research has to contend with; although efforts have to be made to more correctly 
capture the words of research participants.       
All the observed material was subjected to correspondence analysis or relational analysis58, 
which I deployed to critically explore the politics of the location and positionality of 
various community organisations, institutions, social groups and individuals in the 
social space (field) of community safety governance and in related fields in the 
broader political, social, and economic spaces. Doing fieldwork and data analysis, I 
kept in mind my obligation towards ethical conduct. 
 
5.2.4. “Navigating the field ethically”  
In the conduct of fieldwork, I was bound by the ethics of social science research, and 
also by the moral codes of humanity. Every social science research, if it is not to hurt 
the participants or social science profession, should be bound by rules of research 
conduct which are here referred to as “research ethics” (Erickson 1992). The 
principal issue in ethics is that researchers should avoid infringing on the rights of 
participants and undermine their welfare (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993; 
Wassenaar 2006). This is important because research may involve “making 
participants’ private worlds public”, sometimes revealing confidential statements 
                                                     
57 This strategy involves the use of headings and sub-heading taken from phrases in the interview or 
community meeting proceedings as headings or subheadings in the presentation and interpretation of 
research findings (cf. Bourdieu 1999). I adopt that method in Chapters 6, 7 and 8; and where I use my 
own titles, it is clearly demonstrated that they are mine. 
58 This is a Bourdieusian approach to the analysis of the social world. See, for example, Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, Bourdieu 1999a etc. Also see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the notion of 
correspondence analysis. 
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made in a context of a relationship based on trust (Bourdieu 1999b). During 
interview processes and participant observation, I was conscious of the need to 
minimise committing (any kind of) symbolic violence on my participants by exerting 
myself over them as the “knower” and treat them as mere “knowables” (Harding 
1991). I presented myself as a learner and them as my experts and teachers on local 
security and safety issues.  
In light of my ethical consciousness, I conformed to the requirements of the 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Witwatersrand, to which I applied 
for ethics clearance as a pre-condition for the conduct of my fieldwork. I committed 
to abide by principles of informed consent, debriefing, and confidentiality as well as 
giving of feedback to research participants amongst others. 
The principle of informed consent dictated that I avoid intrusive research and seek 
the voluntary agreement of participants to participate in my research (Wassenaar 
2006). I informed participants of their right to withdraw from participating in the 
research should they deem so. Every participant had the privilege of signing a 
consent form if they were comfortable with participating in the research. I debriefed 
all participants who agreed to participate in my research; explaining the purpose and 
utility of the research (Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Having debriefed my 
participants, I guaranteed their confidentiality by promising the use of pseudonyms 
where identity had to be concealed to protect them (Bourdieu 1999c; Singleton, 
Straits and Straits 1993). Except one participant who opted to have his real name 
used in this thesis, all other names are pseudo. The participant whose real name I use 
authorised this in a conversation I had with him: 
“I don’t want to hide my name. I am not afraid of criticism. If anybody gives 
me a good reason not to do the work I am doing in Yeoville I would gladly 
accept their view. You are free to use my real name in your document” 
(18/08/2012) 
As a way of being accountable to the research participants, I promised to do 
feedback workshops in Yeoville; given the means to do so. As much as there are 
ethical precautions to be taken in conducting fieldwork, sometimes the everyday 
politics of fieldwork require pragmatism in navigating the associated social 
interaction and dynamics.  
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5.3. Fieldwork and the politics of everyday life 
Conducting fieldwork involves immersing oneself into the everyday lives of people 
being researched and interacted with. In this section I offer a narrative of the social 
politics of my presence in the daily lives and daily spaces of individuals, groups and 
organisations of concern to my research. I show that the conduct of fieldwork is a 
process of everyday negotiation, social interaction and social commerce. 
 
5.3.1. Negotiation: the diplomacy of access     
One of the main challenges of any research is how to gain entry and be accepted by 
stakeholders and community power-brokers in the social settings the fieldwork is 
conducted (Moser and MacIliwaine 2004; Singleton, Straits and Straits 1993). Gaining 
entry into the field is a question of managing one’s impressions; a question of self-
presentation (Neuman 2000). I disclosed my status as the starting point of 
negotiating for permission and acceptance to participate in community meetings and 
activities (as an observer). This was particularly important under circumstances where 
community meetings were a major source of information.   
Social research contexts may have gate-keepers. This means that a series of 
negotiations and compromises may take place before adequate access to the field is 
gained. I grappled with gate-keeping at the individual, group or organisational levels. 
Being accepted in meetings of community organisations required some negotiation 
with those running those organisations. In the same vein, securing appointments was 
a process of negotiation and renegotiation, sometimes with no success. Research is 
therefore a political process of a series of negotiations, and gaining access is never a 
once off thing (Neuman 2000). Writing about the complexities of negotiating access 
in public entities, Burgess claims: 
“Finally, there are public settings such as towns, football matches, church 
services, school assemblies and parents’ evenings when access cannot be 
successfully negotiated with all participants. In each instance, there is no 
opportunity for the researcher to have full permission to observe for research 
purposes in such settings. Indeed, even if formal announcements are made or 
negotiations conducted with town councils, football managers, the clergy or 
head teachers it still leaves vast numbers of people outside the research 
bargain. Negotiating directly with those on whom researchers intend to focus 
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their studies is a difficult requirement to fulfil in public settings” (Burgess 1984: 
49).  
Nurturing and maintaining social relationships with participants is integral to 
negotiation for (maintenance of) access and sometimes one has to make do with 
denial of access. An example in which full access was denied was the attendance of 
YCPF executive meetings. YCPF executive meetings are those in which executive 
members do strategic deliberations and make tactical decisions. In a conversation 
with the YCPF secretary general, I asked if I could be allowed to attend YCPF 
executive meetings and this was his response: 
“No, you won’t be allowed. The executive will be strategising and they 
wouldn’t want you to attend as they strategise” (Conversation, Zweli [YCPF 
Secretary]: 06/11/2010). 
I pleaded with him and he agreed to negotiate with the rest of the executive on my 
behalf so that I could be allowed to attend this meeting. This, however, ultimately 
failed. One day, before in a YCPF public meeting, for which I had come earlier, the 
YCPF executive guys had a small caucus meeting. I attended this meeting by default. 
In the meeting, one YCPF member, acting on my behalf, asked the YCPF 
chairperson to allow me to attend YCPF executive meetings. He responded: 
“He is not welcome here. He has already attended now. He has eaten the 
butter already. He can attend the CPF broader meeting, CPF public meetings 
and Sector meetings, but not our executive meeting” (Conversation, 
Lehlohonolo [YCPF Chairperson]: 06/11/2010). 
Following this statement, Zweli re-negotiated on my behalf and then the chairperson 
and his deputy chairperson Bongani agreed that I can attend. Bongani said: “You can 
attend, but you keep quite. You don’t contribute anything”. Despite this, they later 
on reneged, completely blocking my access to this meeting.   
So, there was some censoring of what kind of information I could access directly 
from the YCPF executive. In another case, in an interview, the chairperson of the 
YCPF preferred to read out information from a strategic plan document, rather than 
give me a copy which I had asked for. Perhaps the reading of the document was 
selective and was meant to ensure the censoring of information perceived to be too 
sensitive to be shared with me.     
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The challenges of gaining access to participants or research settings are further 
underscored by the incident in which one of my research assistants was attacked and 
nearly got beaten by the husband of a woman he was interviewing. The research 
assistant reported: 
“When I saw the respondent, she was relaxed and basking outside along the 
pavement in Muller Street together with her children who were also playing 
outside. As I interviewed the woman the interview was disturbed towards the 
end as the husband came in and told me to get away and started beating up the 
wife. He also wanted to attack me but I was very fortunate as the woman 
during the interview kept on mentioning a member of the CPF who stays 
across the street and during the interview he was sitting in his car and 
everything that was taking place was in his view, hence I had to run to him for 
safety. The member of the CPF managed to handle the situation with ease as 
he somehow commanded respect and also knew the husband and the wife, he 
also knew about the research which made it easy for him to come to my aid. 
That also confirmed the information that the woman gave during the interview 
to be correct and truthful” (Opinion and attitude survey: participant TB12, 
2011). 
This experience shows the cultural complexities of male researchers conducting 
interviews with women, especially within an androcentric setting in which men as 
husbands, fathers or brothers take guardianship of women and girls. This particular 
case demonstrates that accessing a (female) respondent requires payment of attention 
to the cultural or situational setting. Here the researcher got himself into trouble by 
not accessing the woman for interview with the approval of the husband. Again, the 
beating of the woman by her husband is a matter of ethical concern, yet what is 
relieving is that a YCPF member stopped the husband from beating his wife. 
Sometimes gaining and maintaining access was enabled by key informants who 
treated me as a friend and eased my welcome into their organisations; making it 
easier for me to converse with their colleagues. For instance, in a conversation after a 
YCPF broader meeting, Mr. Thabang introduced me to some participant: 
“You see this gentleman. He must the properly introduced in these meetings. 
Do you know that he will be called doctor soon? In simple terms, I can say he 
is doing a PhD in CPFs and community safety. He needs to be properly 
introduced” (Conversation, Thabang: 09/04/2011). 
This statement was said after I had spent nine months in the field. One would hope 
that I would be known by most local people participating in community meetings, 
but that was not the case. In Mr. Thabang’s view, there was still a need for me to be 
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“introduced properly”. This confirms the fact that entering the research field is a 
process of continuous negotiation and renegotiation given the complex nature of 
social groups.     
I managed, in one way or another, to consolidate myself within the complex socio-
political context of my study area. I felt freer to engage with my research participants, 
both South African and non-South African. As a non-South African researcher I felt 
at home because, at least in rhetoric, leaders of community based organisations 
welcomed non-South African Blacks participating in their activities. Most local 
activists and leaders frequently spoke about the importance of having non-South 
Africans participating in their activities, citing that Yeoville was a pan-African 
community and ought to be inclusive.    
Some research participants hinted, in various ways, that they expected to benefit 
from having me hang around them. There was subtle, but mounting pressure, for me 
to engage with the participants in ways that made them benefit from my presence. 
During an interview a leader of the YCF asked for a favour: 
“We are looking for lawyers to assist us in our fight against hijackers of 
buildings in Yeoville. Can you assist us get some Lawyers” (Zondi: 
10/08/2010). 
I did not promise to get them a lawyer, but he kept on, over the days, asking me how 
far I had gone in that endeavour. So this is a task I got for hanging around a 
community organisation as a researcher. My research participants, in cases such as 
this, treated me as an important contact - a friend and advisor. One therefore 
inevitably assumes political positioning amongst the communities he conducts 
fieldwork. 
  
5.3.2. “Subjective” socio-political positioning acknowledged  
As a researcher, I was positioned in the scientific field and the social field at once; 
inevitably being a socio-political being (Bourdieu 1991b; Bourdieu 2003). I took 
positions in these two fields and had to juggle the associated contradictions.  
In attempting to understand my positioning in some of the power fields in Yeoville, I 
narrate here my first stokes of emotions such as fear and excitement, amongst others. 
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When I came to Johannesburg to stay and conduct research, I initially worried 
continuously. This was because of the horrible stories I had heard about crime and 
violence in the city of Johannesburg, more so in the innercity and townships. Places 
such as Hillbrow, Johannesburg CBD, Yeoville, Diepsloot and Alexandra, as I had 
heard about them were havens of violence and crime; places abound with blazing 
guns and glittering or blood-dripping knives. My research was to focus on one or 
more of these areas.  
As if it was a self-fulfilling prophesy, my first experience as I entered Johannesburg 
was horrible. As I arrived at Park Station, coming by bus from Harare, I was robbed 
of my money. This happened as I was making a phone call at a public telephone 
booth to get a friend to come and pick me up. While making the telephone call, a 
man who appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, came to me and 
asked “ngiceli imali” (give me money). He was speaking Zulu, a language I barely 
understood at the time. All I realised was that I was in danger. Having realised that I 
could not speak Zulu, he spoke in English:  
“Man, give me money. Be fast. If you do anything stupid, my friends will come 
here and you won’t like it. They are watching right now” (Robber [Park Station 
- Johannesburg]: 16/01/2010). 
I tried to pretend not to hear or understand him. The man then stretched his hands 
towards my pocket, presumably in search of valuables. Before he reached my phone, 
I handed him R50 and he left me instantly. This was a scary experience. I wondered 
what kind of life I was to live in Johannesburg. I got worried about how I was to 
successfully conduct a study on urban violence and crime in such a city. Such was my 
introduction to the city of Johannesburg. 
Being present in meetings organised and led by South Africans was not always an 
easy experience. This is because in community meetings, there was a constant 
affirmation of the discourse that most community problems in Yeoville were a result 
of the presence of African immigrants concentrated in the area. Apparently, 
Zimbabweans, Nigerians and Congolese were commonly regarded as the most 
problematic groups. At one point I had to abort my participation at a YCF meeting 
when an invited speaker uttered xenophobic statements much to the ululation of the 
participating crowd: 
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“Some foreign nationals are coming here running away from dictators. Some 
of them engage in serious criminal activities here. We have more than three 
million Zimbabweans here in South Africa. They should go back home and 
solve their problems. They should go and vote out the dictator, simple” 
(Majola, YCF Meeting: 26/08/2010). 
I left the meeting fearing for my safety, although I also found the encounter amusing. 
I left because I had introduced myself to the members of the forum and I was sure 
that most of them knew I am Zimbabwean. One of the leading members of the 
forum constantly looked at me as this man uttered his statements about Zimbabwean 
nationals in South Africa. This issue was linked to the need by members of this 
forum to deal with cases of hijacked houses and illegal collection of rent from 
tenants, which they alleged, was an enterprise dominated by Zimbabwean nationals. 
The ambiguity of my position is further illustrated by the fact that some leaders of 
community organisation insisted on wanting me to attend all their meetings. This, in 
a way, made me feel obliged to attend their forums. At some point leaders of YCF 
registered displeasure if I missed their meetings and this was both positive and 
straining in terms of time and being able to delineate my role as a researcher. There 
was a time I consecutively missed four meetings of the YCF and when I met one of the 
YCF leaders we had the following conversation (Box 2). 
Box 2: “Why are you not coming to our meetings ...?” 
Zondi: Why are you not coming to our meetings these days? Are you confused or 
something? 
Me: I have not been in town in a long time, but now that I am back, I will resume 
attendance.  
Zondi. Things have been happening man. There has been a split in the forum. Our 
secretary and deputy chairperson have abandoned the forum. 
Me: Ah! Why did they leave? 
Zondi: I am sure they have been influenced by those people who dislike this forum.  
Date of conversation: 30/11/2010 
Following the conversation on Box 2, I observe that the insistence on me to attend 
meetings could have been a sign that the YCF leader considered me to be of utility to 
him and his organisation. This brings forth the idea that the field researcher can be 
an asset to the community, individuals or places where he conducts his research.  
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5.3.3. Field research and community politics: profit-seeking, manipulation… 
As a researcher, the perceptions that participants had about me bordered between 
those depicting me a resource in their socio-economic and political struggles to those 
that depicted me as a liability. Some participants saw in me an important connection 
in pursuit of their organisational, social group and individual goals and others hoped 
that the findings of my research could be published to the world and reach 
stakeholders in government and other circles of concerned stakeholders who could 
empathise with their situations.     
Because I am a Zimbabwean, some of the leaders and members of community based 
organisations expected me to be a conduit through which they could reach out to the 
Zimbabwean and other non-South African population in Yeoville (Benit-Gbaffou 
and Mkwanazi 2011). A YCF leader said: 
“We would appreciate having you attend the YCF and other community 
meetings in Yeoville. Maybe that can assist us boost the membership of YCF. 
There is a serious problem of foreigners being negative towards the YCF and 
other community forums and meetings” (Conversation, Zondi [YCF 
Chairperson]: 08/08/2010).  
The other challenge is that in some cases, I was being pressured to give something 
back to individuals and community forums or organisations, just for being allowed to 
hang around them as a researcher. In one scenario, a leader of the YSF wanted me to 
provide him with information on the proceedings of meetings of the YCF (Box 3).  
Box 3: “Why don't you spy for me?” 
YSF Leader: I know there is a meeting that takes place under the tree every Sunday here in 
Yeoville. I know you attend that meeting. What is happening there? 
Me: Yeah. They are trying to deal with the issue of hijacked buildings there. 
YSF Leader: What do they discuss there? I hear that we are being attacked there. Why don’t 
you spy for me?  It would be good if you can give me feedback about what is happening 
there. 
Me: Most of the issues discussed there are discussed in Zulu, which I don’t understand very 
well. I am also almost always at a loss. I am audio recording the proceedings. 
Interview  date: 19/08/2010 
I interpret the request for me to spy on another organisation as an attempt by some 
community stakeholders to enrol me into positions where I become their ally in their 
political games of competition and contestation for legitimation. However, divulging 
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information about other organisations was potentially dangerous in that it could 
result in my image and role as a researcher being tarnished and reduced to that of a 
spy. Needless to say this could undermine my research. In light of these kinds of 
situations, Burgess advises: 
“Researchers should not conduct research in order to spy on the activities of 
others on behalf of the gatekeeper” (Burgess 1984: 51).     
I handled my position in a way that guaranteed that I would not jeopardise my 
relationship with leaders and members competing within and between community 
organisations. To avoid being labelled a spy, I kept confidential all information 
obtained from all meetings and interviews.   
In some circumstances, people in organisations that I was researching and whose 
meetings I attended viewed me as a potential resource for their internal operations. 
On several occasions, I was asked to prepare minutes for organisational meetings. I 
took meeting minutes for the YCPF broader meetings and YCPF public meetings, 
Sector Crime Forums and African Diaspora Forum59. Writing and organisational 
skills that I was perceived to possess were a form of knowledge capital that those 
running community organisations wanted to tap on. At the same time this knowledge 
capital that I was perceived to possess was a source of symbolic capital; of recognition 
and honour as a researcher and as a person. 
Being a researcher within the community security governance field, I found myself 
being unwittingly placed into a complex web of power politics involving different 
organisations and activists (Chapter 6). In this case, community organisations 
enrolled me as a useable human resource/capital, while I enrolled them to access the 
information I needed. It was therefore a relationship of mutual dependence and 
exchange; which however had implications on my obligations to both society and 
science. 
 
                                                     
59 I was a deputy secretary general and subsequently secretary general of African Diaspora Forum 
during and beyond the time of conducting fieldwork and writing this thesis. 
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5.4. Scientific self-guardianship and political involvement 
Conducting social research comes with the complexities of balancing the need to 
abide by the principles of scientific scholarship and our subjective desires to 
contribute to society. It is important to strike a balance between the ethics of 
scientific practice and the moralistic ethics of social engagement. In this case, 
navigating the boundaries of involvement is a community as a researcher, resident 
and/or activist was not an easy endeavour for me. 
 
5.4.1. “Renting rather than tenting”: ethnography beyond Malinowski 
Staying and participating in daily activities in Yeoville, I can safely claim that my 
position as a researcher was not always visibly detected and I could make claims 
about being part of the community (a resident) rather than an outsider. This is unlike 
Malinowski’s experience of having to establish a tent in a place where there were pole 
and dagga houses, when he got involved in ethnographic research among the 
Omarkan villagers of the Trobriand Island (Wax 1972). By renting, I signified a claim 
of belonging to the community I was engaging with. And being a Black African, 
unlike Malinowski who was visibly non-native in Omarkan, I could easily relate and 
sometimes blend with my participants; identifying with them as Africans. No matter 
how much he tried to be part of the native Omarkan, establishing a tent, and not 
staying in the pole and dagga houses, was a stark mark of difference.  
Doing research using prolonged participatory methods pose dangers of overly 
identifying with the community one works in and with. Of course, in my case, it was 
not tantamount to going native in the Malinowskian fashion, as I was already a 
“native”, by virtue of being a Black African, even before I conducted field research. 
As soon as I inserted myself into the field through attending meetings and being 
increasingly visible in community meetings and more generally on the local socio-
political landscape, my presence ever more became obligatory. Missing a meeting 
became an issue for which leaders convening these meetings could question me (Box 
2). In light this, I find it imperative to discuss my activist endeavours during the 
conduct of fieldwork.  
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5.4.2. Is this a scholarship with commitment?  
As a researcher with a vested interest in seeing improvement in the recognition and 
welfare of African immigrants in South Africa, I found myself in a social and 
scholarly dilemma; recognising the limits of what I could do in social activism as a 
researcher. I found solace in my reading of Bourdieu (2000:40, 41, 44): 
“The question that I would like to raise is this: Can intellectuals and especially 
scholars intervene in the political sphere? Must intellectuals partake in political 
debates as such, and if so, under what conditions can they interject themselves 
efficiently? What role can intellectuals play in the various social movements, at 
the national level – that is, at the level where the fate of individuals and 
societies is increasingly being decided today? Can intellectuals contribute to 
inventing a new manner of doing politics fit for novel dilemmas and threats of 
our age? First of all, to avoid misunderstandings, one must state clearly that 
researchers, artists, or writers who intervene in the political world do not 
thereby become politicians [...]. They become public intellectuals, that is people 
who invest in a political struggle their specific authority and the values of their 
craft, such as the values of disinterestedness and truth – in other words people 
who enter the terrain of politics without forsaking their duties and 
competencies as researchers…Today’s researchers must invent an improbable 
combination: scholarship with commitment, that is, a collective politics of 
intervention in the political field that follows, as much as possible, the rules 
that govern the scientific field …” (Bourdieu 2000a) 
In light of Bourdieu’s recommendation, I involved myself in struggles of African 
immigrants. 
My political positioning as a researcher, my identity as a non-South African and the 
political nature of my subject of investigation put me in politically complex roles and 
situations. While doing research, I had an internal urge to do something, however 
small, to improve the situation of African immigrants. In the course of my 
explorations and attendance of community meetings, I got involved with an 
organisation called African Diaspora Forum (ADF), and I was appointed its Deputy 
Secretary in February 2011, got elected into this position in June 2011 and became a 
substantive Secretary in February 2012. ADF is an organisation that aimed to reduce 
xenophobia in all its violent and symbolic manifestations in South Africa. Its work at 
the time of research was concentrated in Yeoville.     
While my membership of the executive of ADF was morally fulfilling as it gave me a 
sense of purpose emerging from contributing something to the African immigrant 
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community, it opened a very useful network for the conduct of my research. By 
virtue of my association with ADF (and Yeoville Studio), most of my participants 
were willing to talk to me and participate in my research. As I sat in YCPF broader 
meetings involving the management of the police in Yeoville, I was regarded as an 
ex-officio member of the YCPF, representing ADF and also conducting research. In 
the YCPF, I also successfully applied for membership on the basis of being a resident 
of Yeoville. This membership gave me voting rights, although I did not have an 
opportunity to participate in any YCPF election. In YSF meetings I was also equally 
accepted as a member of Yeoville Studio and as time went on as an ADF member. 
Having made some observation in Yeoville over a relatively long period, I 
contributed an article in Yeovue News (local newsletter) encouraging South Africans 
and non-South Africans to be tolerant towards each other and participate 
meaningfully in community matters (Chapter 7). To this article there was a response 
which dismissed my call for tolerance, arguing that non-South Africans were 
responsible for the urban decay in South Africa. This response was not only 
disheartening to me, but was interpreted by other contributors to the debate as 
“xenophobic”. My article and Majombozi’s attracted responses from successive 
Yeovue News issues. I had to officially withdraw from this debate, whilst proceeding to 
counter Majombozi’s article under the pseudonym Nkulumane and through ADF 
(Chapter 7). At some point I felt bad about initiating this debate, but realised that it 
was not only a rich source of information for my research, but a learning process for 
me and possibly other people involved in or following the debate.     
It emerged that during and after the conduct of my fieldwork, I had become 
politically involved and engaged. In fact, there is a realisation that scholars should 
intervene in public life and contribute to social transformation without 
compromising their position as scientists or intellectuals (Bourdieu 1998b; Bourdieu 
2008). Describing his own quest for political involvement and intervention, Bourdieu 
(2008: xiii) stated: 
“I run the risk of shocking those [researchers] who, opting for the cosy 
virtuousness of confinement within their ivory tower, see intervention outside 
the academic sphere as a dangerous failing of that famous ‘axiological 
neutrality’ which was wrongly identified with scientific objectivity […] But I 
am convinced that we must at all costs bring the ac
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scholarship into public debate, from which they are tragically absent” 
(Bourdieu 2008). 
The value of science and its contribution to positive social transformation can only 
be realised if intellectuals get involved in the project of social change and 
development. Hence I found myself obliged, as an immigrant, to do something at a 
minute level to improve the situation of African immigrants who suffered 
discrimination in everyday social life in South Africa.  
      
5.5. Field research as political enterprise: concluding note 
From the story of my field experiences, I make a series of points about the politics of 
community-oriented field research. Firstly, I argue that far from being simply 
technical, sampling, selection and deployment of research methods and data analysis 
or interpretation, are political and subjective enterprises that cannot be easily 
standardised.  
Secondly, I conclude that the conduct of community oriented research enmeshes the 
researcher into the realpolitiks of everyday life in which access to communities or 
participants has to be continuously negotiated and renegotiated. It also entails a long 
period of excitement, stress, depression and fear at times; especially in cases like mine 
where a researcher has to conduct research in a context that is different from the one 
he was used to before. Being located in a politically vibrant community may entail 
that the researcher faces the challenge of being bogged in and by manipulative 
politics - which may either be petty or much more serious.     
Thirdly, the field researcher faces a dilemma of guarding the scientific enterprise 
whilst also remaining a social being; as he or she is a social being, even before he or 
she is a researcher. By renting accommodation in the neighbourhood I was doing 
field research, I marked my political presence and became a part of the everydayness 
of the neighbourhood and community - attending community meetings and 
participating in civic structures. My participation took the form of community 
activism - as evinced by my joining of ADF, becoming its Deputy Secretary General 
and later its substantive Secretary General. This entails a scholarship closer to what 
Bourdieu refers to as a “scholarship with commitment” (Bourdieu 2008). In the next 
chapter, I discuss the nature of community politics in the neighbourhood I 
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conducted research - a community politics that I had to navigate in the conduct of 
my research. 
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6. Chapter Six 
Stakeholder politics and community safety governance in 
Yeoville 
 
            Box 4: “Everything is done for a reason” 
OK: Do you harbour any political ambitions outside of the YCPF? 
Lehlonolo: Of course. I was deployed here. Most people you see in CPF structures are 
deployed by the ANC. I am a member of the ANC. 
OK: Do you hope to become a politician one day? 
Lehlonolo: (Laughs). Of course. Everything is done for a reason. No one can just volunteer 
Conversation, YCPF Chairperson, Lehlonolo: 17/04 2012 
  
6.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, accounts of community security initiatives, globally 
and in South Africa, tend to gloss over or ignore the role of stakeholder politics in 
configuring these initiatives. I argue that the field of community safety governance is 
characterised by a constellation of coalescing and competing interests of community 
stakeholders (organisations, institutions, individuals and social groups)60. These 
interests are linked to and go beyond the safety production agenda.  
This chapter argues that the provision of safety has become a business where various 
kinds of economic, social, political, moral and spatial capitals or profits are sort after. 
This is so in a context where safety and security is considered to be in the top three 
of concerns of South Africans (Parnell and Pieterse 2010). In pursuing this argument, 
I examine the logic of stakeholder interests, practices, discourses, strategies and 
tactics in the community security governance field. In this way, I unpack the micro 
social, moral and political economies of the field of community safety production61 
(Arnold 2001; Bowles and Gintis 1998).  
I conceptualise the field of community safety governance as a field of micro-politics 
and micro-economics of stakeholder contestation and coalition. This chapter 
examines the i) shifting nature of organisational relations; ii) coalition of community 
organisations; iii) organisational and individual contestations (pointing of fingers); iv) 
the circulation of actors and concentration of local social influence; v) the positioning 
of state and community actors and lastly; vi) the infusion of local electoral politics 
                                                     
60 See Table 3 for a list of organisational and institutional stakeholders involved in safety governance 
in Yeoville. 
61 See Appendix A for definitions of social economy, moral economy and political economy. 
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into the field of community safety governance. Through this analysis, I unpack 
political actions and position-takings of stakeholders in the community safety 
governance field. 
   
6.2. Power and profit seeking: organising, competing, coalescing … 
Box 4 above demonstrates that actors in community security governing organisations 
have a purpose, and seek gain in one way or another as “everything is done for a 
reason”. The Chairperson of the YCPF, suggested that he was not just an executive 
member of the YCF, but was “deployed by the ANC” in the YCPF - meaning that 
he was in YCPF to safeguard ANC interests (Box 4). This shows that stakeholders 
involved in safety governance operate in a complex environment and have 
converging and diverging interests. Community security governance is therefore a 
field of micro-politics and can be considered as a sub-field of the political field (Bourdieu 
1991a).    
In this section I narrate and interpret the forms and logics of socially unifying and 
contentious stakeholder politics in and of the community security governance field in 
Yeoville. Figure 10 shows multiple dealings by community organisations, social 
groups and individuals involved in community security governance; pursuing their 
interests. Stakeholders compete and coalesce for political, symbolic, moral, social, 
economic or cultural capitals (Katsaura 2012). These capitals are pursued under the 
banner of public interest or public good - the reduction of crime and violence being 
the most publicly or institutionally saleable and buyable one in this case (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Constellation of interests in the field of community safety governance 
Stakeholder interests: 
(Organisational, institutional, individual, social 
group) 
 Public good – public safety 
Reduction of crime, violence and fear 
 
Self gain/profit (capital) 
For organisational, institutional, individual, 
social group benefit (self-interest) 
Source: Author 
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I describe and interpret, in sections below, narratives about contestations and 
coalitions in the field of community safety governance in Yeoville, with special 
reference to stakeholder contestations and coalitions.  
 
6.2.1. Shifting community safety governance landscape 
Yeoville’s local political landscape saw the emergence of YCF in February 2010.62 
Box 5 shows an excerpt of proceedings of a YCF meeting in which the goals of YCF 
were highlighted.  
Box 5: “We need to take Yeoville back” 
Zondi: There is a great concern with 
the hijacking of buildings in Yeoville. 
There is unlawful control of buildings 
by specific individuals or groups, who 
are then collecting rent from tenants.  
 
Nomfundo: Yes. The people who are 
hijacking buildings are foreign 
nationals. I am not shy to indicate 
that. This is what is causing 
xenophobia. How would you feel as a 
South African when you pay rent to a 
foreign national who collects rent that 
is not due to him? These hijackers are 
criminals. The problem of hijacking of 
buildings is one of the biggest ones in Yeoville. 
 
Participant:  As a forum we need to identify these hijacked buildings and do something. 
 
Zondi: Housing shortages are a serious problem. There have been many promises for the 
improvement of the housing situation in Yeoville and nothing has been delivered. People are 
living in squalid conditions and it is unhealthy and unacceptable. Apart from the problem of 
hijacking of buildings, crimes such as robberies, rape, etc. are a big problem in Yeoville.  
 
CPF Chairperson: There is need to map out the hotspots of crime in each of the sectors of 
Yeoville. This is because every space has its own crime problems. This mapping is important 
because it will help us determine how we deploy street patrollers. You cannot deploy street 
patrollers in spaces that have no crime. 
 
Zondi: We need to take the forum seriously. We need to voice the problems of the 
community rather than have decisions being imposed on us from above. The voicing of our 
concern have to be done through community structures. For example, we should reject the 
proposal of the Municipal Demarcation Board to divide Yeoville and Bellevue in preparation 
                                                     
62 The first community meeting that I attended upon getting into Yeoville for my research was the 
YCF meeting. I attended my first meeting on the 8th of August 2010. It is therefore no coincidence 
that the YCF is my entry point in my analysis of the local politics of Yeoville.  
Photo 1: YCF participants holding a meeting 'under the tree' at 
Yeoville Recreation Centre 
@Katsaura 2010 
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of the local government elections.  We need to take Yeoville back if we are to operate fully as 
a forum. We therefore need to be united, because without being united we cannot succeed in 
this.  
 
Gazilami: We need to raise funds to support the running of the forum. We need money for 
airtime and transport to enhance the smooth running of the forum. All forum members 
should contribute money in this regard. 
 
YCF meeting: 08/08/2010 
One can read the YCF as a space of insurgent citizenship (Holston 2008), an ethno-
national regionalist  space (Bourdieu 1991a; Nederveen 2007) and a space of solace, 
association and social mobilisation for a group of people who can be described as 
urban outcasts (Wacquant 1993; Wacquant 2008d) or margizens (Schuilenburg 2008).  
I interpret YCF as a space for insurgent citizenship (Holston 2008) because of i) the 
emphasis on “taking Yeoville back”; ii) its need to “identify” “hijacked buildings” 
and take action on them; iii) emphasis on the voicing of community problems; and 
iv) the “need to map out of hotspots of crime” (Box 5). YCF was a space in which 
frustrated community members attempted to take issues into their own hands in 
attempting to resolve their challenges. I also consider YCF as generating an invented 
space of citizen participation in which established authority was challenged (Benit-
Gbaffou and Mkwanazi 2011; Katsaura 2012). In this case, there was a pledge to 
resist the “imposition” of decisions from above.  
Whom did they want to “take Yeoville back” from? In my observation it was about 
“taking Yeoville back” from i) African immigrants accused of hijacking the 
neighbourhood and causing social malaise; and ii) from allegedly un-delivering 
politicians. Being a gathering of mainly frustrated South Africans using their native 
languages (mostly Zulu, Xhosa and Sesotho) and fanning anti African immigrant 
discourses, the YCF can be described as an ethno-national regionalist entity and space.   
As a space of solace for people marginalised from the housing market and 
mainstream economy, fatigued by waiting for the delivery of social housing by the 
state, congregating a mainly aged female constituency (see Photo 1, Box 5); the YCF 
can be described as a social space for urban outcasts (Wacquant 2008d), wasted lives 
(Bauman 2004) or margizens (Schuilenburg 2008) trying to attain justice and 
reconstruct their lives by engaging in “politics by other means” (Karlan 1999). The 
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struggle for housing, which was at the core of the YCF agenda was tantamount to a 
struggle for spatial capital (Lars 2008) and for associated honour or pride - for symbolic 
capital (Bourdieu 1986).  
Because of the marginalised standing of its constituency and its delegates, the YCF 
can be viewed as an outcast organisation in Yeoville’s socio-political space. They 
lacked economic resources (capital). Recognising this, a YCF leader insisted on the 
need to “raise funds” (Box 5) to ensure the smooth running of the organisation. 
However, one of the main capitals possessed by the YCF was the capital of (the threat 
of) violence, to be deployed on some building-hijacker African immigrants, and the 
capital (of the threat of) defiance or insurgency against local socio-political order and 
authority in Yeoville (Holston 2008; von Holdt 2012a).     
Shedding light on the relationship between YCF and other local organisations is the 
statement uttered by the chairperson of the YSF, an established organisation in 
Yeoville at that time:  
“There is a meeting that is held every Sunday under the tree in the park. Our 
organisations are being attacked there. Those convening this meeting are 
claiming that they want to give people houses. How can you get a house from 
an organisation that operates from under the tree, an organisation that cannot 
even house itself? I launch a huge onslaught on this organisation. It is reported 
that an executive member of the ANC is involved in these meetings. I have 
never been to any of these meetings for political reasons” (YSF Meeting, 
Thabang: 21/10/2010). 
This statement suggests a dismissal of the YCF as a naïve organisation without much 
potential to change the situation in Yeoville. Most importantly, it indicates the fear 
that YCF would undermine existing local organisations. The “under the tree 
meeting” phrase in this statement became a real label used to refer to the YCF over 
time - symbolically representing YCF as an outcast organisation run by outcast 
people with a deplorable agenda. The YCPF chairperson who used to participate in 
YCF meetings (Box 5) even shifted his stance, denouncing the YCF also. I asked him 
why he was no longer attending YCF meetings and he laughed and replied: 
“Do you mean the under the tree meeting? I realised that those people have no 
direction. I am not interested in their activities anymore” (Conversation: 
Lehlonolo, 01/11/2010). 
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He had distanced himself from the YCF, also enacting on it, the “under the tree 
meeting” label. 
In response to their sidelining in the local political landscape in Yeoville, YCF actors 
kept on “voicing” their concerns in public forums such as ward public meetings (see 
Box 6). 
Box 6: “Which forum are you talking about?” 
Zondi: Our community forum requires space in the community hall so as to be able to 
function properly. How can we gain access to the hall for our meetings? 
Ward Councillor: Which forum are you talking about? If there is anyone who wants to 
use space in the hall, they are free to do so as long as they can pay for it, there is nothing 
that can stop them from booking. They don’t have to come to me, but they should go to 
the manager. Maybe you should arrange a meeting with me so we can have a discussion 
about this forum. 
Ward public meeting, 09/10/2010 
By asking “which forum are you talking about?”; the ward councillor meant either 
her lack of knowledge about the existence of the YCF or lack of recognition of the 
forum, among other possibilities. After the initial dismissal of the YCF leader, the 
councillor indicated the possibility of meeting YCF leaders for “a discussion about 
the forum”. To the best of my knowledge, during my more than two year stint in 
Yeoville, no such meeting took place between YCF actors and the ward councillor. 
I observe that the militant and outrightly xenophobic approach of the YCF in 
responding to local challenges of “hijacked houses” placed them in tumultuous 
relationships with other organisations in the Yeoville. This was displayed in 
deliberative public forums where contributions from YCF members were dismissed 
or rebuked (see Box 7). 
Box 7: “Is he the chief of the mamas?” 
YCF member: Our mothers are suffering. They are being ill-treated by these hijackers of 
houses. It is a very painful situation. When are we going to solve this problem?  
YSF member: Why don’t these complaining mamas come to this meeting to present their 
problem? Is he the chief of the mamas? (Mamas means mothers) (This statement provoked a 
burst of laughter) 
Ward public meeting, 11/09/2010 
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The question levied against the YCF leader by the YSF member reduced him to a 
caricatured “chief of the mamas”. It implied that the YCF leader had no mandate or 
legitimacy to speak on behalf of these mothers. This exchange reflects the broader 
polarities between the community security governing organisations and individual 
stakeholders in Yeoville.  
I also observe that due to it its outcast status, the YCF failed to attract funding or 
enough material support for its activities. In November 2011, the YCF rebranded to 
Yeoville Housing and Development Forum (YHDF) and registered as a non profit 
organisation - with the hope improving its institutional standing and attracting 
funding.    
How can the unfolding micro-political dynamics associated with the emergence of 
the YCF in Yeoville be interpreted? The YCF increased the competitiveness of 
Yeoville’s micro-political landscape - creating an arena for stakeholder political 
battles and counter-battles. In these battles, the YSF, YBCDT and Ward Committee 
trio teamed up against YCF - dismissing it as an “under the tree” organisation. In 
return, the YCF dismissed the trio as ineffective, un-delivering and run by politically 
self-interested stakeholders.  
What were the political practices and strategies of the YCF and how effective were 
they? Consider Box 8 for highlights of YCF’s political activities.  
Box 8: Messages to government 
1. “Asenzelwa lutho 
eYeoville”. (Nothing is 
done for us in 
Yeoville) 
2.  “Siyaphela yinkunzi 
esitratweni nasemaflatini. 
Please Yeovue News help 
us”. (We are being 
mugged in the streets 
and in the flats. Please 
Yeovue News help us) 
3. “We want homes” 
4. “We have been waiting 
for houses for 15 
years” 
5. “Safa bo Msholozi, siza bo”. (We are dying Msholozi, help us. [Msholozi is the nickname 
of the incumbent South African President, Jacob Zuma] ) 
6. “Viva Msholozi, singabakho, viva!” (Viva Msholozi, we are yours, viva!) 
Photo 2: YCF participants planning a demonstration  
 
@ Katsaura 2010 
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7. Phansi ngokhuhlukunyenzwa kogogo, Phansi! (Down with the abuse of our 
grandmothers, down) 
Notes from placards displayed during a YCF demonstration: 16/09/2010 
From this demonstration, it emerges that the YCF sought to build political and symbolic 
capitals to be able to successfully compete with other community organisations in 
Yeoville (Box 8). Despite their march in the Johannesburg City Centre, to the 
Gauteng Department of Housing and Department of Home Affairs, none of their 
complaints were addressed.  
Against this backdrop, I argue that making demands from the state is evidence that 
YCF stakeholders could not escape the thought of the state or thinking through the state 
(Bourdieu 1998a). The practices and strategies of the YCF display mimesis and 
mimicry of the state agenda. They are informed by a statised habitus and a politics of 
longing to access the state. There was an engraving, in the YCF stakeholders minds, 
of belief in the state - further reifying the state as a concentration of capital or the central 
bank of capital (symbolic, political, economic etc.) (Bourdieu 1998a). The state was 
perceived by YCF members as a potentially reliable entity - one that can provide 
houses, reduce crime and offer better life chances to socio-economically and spatially 
marginalised South Africans.  
By staging a demonstration, the YCF rebranded itself as a potentially more militant 
voice in Yeoville; thus, creating a platform to dismiss other organisations such as the 
YSF as mild and politically compromised. “In this way YCF, to some extent, 
managed to claim a position within the landscape of community representation and 
activism in Yeoville” (Katsaura 2012: 333) - thus accumulating some political and 
symbolic capitals.  
The key messages of the demonstration were to ask the government to do “away 
with evil hijackers”, deliver homes and govern crime (Box 8). I posit that in making 
these requests from government, the YCF demonstrators invoked their citizenship 
and belonging to the South African polity as a justification of their entitlement to 
services; hence the claim “viva Msholozi, singabako, viva” [viva Msholozi, we are yours, 
viva] (Box 8). In my view the statement that “we are yours” indicates a clamour for 
entitlement and special treatment ahead of the non-South African Black other. This 
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shows the presence, in the minds of some South Africans, of a disjunctive public habitus 
that separates deserving South Africans from undeserving or invading Black non-
South Africans who are depicted as including “evil hijackers” amongst them.  
Now I examine the manifestations and logics of stakeholder cooperation and 
coalition. 
 
6.2.2. Cooperation and coalition of community organisations 
At some point, from 2010 to early 2012, the YBCDT provided office space and 
associated facilities to ADF and YCPF. Asked about the motivation for having ADF 
and YCPF share an office, the YBCDT Director replied: 
“For us to deal with the challenges in Yeoville, we need resources, we need a 
place to work from and we need access to communication and other useful 
resources. I thought of providing space for community organisations so as to 
ensure that these organisations begin to understand each other and to network. 
It would also help members of the community to easily access these 
organisations if they are all pooled in a single space. I actually have a vision of 
acquiring a bigger space where all organisations can have tables. The space in 
the library on Rockey Streets could be ideal. As you can see, this office brought 
together the ADF and the CPF, organisations that could be potentially in 
conflict. Now they have a way or working together” (Interview, Maurice: 
28/02/2012). 
By bringing the YCPF and ADF closer to him geographically, Maurice created an 
opportunity for him to frame or influence the agenda for socio-economic 
development in Yeoville. Bringing of the YCPF and ADF into shared office space 
created a platform for possible mutual understanding between potentially conflictual 
organisations. The YCPF was towing xenophobic lines, while the mandate of the 
ADF was to respond to and prevent any forms of xenophobia. 
The YCPF had plans to engage in policing activities in ways that prejudiced, 
stereotyped and criminalised African immigrants (Katsaura 2012). It had, in its 
programme of action for year 2010, plans to conduct citizen verification and police 
hijacked buildings, which targeted African immigrants. Maurice, who was 
incorporated into the YCPF as the treasurer in 2010, was able to tone down this 
approach and to gradually divest the YCPF of its op
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sentiments (Katsaura 2012). The toning down of the YCPF’s xenophobic discourses 
is evinced by this statement by the YCPF chairperson: 
“It is difficult for us as CPF to deal with this issue (hijacked houses). It has to 
be handled legally. You must know that the power of CPF is limited” (SCF1 
meeting, Lehlonolo: 22/09/2011).  
In another context the YCPF chairperson stated:  
“In cases of hijacked houses, we as CPF can do very little. What we can do is 
to advise the complainant to go to the housing tribunal, which will adjudicate 
over the case. One thing is that the housing tribunal will be having many cases 
to take care of and for them there is no urgent case. The case can also be taken 
to MEC housing at province” (Conversation, Lehlonolo: 06/11/2011). 
Maurice claimed to have influence the YCPF to reduce its xenophobic overtones and 
undertones. Asked why he was appointed YCPF treasurer, Maurice responded: 
“It is because they see that I am doing something for the community” 
(Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010). 
Maurice claimed to be grooming the YCPF leadership:  
“I […] was appointed to be the treasurer of the CPF.  I need to begin a 
process of giving confidence to the current CPF. That can only come through 
an understanding of their role by themselves. There is also need to clarify the 
role of the street patrollers and reduce the mistrust that is there between 
patrollers and CPF” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010). 
He also indicated that he had a vision of creating a network of organisations working 
together to improve socio-economic conditions in Yeoville. Talking of 
representatives of other local organisations in the YCPF broader meeting, Maurice 
suggested: 
“We are looking forward to having representatives of community organisations 
in this meeting. If we succeed in mobilising, we will have 45 participants. This 
would mean that we would need to use the Yeoville Recreation Centre for our 
meeting. We also need to have in this meeting, all our four councillors who 
have something to do with Yeoville” (Maurice [YCPF broader meeting]: 
01/06/2011). 
The YBCDT therefore sought to play a central role in enhancing the networking and 
cooperation of local organisations in helping improve the socio-economic standing 
of Yeoville. 
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The central positioning of YBCDT in the network of organisations in Yeoville was 
threatened by dwindling resources. Towards the end of 2011, the YBCDT’s financial 
status became precarious. In a conversation Maurice indicated the persistence of 
financial precariousness in the YBCDT, stating: 
“YBCDT is facing a funding challenge. I don’t know if we will be able to 
continue. Did you see the email I sent out? I am appealing to individuals to 
help us with contributions- at least monthly contributions of 200 rand. I wish 
we could have 200 reliable contributors. So far we are having 50 people who 
have indicated their pledge to contribute. Some of them have pledged to pay 
500 rand per month. Of these 50, most are waiting to see if others contribute 
before they also contribute. I am however seeing that people generally don’t 
want to give. I don’t understand why people don’t want to give. I learnt of this 
system of individual donations from my research on the Green Peace 
Movement. They are sponsored by more than 1.2 million individuals across the 
world – they do not take money from corporates. The system gives non-profit 
organisations independence. It’s a good strategy only if people are willing to 
give” (Interview, Maurice: 28/02/2012). 
The need to optimise use of scarce resources can inform the coalition and 
networking of organisations for the purpose of pooling resources. The pooling and 
sharing of resources can also reduce organisational tensions as they learn to co-work 
and co-reside.  
In 2010, YBCDT, YSF, ADF with the support of the YCPF worked together to 
manage a pan-African festival, named the Africa Week Festival, held mainly in 
Yeoville and New Town in Johannesburg. Again in May 2011, the ADF held a 
concert entitled “Many Faces, One Africa”. The concert was held with financial 
support from the Foundation for Human Rights and involvement of a private entity 
called Community Media for Development (CMFD). During this concert, the YCPF 
provided security and cleaning services through street patrollers.  
In narrating the importance of the networking of community organisations in the 
community security governance field, one should note that some community security 
governing organisations are networks in their own right as much as they are sites of 
communication. The YSF, by its very nature, is a site of communication between 
various organisations affiliated to it. This communication however is not always 
smooth (see Box 9). 
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Box 9: “... information is not reaching the organisations” 
Mashaba: There has been a problem since the formation of YSF. It seems that information is 
not reaching the organisations that are being represented in the YSF. What can we do to 
improve communication? YSF is the umbrella of all organisations in Yeoville. When we are 
here, we are one, we are YSF. When we visit organisations, the aim is to strengthen our 
relationship and build and work with each other. What we need to have is a strong YSF.  
What we need to understand is that we are trying to build relations. 
Joe: Every organisation that is here is here because of a reason. Why did your organisation 
join YSF?  With the question that we are raising now it’s like questioning why the 
organisation exists in the first place. Should we revisit our constitution? I understand that 
YSF is a voice of the community, working with the City of Johannesburg. 
Mashaba: Not every child we send to school passes. So what it means is that not all 
organisations’ representatives here are properly doing their job of representing the 
community. 
Lebogang: The problem is that some of the people who are here are not reporting to their 
organisations. 
Tracy: I agree with what Lesiba is saying, but not totally. I send many letters to organisations 
so they can participate in objections to new liquor licence applications and the response was 
pathetic. When you even call these organisations they don’t respond. If you call 20 
organisations, maybe only 4 responded. 
Man X: Maybe if we are to use a proper term, what we are talking about is coordination. You 
can only coordinate through communication.  
Brian: We need to communicate as organisations and make sure that in whatever we do, our 
approach should be comprehensive. For example, people were discussing the issue of 
demarcation. While people here seemed to have been against demarcation, but as COPE, we 
supported the new demarcation because we believed that the ward is too big for one 
councillor, so the division is good. 
 
YSF meeting, 27/01/2011 
The passages in Box 9 indicate the importance of inter-organisational information 
sharing. The YSF was conceived as a “voice of the community” to the City of 
Johannesburg; implying that it considered itself a legitimate community 
representative organisation in Yeoville. In reality, of course, there were many other 
organisations claiming to be voices of the community (see Table 3). 
ADF, which claimed to be a federation of 23 African migrant communities, was 
considered by its members as the main African immigrant representative organisation 
South Africa. This made it a site for sharing of information on the challenges faced 
by various groups of migrants living in South Africa. In an ADF meeting, a leader of 
Ethiopian Diaspora Development Association reported: 
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“Ethiopians do not speak nice English. They are using their own language. 
When they are beaten (by police officers) they can’t answer. There are more 
than 200 Ethiopians in Lindela. Our permits are not being renewed. That is the 
problem. The problem is that they (police officers) can identify the faces of 
Ethiopians. They always ask for money from us. It’s very bad. There is a lot of 
corruption. It’s a problem. Please, put the Ethiopian Diaspora on the meeting 
with the public protector” (Njera, ADF Meeting: 03/03/2012). 
  
Ward public meetings hosted by the Ward Committee also operate as a networked 
space. They provide slots for YCPF, YSF and other organisations to report their 
activities to the public. In a ward public meeting where YCPF leaders were not 
present to give a report, the councillor complained: 
“We don’t have a report from CPF. There is no one to report. We included 
them last meeting, but there was no one to report. I feel that CPF should 
always give a report at the public meeting because that’s where they get their 
support.  The Ward Committee Safety and Security portfolio is the one that 
should be provide the link with CPF” (Ward Public Meeting, Councillor: 
11/09/2010). 
The Ward Committee itself had a portfolio on safety and security which was 
supposed to work with the YCPF and other organisations in Yeoville.    
Why did community safety producing organisations network? I observe that they 
network for pooling of resources, sharing of knowledge capital or informational capital - 
resulting in them exerting symbolic influence over each other. The sharing of office 
space under the sponsorship of the YBCDT described above is a case in point. 
Organisations that command more economic resources and knowledge than others 
tend to sometimes dominate the local political arena (as was the case with YBCDT). 
For instance, by virtue of possessing economic capital, the YBCDT was able to 
influence the agenda-setting processes of YCPF, subverting its xenophobic stances. 
Economic resources are therefore convertible into political capital for the benefit of 
safety production, amongst others. While economic capital can be the basis of 
coalitions, it can also be the logic behind contestations – “pointing of fingers”. 
 
6.2.3. “Pointing of fingers”: contentious politics 
The community safety governance field in Yeoville was an arena, not only of 
cooperation, but of conflict. One conflict that I observed was over the rehabilitation 
of Yeoville Victim Empowerment Centre (VEC). The VEC faced challenges 
  114 
 
including poor staffing, dilapidation of VEC building and crumbling furniture. 
Describing the VEC situation, Maurice stated: 
“The walls of the VEC are in shambles and the VEC chairs are broken. It 
shows no respect for the victims. The offices of the VEC are used as a lunch 
office. One of the VEC volunteers was attacked by a victim in the centre and 
the police were busy laughing instead of helping. We have formed a VEC 
committed to deal with the VEC issues” (SCF2 meeting, Maurice: 
26/10/2010). 
In a YSF meeting, a participant jokingly stated: 
“Instead of being a Victim Empowerment Centre, it has turned into a victim 
intimidation centre” (YSF Meeting, Brian: 27/01/2011). 
Something had to be done. The Ward Councillor once observed: 
“We have a VEC, but it needs financial injection.  It’s a very important centre, 
but it’s not supported” (Ward Public Meeting, Ward Councillor: 13/11/2011).  
A local activist also explained: 
“The VEC has been there since 2005. We have been soliciting for help from 
CPF and YSF. People do not really understand how the VEC works. We have 
created a committee to deal with the VEC. We need to improve the physical 
outlook of the centre by painting it among other things. If you are victims of 
crime, you also need good space that makes you good and recognised” (Ward 
Public Meeting, Evelyn: 13/11/2011). 
The VEC building, therefore, was a physical space with symbolic importance; one 
that was supposed to make victims feel at ease and “intimidated”. It needed to be 
physically rehabilitated is it was to aptly play its role. The YSF came to the fore-front 
to raise resources for the VEC, creating a steering committee in 2011 to fundraise for 
the VEC. The steering committee successfully raised funds that were used to 
renovate the VEC building and secure new furniture.  
Now began contestations over control of the sourced VEC funds. A member of the 
VEC steering committee complained: 
“We volunteered and did a lot of work at the VEC. We sourced funds as a 
team, managed to have the VEC building renovated. But look at what we get. 
After the job is done, people start pointing fingers at us, they no longer want 
us. I am not going to the VEC again. Now that we sourced funds, people at 
the VEC (working there) have become greedy. They no longer want the 
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steering committee because they felt that the committee was trying to control 
them. Maybe it’s because of the money. Where there is money, people always 
do that. Sooner rather than later all the money will be finished. There is only 
R7000 left. We had planned that we were going to buy a fridge, a heater and an 
electric kettle with the money, but it seems that the volunteers at the VEC are 
no longer interested in that. All they are interested in now is the money” 
(Conversation: Evelyn [VEC steering committee]: 27/01/2011) [sic]. 
Why did this tension, between the YSF created VEC steering committee and the 
VEC volunteers, ensue? In my view, the YSF stood to benefit symbolically by 
boosting its institutional legitimacy and standing (political capital) in Yeoville as a 
representative of the community. Individual VEC steering committee members also 
stood to make symbolic and political profits by being associated with successful 
fundraising for the benefit of the community.  
Due to competition for political, economic and symbolic profits in the community 
safety field, members of the VEC steering committee were eventually set up for 
conflicts with VEC volunteers and YCPF stakeholders over the management of 
VEC funds. Some VEC volunteers indicated the desire to work independently as 
before and shunned what they thought was a continued presence and interference of 
the VEC steering committee in their work. At the same time the YCPF leaders 
claimed that they were the ones mandated to oversee the work of the VEC, not the 
YSF (and its steering committee). They therefore wanted the VEC finances which 
were in the YSF account to be transferred to the YCPF account. At the same time, 
members of the VEC Steering committee desired to monitor how the money they 
had sourced would be spent. They had planned to use the money “to buy a fridge, a 
heater, and an electric kettle” for use at the VEC.  
The desire by YCPF to oversee the use of VEC funds was indicated in a letter 
addressed to the YSF as follows: 
“We are aware that the VEC support committee initiated by the YSF and 
responsible for some excellent support work for the VEC has come under fire 
from various quarters and proposed withdrawing and disbanding. It has come 
to the attention of the CPF that it has statutory obligations in respect of the 
VEC. We are busy investigating what these obligations are, but we have seen 
that in other police precincts, it is the CPF which has established a VEC 
support committee. If it is indeed true that CPF has this responsibility, we will 
take steps to re-establish a support committee which hopefully will not be 
challenged in the same way as the current support committee. If we do, we will 
  116 
 
gladly invite members of the current committee to join and continue their 
good work. The SAPS and Ikhayalethemba, the community safety structure 
responsible for VEC, have said that they cannot receive funds for individual 
VECs. If we are responsible for supporting the VEC, we will open a bank 
account into which funds for the VEC can be deposited. We will therefore let 
you know what happens in that regard so that the remaining VEC funds in the 
YSF account can be transferred” [sic] (signed by YCPF chairperson, 
27/02/2011). 
To this YCPF letter, some VEC steering committee members reacted with contempt. 
They raised a lot of questions, with one of them rhetorically asking the question: 
“Where was the CPF when things went wrong at the VEC?” (YSF Meeting: Lesiba, 
27/01/2011). 
Regarding the creation of the VEC steering committee, one man, representing 
COPE63 questioned: “Why are people from YSF filling all these positions?” (YSF 
meeting, Brian: 27/01/2011). To this question, the deputy chairperson of YSF 
responded: 
“People just volunteered. There is a lot that happened here. Fingers are being 
pointed at us at the VEC when we were working there. The VEC steering 
committee is no longer in existence now. We have a letter from the CPF here” 
(YSF meeting, Mashaba: 27/01/2011) 
Another one reasoned: 
“What we should do here is to be very thankful that the job was done. It’s not 
important to say the job should have been done by X of Z of Y. What is 
important is that the job has been done. When you are in the YSF you need to 
relinquish your political stance, your identity, so that you contribute towards 
constructive dialogue. This meeting is different from an ANC meeting or a 
CPF meeting. We are invited to this meeting not for a political reason. At the 
end of the day it’s not politics, its governance; governance of our resources, 
our schools and our neighbourhood” (YSF meeting, Participant: 27/01/2011). 
The question “why are YSF people taking all positions?” directly challenged the 
legitimacy of the YSF-created VEC Steering Committee. It attests to the circulation 
of actors and concentration of socio-political power in the hands of a few 
stakeholders in the Yeoville security governance field. It was however dismissed as a 
retrogressive “pointing of fingers”. 
                                                     
63 Congress of the People (COPE) – a South African political party. 
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In a fashion comparable to the questioning of YSF involvement with the VEC, there 
were tensions about the existence and legitimacy of YBCDT. Maurice of the YBCDT 
alleged: 
“I experience a lot of problems here. People want to pull me down and 
undermine what I am doing […]. People would want to pull down a 
development structure like YBCDT for no other reason than the expression of 
power [...] that is for political reasons” (Maurice, Yeoville Studio-YBCDT 
meeting: 02/03/2011). 
The legitimacies of YBCDT, Yeovue News and Maurice’s activities in Yeoville were 
questioned in public forums such as ward public meetings (Box 10).  
Box 10: “The editor of this paper was arrogant in previous public meetings” 
Background: There was a complaint that Yeovue News was in some cases misrepresenting 
issues – publishing misleading information. The currently published Yeovue News was 
(incorrectly) alleged to have published incorrect maps for ward boundaries of Yeoville.  
There were questions regarding issues of accountability of the YBCDT that were raised 
following this issue relating to Yeovue News. Some participants stressed that despite this 
challenge, Yeovue News remains an important source of information in Yeoville. There was a 
proposal that Yeovue News should have an editorial committee composed of people from the 
community to assist the editor of Yeovue News in editing the newspaper. The councillor was 
asked to have a meeting with the editor of Yeovue News over this matter. 
Gazilami: Since this paper is having a lot of misleading information, I don’t think it reflects 
what the community wants. The editor of this paper was arrogant in the previous public 
meetings. He also never used to attend the public meetings. 
Dhlodhlo: We must not mix issues. The issue of errors should be treated as such. The 
councillor said he will deal with the issue. This paper is informative. 
Woman X: With all due respect, the publisher of this paper should make sure he publishes 
correctly. The editor of this newspaper has his own agenda. 
Renilwe: In this paper Maurice is not representing the community as long as this paper is 
being edited by Maurice. We must make sure he doesn’t do it alone.  
Mkokheli (Ward Councillor): This paper is published using public funds and Maurice has 
never hidden that from us. YBCDT is not a private company; it’s funded by the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa. If we have a problem with the way the YBCDT is 
run, we can hold the executive officer accountable. Maurice is not here and has apologised.  
Man: In order for Maurice to get information to publish correctly in this newspaper, he 
should have people around him to help him. I don’t know how he works. Is he alone or is he 
having people he is working with? 
Gazilami: We have been having a problem with the way Maurice has been operating. This is 
the first meeting of a new councillor. He is supposed to be here. We need to ask him 
questions. 
Renilwe: There must be an editorial committee. We don’t even know members of his Board 
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of Trustees. We don’t know them and they don’t even stay in this ward. 
Man D: I think the issue that we have is one of institutional arrangement. It has to be clear 
who Maurice is accountable to. Maybe as our councillor you can have a meeting with 
Maurice and discuss the newspaper issue. 
Mkokheli: Maurice thinks I am his friend, but if anything is wrong, I don’t care. I don’t care 
even if the person who has done it is my wife or friend. If something is wrong its wrong. 
 
Ward public meeting: 27/08/2011 
In response to allegations of lack of accountability of the YBCDT and Yeovue 
News, Maurice published an article in Yeovue News explaining: 
“I did not attend the Ward 67 Public Meeting (see main story). I gave my 
apology to the councillor. But I did ask someone to attend and perhaps give 
me a story. He gave me a couple of pictures and a very short input - not really 
a full report of the meeting. He did, however, give me a report on a discussion 
about Yeovue News that took place at the meeting… The other issue raised at 
the meeting in relation to Yeovue News was the question of accountability - a 
very important issue. Firstly, though, I would like to stress something. The 
Yeoville Bellevue Community Development Trust (YBCDT) is not a structure 
representing the community. It is an NGO, a service organisation. Yeovue 
News also does not claim to be the ‘voice’ of the community. It is primarily a 
source of information. I hear people in the meeting agreed that it was playing 
an important role in this regard… Yeovue News would welcome ideas from the 
community on how best this could be done. The main thing is to not 
compromise the role of the paper as a source of information. The other is the 
issue paper should remain independent of political parties and of sectional 
interests. It should, as far as possible, be sufficiently independent for everyone 
in the community to be able to relate to it” (YN 2011a)[sic] . 
I observe that Maurice’s position as a white man attempting to do “community 
work” in a largely Black neighbourhood was generally precarious. This was vividly 
revealed in a YCPF meeting held on the 2nd of June 2012. This meeting happened 
after Maurice had resigned from being treasurer the YCPF; citing the lack of moral 
values by the YCPF executive members who, he alleged, were involved or complicit 
in illegal and violent acts – yet they are supposed to lead by example. The immediate 
story recited by Maurice was the grievous assault, by the chairperson of Sector Crime 
Forum 1, of a lady who was then reported to be in a comma battling for her life in a 
Johannesburg hospital having suffered brain damage from the beating. This assault, 
according to Maurice, happened at a Shebeen in Yeoville in the presence and 
possibly with the active participation complicity of the YCPF Chairperson and the 
Deputy Chairperson who were drinking in the company of the Chairperson of Sector 
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Crime Forum 1 at the Shebeen. And, in a separate incident, the Deputy YCPF 
chairperson of the YCPF was suspended from the YCPF because he was facing 
charges of fraud and had also been previously arrested on charges of armed robbery 
although he was later acquitted.  
Despite his resignation, Maurice claimed to have been asked to act as an advisor to 
the YCPF by those responsible for the CPF at the Gauteng Department of 
Community Safety. The meeting, on the 2nd of June 2012, was meant to address the 
challenges faced by the YCPF and Thabo, a representative of the Department of 
Community Safety was there. However, the tables turned against Maurice in this 
meeting, as some members of the public questioned his previous appointment as the 
treasurer of the YCPF and his current appointment as advisor. One man during this 
meeting publicly questioned: 
“I wish to know how people get in and out of the CPF. How does this happen. 
We just hear that Maurice was appointed as treasurer and now he has been 
appointed as advisor. How does that happen without our knowledge as the 
community? Who is responsible for this?” (YCPF public meeting, Gazilami: 
02/06/2012).  
Following this, there was a heated debate in the meeting in which the legitimacy of 
Maurice’s position in the YCPF was questioned. There was a fracas in which some 
meeting participants verbally attacked Maurice and threatened physical violence 
against him. This led to Maurice public resignation from position of YCPF advisor. I 
argue that Maurice’s position in Yeoville and in local civic bodies was precarious, 
mainly because he was considered as not representing the public and also because of 
his racial positioning as a white man in a poor Black neighbourhood. Maurice had no 
capital of delegation or representation from below - what he had is personal political capital, 
that is his networks in government circles (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012); as in 
this case with officials in the Gauteng Department of Community Safety. By getting a 
mandate from the Department of Community Safety it could be observed that 
Maurice’s personal political capital is convertible to capital of delegation from above 
(Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012). As a white man, the questioning of his 
positionality in civic bodies and involvement in civic activities in Yeoville was a kind 
of symbolic attack or even symbolic victory by a section of the poor Black South African 
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population that has suffered a long history of racial segregation and prejudices of 
apartheid.        
The precariousness of Maurice’s position, at some point dramatically took the form 
of threats of violence against him and his family. On the 19th of July 2012 he 
received the following mobile phone text message: 
“It has come to our attention that you want to rule this area disturbing our 
bussinessis,wll not allow that, so we are going to make sure that u move out of 
this area, watch and see! we know where your wife works we know the car shes 
driving(polo blue)registration known, your son is driving fox and you are 
driving a volgsvagen kumbi, your son is @ randburg we know where he is 
studing,we know your office and people who are working for you, we are 
giving you a month to leave this area starting from today, this is the are Black 
africans, u are left alone, people like you are staying at sandton, leave before 
you see the wrath of Black people, we are warning you, mother fucker!” [sic]. 
The ADF chairperson pledged his sympathy and support to Maurice and wrote an 
email to the ADF executive committee stating: 
“Dear all. The message […] was sent to Maurice Smithers, we don't know who 
did it. In ADF we don't close eyes on discrimination. We will include this in 
our agenda tomorrow …” (Fagbibo: 20/07/2012) [sic]. 
Responding to the threat, Maurice wrote on his blog: 
“I've dealt with a lot of hostility over the years that I have worked in Yeoville 
Bellevue. That's 14 years of dealing with all sorts of negativity and bullshit 
from community members, political parties, councillors and city officials. But, 
hell, I never thought I'd get an SMS such as this: [text message above]… But I 
did. Get such an SMS. After recovering from the shock of it, I took whatever 
steps were necessary to protect my family. I also consulted widely in the 
community and reached agreement with others in a meeting on Saturday 21 
July that we should go for big publicity to get the story out there while, at the 
same time, working with the authorities to track the perpetrator down. We feel 
it is important to ensure that people are reminded of the old slogan: 'An injury 
to one is an injury to all!' A threat of this nature is a threat to all right-minded 
people who care about making Yeoville Bellevue a better place. I still don't get 
this Sandton stuff though. Why Sandton of all places? First of all, I don't like 
Sandton. Kanyi Mbau still lives there which is good enough reason to stay 
away. Secondly, I cannot afford to stay in Sandton, even if I wanted to. I'm not 
going to be one of those moegoes boasting a supposedly prestigious address, 
but not being able to afford to buy bread. Besides, this grammatically-
challenged purveyor of threats clearly doesn't understand why I live in Yeoville 
Bellevue and not in Sandton. He or she may be here under sufferance, but I 
am here out of choice. And I'm not going to leave just because some unknown 
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entity has decided I should and would happier with me being in Sandton rather 
than working to develop Yeoville Bellevue. What he or she doesn't realise is 
that I am not necessarily intending to see out my days in Yeoville Bellevue. I 
might, but I could just as easily not. But if I do leave, it will certainly not be to 
go north to Sandton. I have more respect for myself than that” [sic] 
(23/07/2012).64 
What could have driven the threats against Maurice? One community leader 
explained: 
“This is an area for poor people and Maurice’s problem is that he seems to be 
working to pull poor people out of Yeoville and replace them with a middle 
class. That’s why he gets these kinds of threats” (Fagbibo: 21/07/2012). 
I interpret the threats to Maurice as reflecting broader struggles in the economic, 
political and social fields in South Africa - operating here at a miniature level. The 
issue of economic and political dispossession of the Black population is at stake, and 
in this case coming out as racial and class politics. Maurice then becomes a white 
“middle class” face in a predominantly “poor” Black community in which the 
suffering of the Black population is (partly) interpreted in racial, ethno-nationalist 
and, sometimes, class terms. 
In explaining this “pointing of fingers”, I invoke the argument that the community 
safety governance field is marked by dynamics of posturing and competition amongst 
stakeholders. These stakeholders compete and coalesce for access to economic, 
political, symbolic, political, social and moral capitals. These capitals are convertible to 
capital of security or security capital which is of service to the community; if they are not 
selfishly personalised or institutionalised. The statement by the YCPF chairperson 
that “everything is done for a reason” and his expression of interests in becoming a 
politician, sustains this view (see Box 2).  
Despite the “pointing of fingers” between actors in the community security 
governance, circulation of actors and pocketing of local socio-political are 
discernible.  
 
                                                     
64See http://yeovillebellevue.wordpress.com/2012/07/23/on-my-way-to-sandton-if-anonymous-has-
his-or-her-way/ , accessed on 23rd July 2012. 
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6.2.4. Circulation of actors and concentration of local influence 
An analysis of community activism in Yeoville reveals that there was a network of 
political and social power brokers that dominated the community security field. 
The same activists circulated between different community organisations within the 
neighbourhood; resulting in concentration of local socio-political influence 
(Katsaura 2012). Figure 11 shows, in concentric form, the key local actors in 
Yeoville. These key actors were both gate keepers and access points into 
community security governance field in Yeoville. Figure 11, however, simplifies the 
reality of community security governance politics in Yeoville.  
 
 
 
The density of localised social power was reflected in the composition of YBCEC65, 
an organisation that was formed during the time I was conducting fieldwork in 
Yeoville in 2011. The composition of this organisation basically reflected the 
structure of the YCPF. The YBCEC chairperson was the deputy chairperson of 
YCPF and his deputy was the treasurer of YCPF and executive director of YBCDT. 
This was questioned publicly (see Box 11). 
Box 11: “What is the structure of the committe that you are talking about?” 
Lehlonolo: The Yeoville Bellevue Community Advocacy Committee was formed to deal with 
the issue of liquor and other issues affecting the community. It meets every second 
Wednesday at 5 pm at 24 Rockey Street. 
                                                     
65
 The Yeoville Bellevue Community Empowerment Committee (YBCEC) was initially referred to as 
the Yeoville Bellevue Community Advocacy Committee (YBCAC). That is why in Box 6.12 it is 
referred to as YBCAC and I generally refer to it as YBCEC in my writing.  
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Councillor Dismissed as ‘under the 
tree organisation’ 
Cooperation –as a representative 
of immigrants 
Source: Author 
Figure 11: Local socio-politics of influence in Yeoville 
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Maurice: The YBCAC is not a CPF structure. It is a community structure and the CPF part 
of it. We have members of YSF who are part of it and we also have ordinary members of the 
community who are part of it. We also deal with issues of spaza shops and illegal rezoning of 
property. We meet every second Wednesday at 5 o’clock. 
Captain Ndaba: What is the structure of the committee that you are talking about? 
Lehlonolo: At the moment we only have an interim structure 
Captain Ndaba: You guys are already holding positions in CPF and YBCDT. How are you 
going to manage when you have many things on your plates? 
Colonel Tshabalala: I agree with what Ndaba is saying. You need to be an objective 
structure. The community should not see it as a structure for particular people, but as a 
structure for the community - their structure. 
Participant A: Did you inform the councillor about this committee? 
Lehlonolo: She doesn’t know about it. 
Maurice: We have written about is many times in Yeovue News. It is not a government 
structure. We do not really need to ask anybody’s permission to do that. We are free to do 
that. 
Thabang: Could you update us on the progress on the work done or to be done by YBCAC? 
Lehlonolo: We are planning to arrange meetings with the liquor board so that we can 
understand the different types of licenses and understand why we have not been invited for 
hearing in some of the Liquor license hearings for those licenses that have been granted. 
YCPF public meeting: 04/03/2011 
The formation of the YBCEC aroused contestation between the ward councillor and 
Maurice (founding local activist). In this case the legitimacy of the YBCEC was 
questioned by the councillor, with the support of sections of the audience in a ward 
public meeting. The accusation levelled against Maurice was that he did not consult 
with the community before forming the YBCEC. This resulted in a public fall-out in 
which Maurice walked out of the meeting; supposedly in anger or frustration. He 
then became the subject of discussion for a couple of minutes after he had left. One 
meeting participant admonished him: 
“Maurice has not right to undermine you. You are a councillor.  He needs to 
account for his behaviour. We need to say it in front of this forum. He should 
apologise” (Ward Public Meeting, Renilwe: 10/03/2010). 
The “pocketing” of local social power and social influence by a small clique of actors 
shows that political capital can be monopolised (Katsaura 2012). There was a small 
group of actors, including the YBCDT executive director, YSF chairperson, YCPF 
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chairperson and ADF chairperson, which had more influence in the arena of 
community safety governance in Yeoville.  
Within this whole socio-political matrix, what was the positioning of the state? 
 
6.2.5. State-community security co-production challenges 
As a starting point in dealing with the preceding question, I note the statement 
below: 
“The CPF is a government structure […]. CPF represents the community. As 
CPF we don’t just deal with crime. We deal with many issues, some of which 
might be the causes of crime […]” (Sector Crime Forum 1 Meeting, Lehlonolo 
[YCPF Chairperson]: 27/07/2011). 
The Chairperson of YCPF, in another scenario, explained: 
“The CPF was meant to help the police in terms of fighting crime. Since we 
are the residents of this area, it is our responsibility to give information about 
crime to the police” (Interview, Lehlonolo: 05/08/2010). 
In this case, YCPF was ideally supposed to conduct joint operations with SAPS; co-
setting and co-defining the local policing agenda (see Box 12). 
Box 12: “The function of the CPF is to assist SAPS prevent crime” 
Colonel Mkulili: Weekly, we do have 
operations, even if it is not a big 
operation, for example, last week we 
had a joint operation with Metro, 
targeting drivers who drive under 
the influence of alcohol. We have a 
matrix of operation, but it’s not in 
the public domain because we don’t 
want people to be forewarned. We 
also identify hotspots and deploy 
police officers there. 
Maurice: Does it mean that as CPF, 
if we have a proposal about 
operations we can do that. 
Colonel Mkulili: In fact, that’s how things should work. The function of the CPF is to assist 
SAPS to prevent crime. 
YCPF broader meeting: 09/02/2011 
@Katsaura 2011 
Maurice doing a presentation about the duties and responsibilities of SAPS and 
CPF civilian members in local crime prevention to clarify sticking issues between 
police and CPF civilian members. 
Photo 3: YCPF Broader meeting 
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Participation of the community in policing is considered as integral for success in 
crime reduction. A senior Yeoville police officer explained: 
“You need to know the community that you are working with.  It is important 
that as police we participate in community initiatives for crime prevention. Last 
time I asked guys from the CPF to give me a list of all the streets that do not 
have street lighting so that I report the matter to the City of Johannesburg 
Department of City Power” (Conversation, Col. Tshabalala: 09/02/2011) 
The relationship between the public and police was evaluated as a success by the 
communications officer of Yeoville SAPS when he indicated: 
“We have the community policing forum which is a partnership between the 
community and the police. We have the Yeoville Stakeholder forum, Africa 
Diaspora forum, Youth Desk. They help the community to accept one another 
and treat each other humanely. Our relationship with CPF is bringing good 
results. We want the community to start to take charge of their safety and 
integrate them in our effort. In some of the cases of possession of drugs and 
firearms, we get tips from the CPF. We conduct meetings with the CPF once a 
month” (Interview, Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010). 
However, in reality, the idea of community – police joint security provision is 
muddled by power politics in which SAPS officers treat YCPF civilian members as 
inferior partners; while YCPF members view SAPS officers as corrupt. Box 13 shows 
how in attempting to do joint operations, civilian street patrollers are not allowed in 
police vehicles, making it difficult for the two to work together. 
Box 13: “I think we are losing the plot here ...” 
Bongani: I remember in December we had a patrolling project on the 31st of December 
2010. The street patrollers were not allowed to get into the police kombi to patrol with 
police. The patrollers then felt segregated and undermined. That’s why we end up losing 
patrollers. 
Colonel Mkulili: The reason why we cannot have street patrollers in police vehicles is 
because if something happens to the patrollers for example an accident, what then happens 
to the person. The matter becomes complicated. Police work is very dangerous and we 
normally have police officers wearing bullet vests and they have guns. And to patrol with 
someone who is unarmed in the car is too risky. 
Maurice: Let’s be clear about the matter. I know that there are times that street patrollers 
travel in police vehicles. Sometimes we have VEC people moving in police vehicles. So there 
is no consistency on this matter. 
Colonel Mkulili: You are right; there is no consistency because some police officers are not 
fully aware of the matter. 
Zweli: I think we are losing the plot here. How do we work together with the police when 
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things are like this? What do you think? 
Mduduzi: I grew up in a time of apartheid when a Black man was not allowed to arrest a 
white man. I see that it’s coming back. It’s being done against street patrollers. 
 
YCPF Broader Meeting: 02/03/2011 
Adding on to these challenges was the complaint that street patrollers did not get 
adequate support from SAPS members. There were allegations that SAPS members 
were not patrolling with the volunteer street patrollers as required by law and this 
exposed and predisposed the volunteer patrollers to risk and mal-practice (Box 14).  
Box 14: “In other areas, the patrollers go out with police ...” 
Zweli: In other areas, the patrollers go out with police, but here in Yeoville they go out 
alone. It is possible to get street patrollers being accompanied by police? This is because we 
will have problems with street patrollers’ lives being endangered. 
 
Colonel Tshabalala: What we have got in terms of stuff is very limited. At one shift we can 
have 18 or 19. The provincial MEC, at any given time wants us to have 6 cars outside, 
patrolling. I don’t have enough manpower at Yeoville Police Station. I would have loved to 
be fully staffed, but unfortunately the situation doesn’t allow. The patrollers know the area. 
We need the patrollers. They give us directions on how to hit areas that are problematic. 
When I report success, I don’t claim the success of the street patrollers to be my success. I 
indicate that street patrollers have done A, B, C. 
  
Captain Ndaba: We need to have a date where we talk to street patrollers. We should arrange 
a meeting with street patrollers and come up with decisions of issues affecting them and 
affecting the community. In each sector we have two vehicles. If the street patrollers have 
phone numbers of officers in the vehicles, the patrollers can meet the police officers every 
10 minutes in the course of patrolling. 
 
Zweli: The patrollers are complaining that they are using their air time and it will take time to 
reach police officers whilst their lives will be in danger. 
 
Captain Ndaba: It’s not their responsibility to call. If they buzz a police officer, it’s the 
responsibility of the police officer to phone them. 
YCPF Broader Meeting: 03/11/2010 
Police-community security co-production in Yeoville was compounded by the fact 
that the management of street patrollers was a question in which the responsibilities 
of YCPF and SAPS were not clearly understood or spelt out. In one YCPF broader 
meeting, the need for YCPF to actively get involved in the management of street 
patrollers was emphasised (Box 15).   
Box 15: “... they are failing to control the patrollers” 
Maurice: The CPF receives complaints from members of the community complaining that 
street patrollers are operating alone without police. There are even complaints that street 
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patrollers are soliciting for bribes 
from members of the public. 
Phezulu66: Do these patrollers sign 
in and sign out? If they sign in then 
the sector vehicle can easily manage 
them. Isn’t it? It is important that 
they sign in and sign out. Remember 
that we pay for their injuries. If they 
don’t sign in and sign out then that 
would be difficult. 
Dorcas: It seems the patrollers do 
not want to patrol with the police. 
Most of them don’t want to attend 
the parade. They stand outside the 
police station. They don’t even 
come back to report to the Crime 
Prevention Unit of the police. 
That’s why we have been proposing that we suspend them all. 
Maurice: Maybe what we need to do is to suspend the street patrolling system and start 
afresh. 
Col Mkulili: Why don’t you as CPF have a meeting with them and deal with the matters 
instead of simply suspending them. I understand your position but don’t suspend them. 
Phezulu: What the CPF is saying if I hear properly is that they are failing to control the 
patrollers and I don’t sit down well with that. What you need to do is to identify the 
problematic members and deal with them, instead of starting another problematic group of 
patrollers. We need to do a workshop. A workshop will take 2 and half hours or more on a 
weekend. I am suggesting that we meet on the 3rd of September from 9 am to 11:30 am. The 
workshop will focus on CPF-SAPS relations. 
YCPF Broader Meeting: 17/08/2011 
The workshop proposed by Phezulu took place on the 3rd of September 2011. At 
this workshop, Phezulu clarified that the CPF and SAPS should co-manage the street 
patrollers and the VEC (Box 15). Regarding the management of street patrollers, 
Phezulu indicated that the CPF is responsible for “mobilising street patrollers”, while 
SAPS were responsible for “deploying them into the streets for patrolling”.  
Even before Phezulu’s clarifications, there was already sense of responsibility over 
the street patrollers by both the YCPF and SAPS. For instance, the disciplining of 
street patrollers drew the YCPF and SAPS together at some point (see Box 16).  
                                                     
66 Phezulu was representing the Gauteng Department of Community Safety in this meeting. The 
Gauteng Department of Community Safety is the one mandated to oversee CPFs and street patrollers 
at a provincial level. 
@Katsaura 
Phezulu from the Gauteng Department of Community Safety making a point at a 
YCPF public meeting – cum- workshop 
Photo 4: YCPF public meeting 
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Box 16: “Nobody wants to dismiss anybody” 
Colonel Tshabalala: Street patrollers said they don’t report to CPF, they report to the MEC, 
not even to the SAPS. We need to set up a commission composed of 3 police officers, 3 
CPF members and 1 chief patroller, to investigate the matter of these suspended patrollers. 
We need evidence before making an accusation against a patroller. Perhaps we need a 
witness to indicate: I saw you taking money from a member of the community” 
Zweli: One of the witnesses said he cannot testify because it could be a problem because he 
might be targeted. 
Maurice: I think an important issue here is that nobody wants to dismiss anybody. The 
purpose of the disciplinary committee will be to make the street patrollers understand their 
role. The fact of the matter is that we need to rehabilitate them. As pointed out, some of the 
patrollers say they don’t recognise the CPF, but only the MEC. Perhaps we need them to 
understand that the CPF are the mothers and fathers of the Street Patrollers. We don’t want 
the street patrollers to harass the community. 
Colonel Mkulili: If you are suspended, you are not allowed to exercise your power. If a street 
patroller has been suspended, the police should stop working with them. If the police 
themselves are suspended, they are not allowed to execute their duties. Even if the police 
officers believe that these people are innocent, let them go through a hearing band let them 
be exonerated before they come back to be street patrollers again. The law allows everybody 
to do citizen arrests, whether they are street patrollers or not or CPF members or not. 
YCPF Broader Meeting: 03/11/2010 
Although the YCPF and SAPS worked together, there was animosity between the 
two entities. Some SAPS officers resisted the oversight role of YCPF. In a YCPF 
broader meeting, a senior police officer contended: 
“The police do not have to work at the pace of someone else. We are trained 
people and can’t be told what to do by civilians” (YCPF Broader Meeting, 
Colonel Tshabalala: 03/11/2010) 
To this, a YCPF executive member responded: 
“The CPF is a statutorily recognised body that has a right to question how the 
police are working. They don’t have to work at their own pace” (YCPF 
Broader Meeting, Maurice: 03/11/2010). 
The contentious nature between the YCPF and SAPs raises questions about the 
efficacy of community-police security co-production. In a YCPF public meeting, a 
YCPF member expressed his wishes and frustrations: 
“There should be no problem between police and CPF, but the police are 
resentful of the CPF. The police say ‘we are trained people and you can’t tell us 
how to do our job’. So the relationship between CPF and police is not that 
harmonious. In an ANC meeting of 2008, they agreed that they need to change 
the way CPF works. About YBCDT, we work on development issues. 
Investment will not come to South Africa when we have the problem of crime. 
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So we won’t get investment in Yeoville when we still have the problem of 
crime. That is the reason why YBCDT is working here” (YCPF Public 
Meeting, Maurice: 06/11/2010). 
In the same meeting a street patroller questioned: 
“Why is SAPS not supporting the CPF? You need to have a good relationship 
like a father – son – mother - daughter relationship. We have a lot of intelligent 
youth in Yeoville, but they are not contributing much to the community. We 
know that money is everything these days, but sometimes learning and 
community service is okay” (YCPF Public Meeting: Street Patroller, 
06/11/2010). 
One community activist claimed: 
“The police regard the CPF as encroaching on their turfs. They are 
undermining them. Maybe it’s because they are young people. The police have 
an attitude towards the ANC Youth League and they dislike this YCPF 
because its leaders are members of the ANC Youth League …” (Interview, 
Thabang: 16/08/2010). 
There was also a belief, among some police officers, that the YCPF was under SAPS 
management. This became a matter of debate in a YCPF broader meeting (Box 17). 
Box 17: “We are treading on dangerous ground” 
Context: We were sitting in a YCPF broader meeting and a participant questioned why the 
YCPF is not officed at the police station. In that meeting the YCPF chairperson explained: 
 
“We all know that the police station is short of office space. That’s why we are 
operating outside of the police station. It’s not statutorily binding for a CPF to have 
an office in the police station. The office is funded by YBCDT”. 
 
And the Station Commander of Yeoville SAPS further explains: 
“The CPF cannot be accommodated just as detectives are not accommodated. The 
provincial commissioner has indicated that if there is no space, then the police station 
cannot be expected to provide an office for the CPF.  I am unable to provide an 
office to the CPF. That’s why I can’t ask why they have an office elsewhere. But that 
doesn’t mean that they should do their own thing in the name of the police. We are 
overcrowded in the offices at Yeoville Police station”.  
 
Maurice interjects: 
“I don’t know why we should be asking this question. The Law doesn’t state that the 
CPF should be officed at the police station. There is nothing that says the CPF is 
under the police. The role of the CPF is to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the police. The CPF should have a level of independence to be able to do this. 
Hopefully, when we get a new police station CPF would have an office at the police 
station. CPF are not part of the police. If they become a part of the police it’s a 
problem. In fact, when the MEC visited us he said this CPF office is the best CPF 
office in Gauteng region. It’s the most secure and vibrant offices present. I am not 
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sure where the security company issue comes from. The CPF is just using community 
office space. There is Migrant Help Desk and ADF also there”. 
 
Colonel Tshabalala also responds:  
“We are treading on dangerous ground. I don’t know what Maurice means when he 
says the CPF is not under the police. I think this means that the Station Commander 
must shed me of my duties and responsibilities”. 
 
And Maurice answers: 
“I wonder if there is any document saying that the CPF is obligated to have an office 
in the police station. According to the Police Act and the CPF constitution, the CPF is 
supposed to be in partnership with the SAPS, looking after the interests of the 
community in relation to policing. It is important for everyone to familiarise 
themselves with documents and facts before raising issues”. 
 
Ward 67 Councillor Mkokheli adds: 
“The CPF does not work under the directorship of the police. They work hand in 
hand”. 
YCPF Broader Meeting: 13/07/2011 
While some SAPS members disregarded the YCPF, there were members of the 
YCPF who dismissed SAPS officers as corrupt. Some even suggested that police 
officers worked in cahoots with criminals. Consider the following statement: 
“Sometimes you have a case of a hijacked house. You have the case reported 
to the police. The hijacker runs away and then the police can take over the 
home and collect rent. This is based on speculation. We don’t have proper 
evidence to this. We need to investigate this matter further” (Conversation, 
Lehlonolo - YCPF Chairperson: 06/11/2010). 
Allegations of corruption of SAPS officers were an issue raised by some YCPF 
members (see Box 18). 
Box 18: “I want to know if Yeoville police station is working as a police station or as a 
court” 
Bongani: I arrested a guy who smashed a car in Rockey Street and stole a cell phone. He sold 
the cell phone to a Palestinian shop owner. I arrested them and in a few days, I found them 
back on the streets and they said they had paid R2500 and R500 respectively. I had handed 
over the criminals to Col. Mkulili. I don’t know if this money was for bail or something else.  
Participant B: The point raised by Bongani is interesting to follow up what the money is for.  
Bongani: When I went to the police station, there was a parade and Colonel Mkulili was not 
even concerned about the case. I met the Gogo whose grandson stole the phone and she 
said she went to the police station and the police said she can pay R500 and they would 
release the boy. I want to know if Yeoville Police Station is working as a Police Station or as 
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a court.  I want to know? 
Dorcas: On the issue of money, I saw some police officers sharing some money, I saw some 
police officers sharing money in the VEC building. 
Bongani: We want to know, from colonel Mkulili, what happened to that case. The figures 
for Yeoville are very low. The head of police said she is worried that the low crime statistics 
are not reflective of the actual crime levels in Yeoville. Some of the cases are not registered. 
That’s a serious issue. 
Maurice: I have seen a case in Yeoville, where a crime is committed and the police try to 
make the complainant and the victim negotiate an out of court settlement. 
 
Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting: 26/10/2010 
On the question of the positioning of the state in the community security governance 
field, I observe that its presence compounds the local web and dynamics of 
stakeholder contestation and coalition. Contestations for power and legitimacy 
(political and symbolic capitals) configured the relationship between the YCPF and 
SAPS. SAPS members claimed possession expert knowledge; cultural capital – with 
some openly indicating that they “don’t work at the pace of anyone”. SAPS also 
acted state agents, with power (political capital) as an organisation and individuals 
delegated to maintain peace and order in communities. Allegations of police 
corruption were, however, a direct question on the legitimacy and capabilities of 
SAPS officers. There were, therefore, processes of de-legitimisation and 
misrecognition of one another between CPF members and SAPS officials.  
I observe that that was a tendency by the state, through its agents such as the 
Gauteng Department of Community Safety, including SAPS, to the field of 
community safety governance. One elaborate example of this is the imposition of a 
constitution on the CPF by the Gauteng Department of Community Safety. The 
same constitution governing the Gauteng Provincial Community Police Board 
(GPCPB 2010) is the one imposed on all CPFs in the Gauteng Province. 
Surprisingly, this arrangement was not questioned by the public in Yeoville, despite 
generalised claims to participatory democracy in South Africa. In a YCPF public 
meeting held on 2nd of June 2012, members of the public demanded copies of the 
CPF constitution from the Gauteng Department of Community Safety without really 
questioning content or source:  
  132 
 
“We are confused. We received a constitution that was circulated to our emails 
some time ago and we thought it is the one. Now we hear that there is another 
constitution. Which is which? Could you please circulate to us the current 
constitution so that we deal with this confusion once and for all?” (YCPF 
public meeting, Jenny: 02/06/2012) 
An official from the Gauteng Department of Community Safety, who was in 
attendance, pledged that he would make sure that copies of the current CPF 
constitution would be printed and made available to members of the public. What 
does this mean in a context in which the CPF is considered a participatory forum? 
This issue, and others, show that the state infiltrates, dominates and sometimes 
suffocate deliberative security governance forums directly and indirectly.   
The power of the state in infiltrating and suffocating spaces of deliberative security 
governance stems from its concentration and command of various forms of capital 
that matter in the security governance field. The police as government workers and 
public servants are “knowledge workers” (Ericson 1994). They are knowledge 
workers because they posses knowledge about crime and violence and governance 
thereof. By virtue of their perceived possession of knowledge and as agents of the 
state, the police also possess “symbolic power” in the eyes of the public (Loader 
2006). To further canvass knowledge, police officers also engage the community, and 
in the case of Yeoville, attend community policing forum meetings. Attendance at 
these community meetings, as much as it is a knowledge canvassing strategy, is a 
governance strategy by the police officers claiming to act on behalf of the state. It is a 
way of canvassing intelligence for the state and a strategy of entrenching the state’s 
symbolic domination of the populace. 
How applicable, then, is Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state as a concentration of 
capital in understanding community-state security co-production politics? Does the 
state really monopolise symbolic capital and the capital of physical violence? The answers are 
both yes and no. This is because there are generalised expectations of protection and 
guidance from the state by social groups in South Africa, yet at the same time there is 
dissatisfaction with the lack of adequate guarantee of community and individual 
safety by the state. This dissatisfaction is saliently expressed in complaints about the 
failure of the policing enterprise amidst increasing crime and violence and 
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accusations of police corruption; which have all contributed to public distrust of 
police (Box 18).  
Regarding monopoly over the capital of physical violence, the South African state seems 
to be in a unique position of not monopolising this violence as South African groups 
and individuals tend to relentlessly dispense this violence, especially on African 
immigrants and suspected criminals, even against the official orders of the state, or in 
complicit with it (see Chapter 8). Worse still, studies have indicated that there are 
more firearms in the hands of civilians than in the hands of the aggregated state 
security machinery (that is the police and army) (Keegan 2005; Kirsten 2007). How 
then can the state effectively guarantee social peace or social order in a society 
hampered by high levels of crime and violence? What we notice is a normalisation of 
violence as an everyday practice within South African local and national moral orders 
(von Holdt 2013).  
As the central bank of symbolic capital, the state influences the means of political and 
symbolic production (and reproduction); as in the case of generating the CPF 
constitution and imposing it on the CPF and members of the public who participate 
in the CPF in one way or another. The state, therefore, in this case is considered as a 
possessor of pedagogic authority. And, the members of the public and members of the 
CPF are complicit in their own domination - they uncritically accept a CPF 
constitution imposed from provincial government in a way that is typical of what 
Bourdieu refers to as misrecognition. It shows that members of the CPF and of the 
public look up to the state; think with and through the state and cannot escape the 
trap of the thought of the state - that is, they possess a statist and statised habitus. This 
confirms the weakness of the CPF in engaging the state. 
The state or the thought thereof, is ever present in spaces of community security 
governance; and to further show this, I narrate how delegates and representatives in 
community security governing organisations pursue statist or state-yearning political 
goals.  
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6.2.6. “Are you going to vote for me?” 
There is evidence of use of local security governance platforms by (aspiring local) 
politicians to advance political agendas or the hijacking of political party politics 
into local security governance initiatives. An example of this is the hijacking of 
YCPF elections by members of the ANC Youth League in September 2009. In this 
case, youths, who belonged to the ANC Youth League, were able to take over 
control of the YCPF, deposing the older members of the previous YCPF and 
subjecting them to shame. There are allegations that the elections were conducted 
without following proper procedure. The mobilisation strategies of the winning 
candidates depended on their ANC party networks and this opened room for the 
questioning of the legitimacy of the resultant YCPF executive. The YCPF treasurer 
said: 
“People are elected into positions in CPF in a public meeting of approximately 
50-100 people. Those people that are there on that particular day are the ones 
that vote. This electoral process is flawed and there is need to reinvent the 
process. It would be important to have people representing the YSF, NGOs, 
political parties, schools and faith based organisations in the CPF. I have been 
trying to find out what to do with the CPF.  Last year there was gonna be an 
election. Before the election, the ANC Youths became too militant challenging 
the police and the existing CPF. Till today, the station commander does not 
attend public meetings. He wants an apology from the youths. The youths 
voted new people into the CPF on the basis of ANC strength. There was no 
handover between the current CPF and the older CPF [...].” (Interview, 
Maurice: 27/09/2010). 
In one YCPF meeting, Maurice further brought to question the legitimacy of the 
current YCPF, claiming: 
“The current CPF was appointed under the constitution of the previous CPFs 
(going back to the CPF of the early 2000s. The MEC’s office has issued later 
versions and we are in the process of ensuring that the current CPF is 
completely compliant. It will then be submitted to the MEC’s office for 
approval” (YCPF broader meeting, Maurice [YCPF Treasurer]: 13/07/2011). 
 
And a senior police officer said: 
“It is possible that the election of the current CPF was not properly done – the 
CPF is investigating that and will report back on it. This is not being done to 
say that the CPF has no right to exist. It is merely to show that we should 
ensure that all our documentation is in order so that the CPF and the Sector 
Forums can move forward properly and fulfil the mandate they have been 
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given in terms of the Police Act” (YCPF broader meeting, Col. Tshabalala: 
13/07/2011). 
However, there was another perspective regarding the September 2009 YCPF 
elections. According to one of the elected YCPF members, there was nothing wrong 
with the elections and the YCPF was not really hijacked by members of the ANC 
Youth League. A YCPF executive member contended: 
“Let me clarify something. I am a member of the ANC [...] And I am a 
member of the ANCYL as well. I am not going to be biased here…The ANC 
youth League didn’t hijack the CPF. The ANCYL did not do such a 
thing…everybody said it was fair. If you are not able to mobilise people, why 
should you complain. People vote someone whom they know. Let’s not get 
there because people always want to disturb what is working properly. The 
previous CPF was composed of disgruntled members. They were criticised in a 
public meeting…How can you resign if you are criticised in a public meeting? 
If you resign it means that you are not a leader and it shows lack of maturity. 
The community comments, the community criticises. You can’t please 
everyone, but you can at least try to keep them happy. Because of that same 
meeting, the station commander Mkulili has stopped attending all public 
meeting. He says he wants a public apology” (Interview, Zweli: 05/10/2010). 
The competitive politics within the community security governance field mutates 
into a vicious politics of power. Spaces of local security governance are convertible 
into spaces for electioneering for political office in government. For instance, some 
office bearers of YCF attempted to campaign for councillorship in Yeoville and the 
surround areas during the May 2011 local government elections in South Africa (Box 
19).  
Box 19: “... Are you going to vote for me?” 
Nomfundo: Are you going to vote for me?  
Me: I am not eligible to vote. If I was eligible I was going to vote for you. 
Nomfundo: Which papers are you using? 
Me: I am using my passport 
Comment: She had forgotten that I am Zimbabwean, or perhaps she thought that I was a 
Zimbabwean with South African papers. 
Conversation with Nomfundo after YCF Meeting: 29/01/2011 
Explaining their political ambitions, the chairperson of YCF indicated: 
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“We are trying to ensure that we are given control of councillorship in 
Yeoville, so that we would be able to solve its problems. We can only be able 
to solve the problems of Yeoville if we can take over the office of the 
councillor. As things stand, it’s difficult for us as a forum to influence decisions 
about Yeoville. People need houses, and we can only solve that problem if we 
get access to power in council. Here we have councillors who don’t stay in 
Yeoville; councillors who don’t stay with the people. How will they be able to 
solve the problems of the community? How can they understand the people? 
Councillors should stay with us. These are the kind of councillors we want to 
encourage” (Conversation, Zondi: 06/02/2011). 
For YCF actors, the issue of hijacked houses and the housing question in general 
provided a platform for the gaining of political capital by community activists 
including local (aspiring) politicians. The campaign manifesto of YCF politicians was 
centred on housing issues and poverty. It read: 
“As an independent candidate, I will focus on stopping evictions from 
residential properties, a housing and building audit, full home ownership with 
title deeds, and end to overcrowding, write-off of electricity and water arrears, 
relocation of street traders, a youth and community centre, skills development, 
community and school safety, illegal liquor outlets, a designated taxi rank, 
making provisions for the poor and vulnerable and promoting integrated 
community building. Local government is not a politician’s ‘battlefield’, but for 
service delivery” (Yeovue News 2011), Vol. 4, Number 14, page 2-4) 
The glaring fact of lack of housing delivery in Yeoville became a point of reference 
and of departure for those seeking to gain access to political office. It became the 
political rallying point of YCF’s independent candidates. The housing audit 
mentioned in this manifesto is a direct response to the allegations that there are 
hijacked buildings in Yeoville and other areas in Johannesburg.  
Some members of the community complained about the power hungriness of local 
leaders, neglect of the needs of the community and lack of attendance of community 
meetings (Box 20). 
Box 20: “They are sucking the same lollypop that was sucked by those before them” 
Jola: We had a CPF meeting on Wednesday. The councillors were there at the meeting and I 
asked them to come over to this meeting to help us. They are not here. Apologies do not 
build a community. 
Jenny: If we ask a question about this political leadership. Is it staying in Yeoville? They are 
living in Sandton where there is 24 hour security. We are living here with our children. We 
need to make this a healthy community […]. This is not the first incident from our 
councillor. They are sucking the same lollypop that was sucked by those before them. 
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Man: I think there is a problem. If 
people are put into power they tend 
to take people for granted. 
Nevertheless we shouldn’t stop. If 
he doesn’t cooperate he has to be 
pushed out. If someone is put for a 
shorter period he performs, but if he 
is put for a longer time he doesn’t 
perform, he sleeps.  
Mduduzi: I am glad that men and 
women are saying the train must 
move forward. Despite his apology 
we must move forward and he gets 
us wherever we will be. 
 
Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting: 18/08/2011 
What is the positioning of individuals within the matrix of power in the community 
security governance field? As evidence suggests, there is a possibility of individual or 
collective pocketing of local social power and social influence for purposes of get-
crashing into the state by local (aspiring) politicians doubling and genuine social or 
community activists. The political capital of a local security governing organisation or 
conferred by it can be individualised and fuel individual political ambitions. The YCF 
leaders, for example, tried to get into local government structures using the YCF 
ticket and on the back of clamours for resolution of the challenge of hijacked houses. 
One of them even went to the extent of asking me: “are you going to vote for me” 
(Box 19).  
This shows that the field of community security governance is one that is composed 
of bodies influenced by the habitus of profit; in this context political profit. Shaping the 
dynamics of these attempts to pocket social power are struggles to access, influence 
or be part of the state by the capital seeking individuals or stakeholders (cf. Bourdieu 
1998a). In this case, (potential) local elites try to tap on or access statist capital and 
pocket it to enhance their local socio-political influence in the context of the 
neighbourhood. They are therefore engaged in political double-dealings (Bourdieu 
1991a) or multiple-dealings (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012) in the community safety 
governance field.  
@Katsaura 2011 
Photo 5: YCPF Chairperson leading a Sector Crime Forum meeting 
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I conclude, below, by offering a verdict on whether or not community safety 
governance should be considered as competitive socio-moral and politico-economic 
business. 
  
6.3. Community safety: socio-moral and politico-economic business?  
Community safety initiatives take place within a context in which organisational, 
institutional, social group and individual interests can be interpreted as based on the 
struggles, competition and coalition for accumulation of or access to political, 
symbolic, moral, economic and social profit or capital, amongst other logics. 
Community security governance is therefore a field of micro-politics; articulated to  
political  and economic  among other fields (Bourdieu 1991a). While players in the 
community safety governance field (compete to) accrue various forms of capitals, I 
wish to avoid unrelentingly representing them as always consciously calculating 
entities or beings. Competition for capital in the community safety governance field 
does not necessarily result in the conversion of these capitals into the capital of security 
or security capital, which is a public good whose generation is the main official agenda 
of some community organisations (for example YCPF and ADF). 
Community organisations or individuals coming into the safety sector do not always 
have safety improvement at the core or their mandates or interests, but nevertheless 
come into the sector because it is politically and economically profitable. The 
community safety sector is politically profitable for aspiring politicians because safety 
or crime reduction is one of the key concerns of ordinary South Africans; who are 
also voters. It is economically profitable because if it considered as fundable; with 
potentials for grants from government and donor agencies to community based 
organisations or local non-governmental organisations.   
The multiplication of organisations or interest groups in the community security 
sector may increase competition and sometimes lead to duplication of initiatives and 
efforts; all of which can lessen the effectiveness of safety initiatives, sometimes 
resulting in a waste of human or economic resources. This duplication, however, may 
bring checks and balances as organisations can police one another; as in the case of 
the collective organisational (YSF-YBCDT-Ward Committee driven) rebuke of the 
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YCF which was deemed as having potential to fan xenophobic violence and other 
forms of violent insurgency.  
Through a procedural analysis of the empirical realities of community participation in 
security governance, I conclude that public meeting attendance in dialogical spaces of 
security governance is a matter more of ritual than of concretised security promoting 
outputs. I maintain that while public participation is a potentially useful tool for 
security governance, it is liable to being hijacked by state interests that tend to 
annihilate the local safety governance matrix. Security governing deliberative spaces 
are in essence here conceptualised as spaces in which the state canvasses local 
knowledge about community dynamics, whilst enabling the management of social 
anger and social frustration without necessarily addressing or resolving the real 
challenges faced by the citizenry.    
Urban security governance theory and practice therefore necessarily needs to treat 
local security governance as inherently political and characterised by agents with 
multiple, clashing and polycentric agendas. Community safety governance should be 
considered as an arena in which socio-moral and politico-economic business is 
cooperatively and contentiously conducted by stakeholders - organisational, 
institutional, individual and social group. I expand this analysis in the next chapter, 
where I analyse the role of ethno-national groups and associated discourses and 
practices in the making of the community safety governance field (Chapter 7).  
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7. Chapter Seven 
Ethno-nationalist politics in community safety governance:  
Lessons from Yeoville 
 
“The CPF Executive and the SAPS in Yeoville and the Department of Community Safety 
must work together to find constructive ways of getting the involvement of the migrant 
community as full participants contributing to the fight against crime. Migrants are a large part 
of our community and we will not win the war against crime without the cooperation, 
assistance and involvement of the migrant community” (Smithers et al. 2012). 
 
7.1.  Introduction  
This chapter examines ethno-national regionalist politics in community safety governance. 
This is against a backdrop in which urban safety studies in South Africa overlook the 
importance of ethno-nationality in the configuration of local discourses, practices 
and strategies of community safety production (see Chapters 2, 3). The South 
African body of literature demonstrates connections between ethnicity and 
xenophobic discourses and practices in the public domain (Harris 2002; Kupe, 
Verryn and Worby 2008; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh and Gavatri 2005; Neocosmos 
2010; Nyamnjoh 2010a; Nyamnjoh 2010b); yet there is a dearth of literature on how 
these discourses and practices percolate community-based safety initiatives. I 
respond to this scholarly gap.    
I explore dynamics of ethno-nationalist posturing, exclusion and isolation in the socio-
political space of urban community safety governance – taking the form of “ethno-
talks”, “ethno-practices” and “ethno-discourses” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). I 
briefly relate ethno-nationality to other identities such as race, age and gender in my 
analysis. Although peripheral in this study, race, gender and age are categories that 
require a more nuanced analysis in the future; given another space and time.   
This chapter argues that the field of community security governance generates a 
socio-political space in which various ethno-national groups mobilise, take positions 
and jostle for recognition or protection. I examine three elements: i) the 
representations and manifestations of the politics of ethno-national otherness and 
othering in the community security field; ii) ethno-national regionalist discourses, 
practices and strategies in arenas of participatory community safety governance; and 
iii) the concoctive entwinement of ethno-nationality with other cartographies of 
identity such as age and gender in the making of community safety politics. Below, I 
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describe and interpret dynamics and discourses of ethno-national regionalist scapegoating 
in the community safety field. 
 
7.2. “The easiest people to blame …” 
Perceptions of and about African immigrants in Yeoville, like in the broader South 
African context, are loaded with stereotypical problematisation and criminalisation of 
their very identities and beings (Landau 2010; Nyamnjoh 2006). A community 
activist in Yeoville underscored: 
“The easiest people to blame are foreigners. People who are illegal migrants get 
into criminal activities because they can’t work. The responsibility of the state 
is to protect people from each other” (Interview, Maurice: 22/09/2010). 
Commenting on relations between South Africans and African immigrants in 
Yeoville, an African immigrant stated:  
“The relationships between foreigners and South Africans are not good. 
However, foreigners are still tolerant towards the behaviours of South 
Africans. They have never changed. The problem is with South Africans seeing 
us as invaders. We as foreigners accept them, but for them to accept you it’s a 
problem. They accuse us of taking their jobs. This behaviour is probably like 
that because most South Africans have never travelled. Those who have 
travelled have a different approach. The ones who went outside are friendlier 
to foreigners” (Participant, group interview with migrants: 2011). 
In many cases African immigrants are scapegoated as the causers of rising socio-
economic problems in South Africa, including crime and violence (Landau 2006a). 
They are viewed as a category deserving containment if further decay in South 
Africa’s urban spaces, societies and economies is to be curbed (Hornberger 2011) 
[see Figure 12].  
 
Figure 12: Connections of ethno-national regionalism and community safety governance 
Fear - crime, violence Participatory local safety 
initiatives 
Scapegoating/ blaming 
of African immigrants 
Self-isolation or forced 
exclusion from 
participation 
Source: Author 
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African immigrants are, from my observation, viewed from three perspectives as i) 
posing threats in and to public places, ii) distorting and criminalising the housing 
market, iii) and as unwarranted socio-economic competitors or economic criminals. 
        
7.2.1. Ethno-nationalist imageries of crime, disorder and place 
At the level of perception, the genesis of crime, violence and other urban disorders in 
innercity Johannesburg is, in many instances, associated with some regimes of city 
space occupancy by African immigrants (Legget 2002; Vetten and Sadiyya 2005). 
Their trajectories in city spaces are abound with scapegoating and criminalising 
legends (Simone 2004a). In Yeoville, some South African public discourses, classify 
criminal activities or potentials on the basis of stereotypes about ethno-national 
groups. A ward councillor in Yeoville expressed: 
“Nigerians are known for drug dealing. Zimbabweans are known for 
committing robberies. I was once mugged whilst coming from a meeting with 
other women. We were robbed of our purses. There I lost my ring of 31 years 
of marriage. Perhaps they sold the ring for 5 Rand.  It was in Dunbar Street. 
The guys who robbed us were Zimbabweans” (Interview: Ward Councillor 
Noma, 16/08/2010). 
A YCPF leader maintained: 
“The people who commit violent crimes are mostly Zimbabweans and Zulus. 
These ones use guns and knives. The Nigerians normally commit technical 
crime: electronic money transfers. Zimbabweans for crime are number one and 
Zulus as well.  Mozambicans are good in muthi67. They make you sleep and 
come to collect everything in your house. Hey! Hey!  We are in a shit… 
Everybody is coming here …” (Interview, Mduduzi [YCPF member]: 
08/08/2010).  
He further narrated: 
“I had some tension with one Congolese national who was my neighbour and 
making a lot of noise […]. I ask him where you coming from. He says this is 
my house. I tell him I am not asking whether this is your house, but where you 
come from, how you came to South Africa. He said Congo. I tell him, when 
you are in South Africa you must follow the South African law. After 12 
midnight, everybody must be sleeping, people working, children studying [...] 
and people should not make noise. We are not saying South Africans are 
100%. They also have their own problems. It’s not like foreigners are the only 
                                                     
67 Muti is an African name for charms or traditional medicines. 
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ones who have a problem” (Interview, Mduduzi [YCPF member]: 
08/08/2010) [sic]. 
The association of criminality with particular ethno-nationalities was confirmed, with 
some reservations, in an opinion and attitude survey (Box 21). 
Box 21: Nationality and crime 
Comment 
40% of participants indicated that 
there is a relationship between 
nationality and crime perpetration 
or types of crime committed. 
52.5% stated that they do not 
believe that there is a link between 
perpetration of crime and national 
identity. 5% could not make 
introspection into the relationship 
between nationality and criminal 
activity. 2.5% did not respond.  
The majority of those who saw a connection between nationality and crime were South 
Africans (85% of South African participants). However, 95% of non-South African 
respondents mainly did not see the link between criminality and nationality.   
 
Summary of responses 
In terms of the nationalities who were considered as involved in criminal activities in South 
Africa in general and in Yeoville in particular, Zimbabweans top the list, followed by 
Nigerians and South Africans. Zimbabweans were generally associated with crimes such as 
muggings, robberies, petty theft, fraud and domestic violence. Nigerians were associated with 
drug dealing and fraud, while South Africans were associated with use of fire arms and 
robbery. Other nationalities mentioned include Mozambicans who were associated with 
carjacking and use of firearms. Congolese were associated with domestic violence. Generally, 
nationalities from West Africa were associated with fraud. Those who did not see any 
correlation between nationality and criminality indicate that they would not want to pinpoint 
any nationality, that crime is sometimes committed by syndicates composed of various 
nationalities including South Africans and that they were no experts in that and the police 
would know better. Those that did not respond could have found the question highly 
political and therefore simply evaded it. 
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
While the association of criminality with African immigrants was common in public 
discourses, there was also public sceptism about it. Asked if there was a connection 
between nationality and crime or violence types, a senior police officer responded: 
“Their nationality? I cannot just say a particular nationality, because Yeoville is 
a multi-national community. So we can not single out a particular nationality. 
Even South Africans are being arrested. For example, in January our team 
arrested 13 youths for carjacking and robbery. All of them were South African 
Figure 13: In your opinion, do you think there is any link 
between people's nationalities and likelihood to commit 
crime 
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nationals. A week after that, we arrested another four, who were part of the 
syndicate of the arrested 13. I cannot just make a correlation between crime 
and people’s nationality. If we speak about fraud, people say Nigerians are the 
ones who do fraud. But I do not agree with them, because we arrest South 
Africans and charge them for fraud, Cameroonians, Congolese, Zimbabweans 
and Nigerians. So we cannot just single out a particular nationality. All 
nationals are committing fraud. There is a general perception that Nigerians are 
the ones dealing in drugs, but I do not believe that, because they infiltrate the 
locals. South Africans are also involved. There of course are Nigerians 
involved in drugs, but there are others engaging in honest business” (Interview, 
Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010). 
 In the same vein, a local politician emphasised: 
“Crime was always there in Yeoville, but then the crimes that are now being 
committed here; foreign nationals are also committing them. The crimes that 
are committed here are muggings, committed by foreign nationals. I don’t 
know how to put this, but also my car was broken into and my radio was 
stolen. Someone just opened my door and stole my radio. My radio was not 
stolen by a foreign national. It was stolen by a South African. We have a high 
proportion of foreign nationals in Yeoville, but South Africans, even though 
they are a small number, are visibly committing crime…Buildings are hijacked 
by foreign nationals, but also mostly by South Africans. Mostly I am afraid of 
young boys of foreign nationality who grow up here and get used to the 
situation of engaging in crime” (Interview, Mpho: 08/02/2011) 
In public and academic perceptions, innercity decay in Johannesburg is correlated to 
the immigration of a pan-African cohort from inside and outside South Africa 
(Simone 2004a). Innercity decay, in Yeoville, was considered as concomitant with 
“white flight” in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Chapter 3, YBCDT undated). 
Long time Yeoville resident and community activist narrated: 
“I have always lived more or less around this area through the seventies and 
eighties when I was a political activist. Since about 1998 I began to look at 
development issues in Yeoville. There was a major transition happening. 
Yeoville was a traditionally white area. By 1990 Yeoville was 85% White and 
most of the Blacks who were here were domestic workers. By 1998, Yeoville 
was 99% Black. This transition was a very unmanaged one. This is an area of 
migrants. Suddenly within a space of 8 years, we have a whole bunch of people 
from all over South Africa and eventually all over Africa. Nobody is telling 
them the rules; nobody is telling them how to do things. They don’t know.  
There is no communication. The city doesn’t know how to do it. So there has 
been a steady erosion of management in this area. This has resulted in people 
engaging in anti-social activity, anti-social behaviour including violence” 
(Speech, Maurice: 19/08/2010). 
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Ethno-national stereotypes about crime and violence in Yeoville also had some 
territorial or spatial overtones. African immigrants were considered as occupying 
specific physical spaces, turning them into spaces of criminal commercial and social 
activities. In Box 22 I summarise a community activist’s characterisation of various 
places in Yeoville according to occupancy by various ethno-national groups, whose 
activities he suspected to be illegal or criminal.  
Box 22: Narrative of conversation with a key informant during a tour of Yeoville 
In Yeoville, specific streets or 
street corners are viewed as 
criminogenic spaces inhabited and 
utilised by foreign nationals of 
African origin. During a key 
informant interview, Mr Thabang 
described how the various spaces 
in Yeoville’s main business street 
have been appropriated by various 
groups of migrants for various 
purposes. He indicated that corner 
Raymond and Rockey Street was a 
hub for Zimbabwean. At that 
corner, he indicated that there was 
a building called the green house 
where a crowd of Zimbabweans was found. Most of these Zimbabweans, according to him 
used cell phones to rob people and defraud banks and they also robbed shops and sold 
stolen goods.   
Mr. Thabang characterised Corner Hunter Street and Fortesque as a little Kinshasa. He 
stated that there were people who illegally produced passports, South African ID books and 
death certificates. At corner Grafton and Raleigh Street, according to him, there were 
Nigerian drug dealers who were always dressed in expensive clothes and drove expensive 
cars. According to him, Times Square, at corner Raleigh Street and Fortesque, there were 
many Zimbabweans. Behind Times Square, as he stated, there were lots of Ethiopians and 
Somalians. This place, according to him was a port of call for trafficked humans. He 
indicated that there was a big truck that came there at night to drop off trafficked Ethiopians 
and Somalians.  
He stated that Corner Hunter Street and Kenmerre Street was a place for Ghanaians. He 
alleged that these Ghanaians committed internet crimes together with Nigerians. He 
expressed that Nigerians were the masters of internet crime. In Raleigh Street, between 
Kenmerre Street and Bedford Street in front of Shoprite, according to Mr. Thabang, there 
were lots of young men hanging closer to ATMs. At that spot pin numbers were memorised 
and money was being withdrawn fraudulently. At corner Raleigh Street and Bedford Street, 
as Mr. Thabang narrated, there was a cohort of Tanzanian dagga dealers doing business 
there. Corner Cavendish and Raleigh Streets, according to him, was highly populated. There 
were Nigerian heavy drug runners. This place was also an adult entertainment area. Also, the 
area in Raleigh Street, anchored by Kenmerre and Cavendish Streets was considered at the 
business node of Raleigh – Rockey Street.   
The area at corner Raymond and Rockey Street was characterised by Mr. Thabang as the 
Photo 6: Picture taken during tour of Yeoville - Rockey-Raleigh Street 
@Katsaura 2010 
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criminal corner of Yeoville. This is because, as he alleged, there was a big drug syndicate 
there. According to him, people sat there day and night selling dagga and heavy drugs such as 
Cocaine and Heroin.  
At the same corner (Rockey and Raymond Streets), Zimbabweans were alleged to be selling 
stolen goods and cell phones. It was also characterised as the corner having a high density of 
Nigerians. That corner, as Mr. Thabang puts it, was a zone where people drink 24 hours.  
The place in Rockey Street, between Raymond and Bezuidenhoudt Streets was described as 
an area with a very high concentration of internet cafes. At that spot, as described Mr. 
Thabang, marriage certificates, passports and tertiary institution diplomas were printed and 
sold.  
The area on Rockey Street between Bezuidenhoudt and De La Rey streets was characterised 
as derelict. This was the place, according to Mr. Thabang, where some criminals hide. 
Tour of Yeoville with Thabang: 25/08/2010 
In a bid to verify Mr. Thabang’s description of ethno-national geo-strategies and spatial 
occupancy of street corners in Yeoville, I note that his characterisation was grounded in 
his “common-sensical” observations of everyday socio-economic spatial trajectories 
of ethno-national groups. His characterisation was by and large simplistic given the 
maze of population mixing and criss-crossing characterising Yeoville. This maze 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to confidently pinpoint the occupancy of a 
particular street corner by a specific ethno-national group.  
What was a bit obvious, however, was a conglomerated network of business 
groupings based on ethno-national similarity or proximity; operating as cultural-
economic enclaves (Caldeira 1996b; Kahera 2002; Marcuse 2005a; Marcuse 2005b). These 
cultural-economic enclaves were, however, not always readily clear-cut as they tended 
be a hotchpotch people that was not easily readable.  
Such cultural-economic enclaves, apart from being enclaves of commerce, were also 
represented or labelled as criminal enclaves. A local activist stated: 
“There are certainly more serious crimes being committed in Yeoville such as 
bank fraud. I can talk about the various spaces and clusters of criminal 
activities associated with particular nationalities in Rockey-Raleigh Street” 
(Interview, Thabang: 25/08/2010).  
These ethno-national enclaves were perceived as criminogenic and the occupying 
African immigrants as potential or real criminals – referred to as crimmigrant bodies 
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(Aas 2011). Ironically, these enclaves can also be considered as spaces of collective 
safety for African immigrants (Harris 2003a).  
Territorialised ethno-nationalist groupings are a part of individuals’ and social groups’ 
safety provisioning spatial strategies (de Certeau 1984). African immigrants’ grouping 
into physical spaces of Yeoville can be described as generating or reflecting on 
territorialised ethno-national regionalist politics (see Figure 9). This becomes very 
sensitive and acute in South African cities if it shifts into a “public politics of the 
house”. 
       
7.2.2. Ethno-nationalised housing politics, fear, crime and violence 
Ethno-national scapegoating or criminalisation of African immigrants in everyday 
discourses and practices were associated with struggles for housing in Yeoville (see 
Chapter 8, subtitle 8.4.1). The presence of the Black African immigrant was 
considered, by some disenfranchised and disgruntled South Africans, as one of the 
causes of housing shortage. It was alleged that the presence of Black non-South 
Africans contributed to increases in housing rentals, overcrowding and attendant 
social problems. Another accusation was that non-South Africans were culprits in the 
hijacking of residential buildings. An executive member of YCF stated: 
“I will be open with you. Zimbabweans and Nigerians are the ones that are 
hijacking houses here. I won’t be shy about that” (Conversation, Nomfundo: 
08/08/2010). 
This statement reflected the common view of many Black South Africans disgruntled 
by lack of (affordable) housing in Yeoville. Consider the following statement by a 
South African participant in a ward public meeting: 
“Viva Bahlali Viva! Thank you for the opportunity to come to this meeting. 
The need of South Africans is the pride of the roof. You have to pay a big 
amount of money as rent. People are paying between 1 500 rand to 2 000 rand 
for a room in a house owned by a foreigner. Can you go to Nigeria and own a 
house and make them pay rent to you? South Africans are suffering” (Ward 
Public Meeting participant: 13/11/2011). 
The field of housing in Yeoville and more generally in South Africa, is characterised by 
contestation and competition; often taking an ethno-nationalist slant and even an 
outrightly (violent) xenophobic one (see Chapter 8). Struggles within the housing field 
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are struggles for spatial capital and the associated symbolic capital; that is the “pride of 
the roof”. The housing field, is therefore intricately connected to the field of security 
and more generally, to political and economic fields. Below, I examine how the 
criminalisation of African immigrants mirrors contestations within the broader 
economic field. 
 
7.2.3.  Safety and socio-economic dimensions of ethno-national politics  
Writing in Yeovue News, a South African contributor describes the economic and 
spatial implications of the presence of African immigrants as problematic: 
“Every self respecting migrant should abide by the laws, by-laws, rules and 
regulations in their host country, in this case, South Africa. Migrants must not 
expect to do in a host country what they were doing in their original countries 
or, indeed, things they were not allowed to do in their countries because of 
stricter law enforcement…The reality we must boldly face is that most 
migrants in Yeoville Bellevue come from unplanned, underdeveloped cities 
with little infrastructural development and no effective by-laws or 
enforcement. Migrants need to orient themselves to life in South Africa. They 
need to understand by-laws, environmental health standards and other basic 
requirements for safe and healthy living. Yes, having so many migrants causes 
overcrowding. Yes, many people do not have basic property maintenance 
skills. I cannot try to be politically correct here when reality dictates otherwise 
[…]. Education around such things needs to take place without ill feelings. Do 
not use South Africans as scapegoats for your shortcomings” (Majombozi 
2010). 
The typical “African immigrant” is publicly represented as one who hails from an 
anarchic African country and as ignorant and disrespectful of South African laws. 
Many African immigrants, by virtue of fleeing economic or political crises from their 
countries of origin and seeking better economic opportunities in South Africa, are 
viewed with contempt and as endangering others (Landau 2010). See excerpt below 
(Box 23). 
Box 23: “I really get annoyed …” 
Councillor (Noma): There is a Nigerian hair salon that employs Nigerians only. How do we 
fight xenophobia if things are like that? People are not working together. Foreigners do not 
want to work together with us. 
Woman A: They don’t want to employ us. They say we South African are poor. 
Woman B: Cultures are different. I really get annoyed to see someone standing on the 
streets, blocking people’s free movement (one respondent on the bench) 
Woman C (ANC member): Perhaps we need to change the word xenophobia for another 
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word. Because each time it is mentioned, we fail to find a solution for our problems. 
Councillor: Our brothers need to share resources with us, South Africans, if we are to live 
well together 
Ward public meeting: 14/08/2010 
Box 23 shows the us and them schema (Nyamnjoh 2006) in relationships between 
South Africans and African immigrants in Yeoville. Some public economic 
discourses in Yeoville projected African immigrants as problematic economic beings. 
There were, for example, complaints such as “they do not want to employ us”, 
“foreigners don’t want to work together with us”, or “our brothers need to share 
resources” (Box 23). Competition over the use of public space is another factor 
contribution to the negative perception of African immigrants in Yeoville by some 
members of the South African public. One South African here bitterly complained “I 
really get annoyed to see someone standing on the streets, blocking people’s free 
movement” (Box 23).  
Reflecting the economic dimension of the criminalisation of African immigrants, a 
Yeoville ward councillor underscored: 
“If you are a refugee, we find you getting a car. Where do you get money to get 
a car when you are a refugee?” (Ward Public Meeting, Noma: 09/10/2010). 
Yet some African immigrants complained about their economic marginalisation, 
which they claimed, lent them gullible to criminality of make them easy scapegoats 
for the crime and violence situation in South Africa: 
“There is more chance to rejection than integration for migrants in South 
Africa. An African migrant is seen as an extra person in the society and as a 
threat. The presence of a migrant is minus one job, it is minus one 
accommodation and it is a threat to medical service. Don’t blame the effects, 
blame the cause. The people who are coming to South Africa do not come to 
be criminals, but because they were rejected, they end up committing crimes. 
The fact that migrants are responsible for committing crimes in South Africa is 
not true, that is just a perception. Many foreigners are into illegal business and 
petty crime. Most organised crime is done by South Africans, for example 
ATM bombings”. (Interview, Yonga-Yonga: 08/04/2011). 
It follows then that African immigrants were liable publicly perceived as a governmental 
category - one to be controlled or contained. One South African emphasised: 
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“[…] I am still stressing on the control of immigration in this country. If the 
government can be able to identify all the people that live in the country 
(South Africans and non-South Africans) they can pretend to fight or stop 
crime. Instead of having too many public holidays, the government can 
effectively use these days to deal with this issue of identification of people or 
documenting people. They must work hard and they need a proper planning. 
We don’t need useless holidays. This is nonsense” (Opinion and attitude 
survey participant T9A, 2011).  
 
It is not surprising that “African immigrant” is already a targeted “object” of 
everyday policing in innercity neighbourhoods of Johannesburg (Hornberger 2004; 
Hornberger 2011). This ethno-nationalised policing is potentially abusive of African 
immigrants as evidenced by the fact that police officers, who are supposed to protect 
the public, are even alleged to be harassing African immigrants and extorting bribes 
from them (Hornberger 2011). A migrant human rights activist complained: 
“The law enforcement agencies are promoting crime. They are taking bribes. If 
you see someone getting arrested, they won’t be having a bribe to give to the 
police” (Interview, Yonga-Yonga: 08/04/2011). 
A South African local politician confirmed: 
“The police go to foreign nationals when they want money, demanding 
documents and asking money from them if they do not produce those 
documents. The JMPD are also not addressing the traffic situation in Yeoville. 
I have reported this to the MMC for safety and Security, but nothing was done. 
I also feel that the Yeoville Police Station is very small. If only we have a bigger 
police station, I think it will go a long way to solve the problems” (Interview, 
Mpho: 08/02/2011). 
Consider the story of a Rwandese migrant: 
“The problem is that sometimes you don’t know who is who. Yesterday I met 
someone in Rockey Street at 1 am. He said he wanted to search me and I asked 
him who he was. Then I saw volunteers come and they said let him search you. 
He searched me and took my bank cards and credit cards. He took me to the 
police station to verify my cards, but later he just gave me back my cards and 
didn’t explain anything to me if there is anything I had done wrong so that I 
won’t do it again” (YCPF Public Meeting, Rwandese migrant: 06/11/2010). 
The generalised dislike and criminalisation of African immigrants by some South 
Africans in Yeoville was therefore linked to the perception that they bring economic 
competition and are involved in “criminal economies” (Friman 2004).  
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Some South African public discourses therefore ethno-nationalise criminality and 
violence; representing some Black African immigrants as posing unnecessary 
economic competition against Black South Africans. These discourses also stereotype 
the African immigrant as an “economic criminal”, “trespasser” and “socio-economic 
saboteur” - a category that needs to be controlled and contained for the production 
of safety.  
 
7.2.4. “Let’s unite and go and remove these people …” 
Sometimes, in public forums, there were expressions of anger over the presence of 
African immigrants in Yeoville and, and more generally, in South Africa. See excerpt 
in Box 24. 
Box 24: “Lets unite and go and remove these people” 
Context: There is a man who demonstrates anger over the blocking of pavements by street 
traders. He stresses that these traders are mostly foreigners and he indicates the need to 
physically remove these people from the street. His complains is that the pavements in 
Yeoville are unwalkable and he cannot freely do shopping. He stated: 
“Let’s unite and go and remove these people and make Yeoville clean”. 
This sparked a debate on the matter of street trade, environmental cleanliness and crime in 
Yeoville. Below are extracts of some of the statements uttered in this meeting: 
Bambanani: The only thing is that crime is covered by Xenophobia. Once you start 
this, you are on the wrong side of the law; it will be xenophobia. 
Sibanda: I think we need to be sober minded in whatever we do. You could do the 
right thing but in the wrong way. I am from Zimbabwe, but I am attending this 
meeting because I am interested. Let’s not do things in anger, but we need to go 
forward and solve the problems with a sober mind. 
Mr X: People must understand that selling on the street is illegal. I know they need to 
survive, but it’s not allowed. 
Thabang: Colleagues, friends and brothers, I think we are going the wrong way. You 
are going the xenophobic way and that is totally wrong. All of us when hawkers do 
their meeting we should attend those meetings and raise our issues with them. We 
need to have street committees. When we come to the next meeting we need to know 
how many of us have established street committees; how many of us belong to street 
committees. 
Sector Crime Forum  2 meeting: 17/02/2011 
From meeting conversation in Box 24, I detect three elements characterising 
relationships between South Africans and African immigrants in Yeoville. There are 
ethno-national regionalist politics, ethno-nationalist insurgency and the contradictions 
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between the law and local moral orders (Holston 2008; von Holdt 2010). Ethno-national 
regionalist discourses and practices created imageries of the legend of the immigrant 
African street trader as littering the environment, contributing to spacio-cide68 (Hanafi 
2009) and undermining “street conviviality” and “walkability” (Karner and Parker 
2011), by “blocking” pedestrian flow on pavement. These spatial mal-functions or 
illegal land-uses were publicly considered as contributing to crime and violence in 
Yeoville (Box 24). 
In light of the imageries of the non-South African street trader as a spatial assailant 
contributing to spatial disorder - street chaos, crime and violence - there was an urge 
towards violent and forceful insurgency to address or contain these perceived 
challenges. The clamour that “let’s go and remove them and make Yeoville clean” 
attests to the potential for this kind of forceful or violent insurgency against street 
traders and the enterprise of street trade (Box 24).  
Also, there was awareness of the potential limits of such violent insurgency among 
participants in the meeting excerpted in Box 24. The participants recognised that 
(threats of) violence against street traders, who were mainly African immigrants, 
could clash with the law or be interpreted as xenophobia or indeed could turn out to 
be xenophobic. Hence the statement: “once you start that you are on the wrong side 
of the law” (Box 24). Responding to the call for forceful removal of street traders 
from the streets, a South African activist warned: “that is not the way to go” (Box 
24). A Zimbabwean participant in this meeting also counselled the meeting 
participants “to be sober minded” and “not do things in anger” (Box 24).  
There were frustrations among some South Africans who wanted to use violence 
against the “problematic immigrant criminals”. One South African complained that 
“crime is covered by xenophobia” (Box 24). In another context the same South 
African stressed: 
“Sometimes you see someone breaking the law and if you try to stop them, 
then it becomes xenophobia. Anyone who breaks the law in a country should 
be punished irrespective of their nationality (Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting 
participant” (Ntate, 02/06/2011). 
                                                     
68
 The killing of space or the built environment. 
  153 
 
This shows that there is sometimes a potential clash between the law and local moral 
orders (von Holdt 2010). Such local moral orders are characterised by doxic69 
invocation of “anti-foreigner” violence by some South Africans in attempting to deal 
local challenges perceived to be emanating from the presence of African immigrants. 
In understanding the criminalisation of African immigrants, one should note African 
immigrants are not just victims, but are proactive social agents. The section below 
narrates the counter-otherisation and counter-criminalisation practices, strategies and 
tactics (Bourdieu 1977; de Certeau 1984) collectively and individually employed by 
African immigrants.  
  
7.3. Counter-criminalisation and counter-otherisation practices 
The association of criminality with African immigrants was dismissed by some 
Yeoville residents (African immigrants and South Africans included) as not fact, but 
a matter of just scapegoating. A migrant activist questioned: 
“These people behave as if there was no crime before 1994 in South Africa. 
When someone breaks the law they write foreigner and the magistrate will 
know that you are a foreigner. It’s not easy for migrants to get bail. That’s why 
we have a significant number of Zimbabweans, followed by Mozambicans, 
Nigerians and Congolese in prison. The types of cases are different. Having the 
majority of people in prison as migrants doesn’t mean that migrants are 
committing too much crime. The fact is that South Africans can easily get bail” 
(Interview, Omokoko: 08/04/2011). 
One migrant activist proposed: 
“How do we get migrants to be accepted in South African communities and 
their contribution to the country and the communities they live in to be 
appreciated? I think it is important for us to publish profiles of migrants 
contributing towards the well-being of South Africa and we can do this 
through the proposed Diaspora News. We might also need to have ADF 
business cards with logos of the organisation in order to have a professional 
appeal. We might also need to prepare and distribute to the public, leaflets 
showing the mandate and activities of ADF in various languages so that we 
appeal to the wider community of migrants, highly educated and less educated” 
(ADF Meeting, Yonga-Yonga: 26/02/2011). 
                                                     
69 I refer to these invocations as doxic tendencies because they are habitualised as everyday practices. See 
chapter 4 for a discussion of the Bourdieusian concept of doxa. 
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This was a proposal for use of the media to reconfigure the public representation and 
image of immigrants; profiling their progressive contributions to the economy and 
society. The ADF used to have a newspaper insert called African Diaspora Forum News 
in The Star newspaper in 2009. In this newspaper they profiled the socio-economic 
contributions of immigrants in South Africa and communicated migrant issues in 
general [see: (Benit-Gbaffou and Kisakye 2010)]. Also, in 2012, ADF created a Media 
Task Team. The terms of reference for the ADF Media Task Team read: 
“The media task team should be involved in publication of material for 
purposes of improving the public perceptions of foreign nationals in South 
Africa. In this regard, they will need to work with prominent South African 
media (newspapers, radio, TV) so as to reach a large South African audience, 
which is the primary target. They should initiate sustainable educative media 
projects aimed at reducing or fighting xenophobia, first and foremost 
challenging the dominant idea that: Foreign nationals are a burden to South 
Africa (showing concrete examples of migrants’ contribution to economy 
and society); Foreign nationals are only “victims” (showing concrete 
examples of their agency, initiatives, rich and diverse cultural lives)[…].” 
 
Lobbying activities played a role in attempts to improve the perception of African 
immigrants by the South African public. On 3 March 2012, ADF created a task team 
to deal with policing issues affecting migrants. The task team was expected: 
 
“To work in cahoots with the SAPS and CPF structures to encourage inclusive 
policing in relation for foreign nationals living in South Africa… This involves 
in particular regular participation in CPFs (meetings, activities, executives) in 
areas where migrants are numerous, and/or where there are specific issues of 
xenophobic policing… This task team should formulate, jointly with policing 
bodies or on its own, projects that address the challenges of xenophobic 
policing…” 
Such lobbying was meant to encourage and promote migrant inclusive and friendly 
policing by SAPS.   
Activism against police harassment of immigrants involved other civic organisations. 
Box 25 narrates an incident where a Yeoville resident and migrant activist was 
unfairly arrested by SAPS officers; resulting in joint migrant rights activism by a 
variety of community and civic organisations condemning the arrest. 
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Box 25: “My family will ask me what happened to me in South Africa” 
Context: As detailed in the statement of complaint by the arrested activist, Omokoko, he 
was arrested on the 17th of August 2011 after skirmishes with a taxi driver and rank 
marshals. The incident took place in the CBD of Johannesburg. In this case, Omokoko had a 
problem with a taxi driver after he was accused of paying taxi fare using a fake 100 rand 
note. According to Omokoko, the accusation by the taxi driver was trumped up. Fearing for 
his safety, Omokoko called the police to come and help him. Upon arrival, the police failed 
to clearly get a statement from Omokoko who had called them. Instead of getting a 
statement from Omokoko, the police ended up having a conversation with the taxi driver in 
Zulu language, which Omokoko did not understand. After that conversation, Omokoko was 
surprised as the police officer arrested him. Omokoko indicated that the way he was handled 
by police and the searching by police was abusive. They referred to him as a criminal despite 
the fact that he had not been convicted. He was then detained at John Vorster Police Station 
for two nights until the 19th of August when he was due to appear before a magistrate’s 
court. According to Omokoko the prosecutor declined to proceed with the case citing lack 
of incriminating evidence against him. Omokoko was then released on the 19th of August 
2011. He describes his experiences and his thoughts as follows: 
“I know that some South Africans don't like us. They are not helping us also to bring 
peace, democracy and justice in our country like we helped them during the apartheid 
era. One day without their help we will go back to our country with many injuries. My 
family will ask what happened to me in South Africa. I will for sure tell them that I 
was injured by my fellow Africans who are South African simply because I'm another 
African. My family, my children and future generations will remember this may be 
forever. I am very surprised to see that how some South African till today have not 
learnt that Afriphobia is bad. This undermines the efforts made by the people like 
Oliver Tambo, Walter & Albertina Sisulu, Steve Biko, Joe Slovo (who was a Migrant) 
and Nelson Mandela to fight against apartheid and any forms of discrimination. It 
undermines the spirit of ubuntu and South African democracy and Justice. It is very 
clear that South Africans with xenophobic attitudes are practicing exactly what they 
fought against” (Email conversation with Omokoko on the 27th of August 2011). 
Consequences: The incident of Omokoko’s arrest resulted in a meeting of human rights 
activists from Amnesty International, CoRMSA70 and ADF on the 26th of August 2011. The 
aim of the meeting was to find ways of responding Omokoko’s case and similar challenges 
faced by migrants in their daily lives and interaction with the police in South Africa. In this 
meeting, the participants resolved to a) release a press statement and do a media briefing as a 
way of protesting against police abuse of migrants and raising public awareness of police 
misconduct and xenophobia; b) take a legal route in seeking recourse for the suffering that 
Omokoko experienced at the hands of police and send a message to discourage police from 
harassing migrants; c) engagement with Minister of Police and Minister of Transport on 
matters of the safety and security of migrants. 
In the face of identity-based adversity, African immigrants have also adopted blame-
shedding strategies in public forums; campaigning against being scapegoated for local 
problems, including crime. In a YSF meeting a migrant claimed: 
“Wrong is wrong. Let’s not think of whether it’s South Africans doing it or 
foreigners doing it” (YSF meeting participant: 21/10/2010). 
                                                     
70
 Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA). 
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Some (African) immigrants have mobilised and organised to protect themselves from 
xenophobic discourses and practices. They created their own forums, such as ADF, 
in response to fears of real or perceived xenophobic practices (including violence) 
and discourses. The ADF Chairperson explained: 
“When the xenophobic violence started in May 2008, the government didn’t 
do anything. We thought that the government would send the police of army 
to stop the violence, but it didn’t. That’s why we formed ADF to respond to 
this violence and to lobby government and other stakeholders to act. I had to 
use my own network, being a leader of the Ivorian community, to make sure 
that this endeavour was a success.  As ADF, we work with migrants and we 
want to work with the South African community to combat xenophobia. We 
had projects in Alexandra and we worked with the police and CPF to deal with 
the people, educating them about other African countries… We have a strong 
network. We have a relationship with high ranking police officers. This helps 
us when members of the migrant community are arrested unfairly we can deal 
with the matter easily. We can make phone calls to these high ranking people 
so that we get assistance. We also work closely with councillors and other local 
politicians who are useful to us” (Interview: Fagbibo: 26/08/2011). 
He also explained that ADF also work on litigation in cases involving abuse of 
immigrants by police officials. He explained: 
“Many people can be arrested because they are not carrying their passports. 
They might be carrying certified copies of the passport – certified by the 
police. They ask for the original document and threaten to arrest you if you 
don’t pay a bribe. We have assisted many migrants who were arrested like that. 
We have also assisted several of our members in litigation cases. For example, 
our ADF member, Cyprian was arrested in Hillbrow being charged for 
loitering. It was an unfair arrest. He has won a case against the Minister of 
Police and has just got paid R30 000 as compensation” (Interview, Fagbibo: 
26/08/2011). 
Also engaging in work to help immigrants in South Africa and stationed in Yeoville 
was the Refugee Help Desk (RHD). The Chairperson of RHD described his work: 
“Myself, I am a migrant. Since the xenophobic attacks, we don’t want people 
to talk for us as migrants. I feel what migrants feel and I understand them. My 
Job is to provide refugees with necessary information which can make them 
have an impact on the socio-economic development of migrants in South 
Africa. As refugee help desk we help migrants with identity documents and 
permits, do advocacy and lobbying for migrants and source essentials such as 
blankets and food for vulnerable migrants[…]. While we deal with xenophobia, 
we are organising awareness campaigns, training workshops …” (Interview, 
Omokoko: 08/03/2011). 
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African immigrants were therefore not passive bodies or groups upon which criminal 
and othering labels simply stuck. They engaged in counter-criminalisation and counter-
otherisation practices and tactics. In doing so, they organised themselves to create 
systems of mutual support and defence. The cases of ADF, Refugee Help Desk’s 
attempts to foster the acceptance of African immigrants in South African societies 
bear testimony to this.  
Counter-otherising strategies also take place at individual levels as people live, 
transverse or “walk in the city” (de Certeau 1984); prioritising self-protection against 
potential violent and non-violent xenophobic practices in the process.  
Through such collective and individual practices, African immigrants gain a special 
kind of street knowledge or “street science” (Corburn 2005)which they use to 
navigate the fearopolis that Johannesburg is. I refer to this kind of knowledge as part 
of the capital of security; accumulated through everyday practices and discursive 
exchanges, and usable in everyday navigation of the city. Safety governing practices, 
strategies, tactics and discourses are shared, in the case of Yeoville, within the arena 
of participatory spaces. I therefore focus, in the next section, on examining the 
ethno-national regionalist dimension of these discourses, practices, strategies, tactics 
and the implications thereof. 
  
7.4. “These people don’t come to meetings ...”  
Non-South Africans faced exclusion from official positions in the CPF and related 
bodies. In its specifications of persons who should not hold positions in the Gauteng 
Provincial Community Police Board (GPCPB)71 and the CPF, the GPCPB 
constitution of 2010 states: 
“Persons who are not citizens of the Republic of South Africa” [section 22, 
subsection 22.2.5 (GPCPB 2010)]. 
Box 26 below shows an excerpt of a discussion between ADF delegates and General 
Mdubuli who managed Johannesburg’s Region F policing cluster (which includes 
Yeoville, Hillbrow, Berea, Jeppestown, Joubert Park and Linden). 
                                                     
71 The Gauteng Provincial Police Board is the one that oversees the establishment and running of all 
CPF in the Gauteng Province. 
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Box 26: ADF meeting with senior police officer 
Fagbibo: We are here so that we discuss with you the problem of police harassment of 
foreign nationals. Just recently the police have arrested Congolese nationals in Yeoville. I 
wish to propose that we work on creating a small committee to work together for promoting 
policing that is friendly to migrants.  We wish to have foreign nationals participate in 
Community Policing Forums also. 
General Mdubuli: The problem is not with the CPF. You are blaming the wrong people. 
There are always leaders. If my memory serves me well, the issue is that the migrants cannot 
be part of CPF executives, but they can be part of the CPF subcommittee. We can have a 
more formal meeting to discuss these issues. 
Context: I was present in this meeting as the Secretary General of ADF. The meeting 
involved me, Fagbibo and General Mdubuli. In this meeting, we agreed to set up a date 
where we would discuss this matter in the presence of all station commanders in Region F, 
all CPF representatives, interest groups and academics. 
ADF meeting with General Mdubuli at Hillbrow Police Station: 29/01/2012 
This meeting (Box 26) culminated in a meeting of the Region F policing cluster police 
station and CPFs representatives and ADF. ADF was invited to be part of 
discussions on the inclusion of migrants in community policing initiatives. During 
this meeting, the Chairperson of the Gauteng Provincial Community Police Board 
explained: 
“We can have a sub-forum that involves migrants and deals with issues of 
xenophobia. This sub-forum can be led by a South African. Migrants cannot 
be in the executive of such a forum and the chairperson should be a South 
African by necessity. Our brothers from other lands in Africa cannot hold 
executive positions in the CPF or Sector Crime Forums but can be members” 
(ADF-SAPS meeting, Malinga: 17/03/2010). 
A resolution was then passed to include migrants in Community Policing Forums, as 
only ordinary forum members, in all policing zones of Region F, Johannesburg. The 
written version of this resolution was however not made available to ADF members 
in due course. This meeting had been framed as an ADF-SAPS meeting, but after the 
passing of the resolution the rest of the meeting unfolded as a SAPS-CPFs meeting. 
ADF members had gone there hoping to create a structure that fosters or oversees 
policing activities and promote migrant friendly policing in the Region F policing 
cluster. They had their own proposal in this regard; although they did not have an 
opportunity to really present it. In light of the failure of ADF to make an official 
presentation of their proposal due to lack of space and time to do so in the meeting, 
an ADF member that I was sitting next to during meeting proceedings mumbled: 
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“Is this what we are here for? It seems the aim of the meeting as we know it is 
being brushed aside” (ADF Member, 17/03/2012). 
After the meeting as I conversed with the ADF chairperson about the way the 
meeting went, he said: 
“At least they passed a resolution. It is something. You cannot come to ask for 
something and get it all. The situation is tough. Anyway, we have created a 
platform from which we can strategise going forward”. 
This event largely shows the engrained exclusionist attitude of officials (including 
those who drafted the CPF constitution) and sections of the South African public 
towards African immigrants in South Africa. In fact, this exclusivist attitude is part of 
public doxa influencing relationships between South Africans and African immigrants 
in both official and non-official contexts.  
Although, there was institutional or official exclusion of “foreign nationals” from 
holding positions in the CPF and Sector Crime Forums, there was a case in Yeoville 
where the chairperson of Sector Crime Forum 1 was a Zimbabwean. It is apparent, 
however, that this was because the YCPF was not aware of the constitutional 
exclusion of non-citizens from holding executive positions in the CPF and its sub-
forums. 
Given the embeddedness of othering behaviour at governmental and grassroots 
levels, it was not surprising that there was a low level of attendance of YCPF and 
other (South African dominated) public forums by immigrants in Yeoville. The lack 
of participation of immigrants in YCPF meetings became an issue for South Africans 
running these institutions. There were allegations, by participating South Africans, 
that African immigrants were disinterested in participating in community initiatives. 
A South African YCPF member complained: 
“These people don’t come to the meetings. People from Congo and Nigeria 
don’t come to meetings. The only people who come are South Africans and 
Zimbabweans” (Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Mduduzi: 02/06/2011). 
In an interview, a community activist explained: 
“Yeoville is a multinational society, it is not a community. People are not 
working together. There is conflict. The Nigerians themselves are not working 
together, for example the Ibo don’t recognise the Hausa and Yoruba” 
(Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010). 
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Writing in the Yeovue News, I noted: 
“… South African citizens […] have the view that international migrants: do 
not want to participate in community dialogues and initiatives to deal with the 
challenges of the area; are generally responsible for most of the community’s 
problems including crime, illegalities (such as street trade), overcrowding and 
environmental littering in the area; and do not care about the area and are 
mainly concerned about making money. My concern in this piece is to dispel 
these allegations and to encourage people to work together to improve the 
community irrespective of their origins. I believe that, in this community, all 
residents share responsibility for the negligence and decay in the area. By the 
same token, responsibility for maintaining and upgrading our area lies with us 
all, irrespective of our citizenship status. We all belong to Yeoville-Bellevue 
and Yeoville-Bellevue belongs to us all who live in it. If we see a person 
throwing rubbish onto our streets, pavements and parks, we should take action 
as residents. If we see a man urinating on the pavements in front of our kids 
and wives, we ought to confront him. If we witness a thief pick-pocketing on 
the streets, it’s our responsibility as residents to take action […]. To 
“indigenous” members of the South African community living in Yeoville-
Bellevue, I say: embrace your African brothers and sisters from other parts of 
the African continent and help each other rebuild the image of our Yeoville 
Bellevue” (Katsaura 2011). 
The call for unity and for participation that I made in this local newsletter met with a 
response in Yeovue News: 
“Migrants need to orient themselves to life in South Africa. They need to 
understand by-laws, environmental health standards and other basic 
requirements for safe and healthy living. Yes, having so many migrants causes 
overcrowding. Yes, many people do not have basic property maintenance 
skills. I cannot try to be politically correct here when reality dictates otherwise. 
Education around such things needs to take place without ill feelings. Do not 
use South Africans as scapegoats for your shortcomings. Visit Soweto, 
Soshanguve and compare the standards of environmental cleanliness there. But 
some migrants become aggressive when they are challenged on these things, 
even saying ‘this is a free country, I can do what I want […]’. South African 
migrants in other countries are in small numbers, mostly on assignments by 
their companies or in other gainful employment. Most of our exiles who left 
during struggle years have returned, their mission accomplished. Very few felt 
the need to stay on in their adopted countries…” (Majombozi 2010) [sic]. 
The main point raised in this response is that most African immigrants are 
undeserving intruders. Implications are that they were responsible for the social 
problems in Yeoville and not worth of participating in community meetings as equals 
with South Africans. About this response, the editor of Yeovue News wrote: 
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“Last week we carried a piece by Obvious Katsaura, a Zimbabwean student 
who made some points about migrancy in South Africa. This week, there is a 
strong response from Thembi Majombozi, a South African resident in Yeoville 
Bellevue. Obvious and Thembi agree on some issues - for example, they both 
say that migrants are not involved enough in broader community issues. Both 
have said that migrants are usually not well-represented at community 
meetings, e.g. ward public meetings, YSF meetings and CPF meetings. Thembi 
speaks strongly on a number of other issues. Some would say that she is being 
xenophobic. Others would say that what she is saying is correct” (YN 2011b). 
The next Yeovue News issue carried a collection of responses to my article and 
Majombozi’s, as excerpted in Box 27 below. 
Box 27: Newsletter exchanges 
The Freedom Charter, so valuable and important a part of our development, cannot be 
adopted by Obvious Katsaura and others to suit the needs of migrants who are desperate 
because they have no legal standing in our country … Joyce Ozynski. 
… I urge South Africans participating in community forums to continue trying to create a 
friendly environment in which migrants can contribute to dealing with the problems faced by 
Yeoville Bellevue without fear. This could be done through avoiding hate speeches against 
migrants, and rather promoting constructive engagement … Nkulumane, Yeoville Bellevue 
resident 
World-wide, there is no country without foreign nationals. Foreign nationals can be 
immigrants, refugees, business people or embassy representatives, etc. In term of (migrants) 
violating and disrespecting the law, rules and regulations, please report to us and other 
migrant bodies for (attention) and let us work together on law enforcement with Yeoville 
Police Station as well as other authorities concerned [...] Mr. M. Moussa Dominique; Activist. 
Yeovue News Vol. 4. No. 11 (YN 2011b) 
The ADF interpreted Majombozi’s article as xenophobic and responded officially 
through Yeoville News: 
“As ADF, it is our view that the ‘us and them attitude’ dominating the article 
in question, as well as the very common misperceptions concerning migrants 
contained in it, do not profit the South African community. They undermine 
the spirit of coexistence and are against the principle of a rainbow nation that 
is supposed to bind South Africa together, irrespective of people’s colour, 
creed, society, and it would be a very positive step to have volunteers to teach 
migrants the local languages, as many countries in Europe are currently doing 
…” (ADF 2011). 
This newsletter exchange exposed the silent and salient tensions and intolerance 
between African immigrants and South Africans in Yeoville. 
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Despite the general lack of participation by African immigrants in security governing 
initiatives dominated by South Africans, some African immigrants consistently 
participated in these forums. A Zimbabwean who was the chairperson of Sector 
Crime Forum 1 declared his Zimbabwean identity stating: 
“[...]. You heard me telling them that I am Zimbabwean.  I am not afraid to tell 
them that I am Zimbabwean. I was just trying to help them do things” 
(Conversation, Sibanda: 17/02/2011). 
The lack of participation of African immigrants in community safety initiatives was 
not just a result of forced exclusion but a question of “self-isolation” (Barry 1998). 
Asked why he did not participate in YCPF meetings, a Zimbabwean immigrant 
staying in Yeoville responded: 
“Because I don’t care about that. It doesn’t give me food on the table. I have 
better things to do. I am not permanent here, so I have got nothing to 
contribute to the community and my days are numbered. I am just a tenant 
here and I will be leaving the area” (Interview, Reggy: 12/02/2011). 
On the question of whether his lack of participation had something to do with his 
nationality, he replied: 
“No, I could go despite being a foreign national. It’s just that I came here to 
look for money. I cannot be wasting time on meetings. I feel that it’s a waste of 
time. There is nothing that I will say that will change this area” (Interview, 
Reggy: 12/02/2011). 
In another incident, I asked a Zimbabwean migrant and friend of mine who stayed in 
Yeoville to go with me to a YCPF meeting and he yelled and asked: “To do what?”72 
Public discrimination was therefore not solely responsible for non-participation of 
African immigrants. Some South Africans in the CPF executive indicated that they 
would welcome immigrants into the forum: 
“As a CPF, we accommodate everybody as long as the man has got a passport. 
We give the person the job. As a person is doing the job, he searches the 
wrong people and takes money from them. The people report to the police 
and the person gets arrested” (Interview, Mduduzi: 18/08/2010). 
He continued: 
                                                     
72
 Conversation, Inyandezulu: 09/04/2011. 
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“I think you have published an article in Yeovue News to explain to people about 
CPF. We need to have a box where people can put their written complains. 
Some people do not speak the same language as us. They are scared. People 
must stop calling each other Kwere Kwere” (Mduduzi: 18/08/2011). 
This echoes the desire by some South Africans in Yeoville to nurture a spirit of 
tolerance and co-relation between South Africans and African immigrants; 
encouraging African immigrants to participate in community safety initiatives. The 
participatory environment was therefore not always unfriendly, although some 
African immigrants could have made the choice not to participate. 
The conditions in the participatory forums could also have (unwittingly) isolated 
some African immigrants. The use of local languages in spaces of public participation 
was a constant cause of the isolation of “foreign nationals” in these meetings. 
Although some or most of the organisations officially use English as their main 
language of community engagement, many times South African speakers would 
switch to Zulu, Sotho or Xhosa; to the exclusion of some African immigrants. Even 
some South Africans did not understand these South African languages. In a ward 
public meeting (27/08/2011) a coloured South African lady kept interrupting the 
councillor who was speaking in Xhosa retorting: “I can’t understand anything! Is 
everybody Xhosa?” 
Language as a means of human association is therefore an inherently political tool, 
one that is deployable to confirm and entrench of socio-political difference. It can be 
a tool for the exclusion of particular groups of people who do not share the same 
language, by those whose language and cultural group is dominant.  
Language, however, can be progressively used to foster social integration. In this 
case, there were calls for people to “stop calling the Black others Kwerekwere”. In a 
ward public meeting, the chairperson of the ADF had this to say about the issue of 
language: 
“I think you are touching very important issues, issues affecting the 
community. I am busy learning the local languages. We want to participate and 
contribute as well, but we don’t understand everything if you use the local 
languages. Somebody here said they are from Rwanda, another from Uganda 
and I am from Ivory Coast. Can you speak in a shared language please?” (Ward 
Public Meeting, Fagbibo: 14/08/2010). 
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About the effects of language on the participation of African immigrants in the 
YCPF, a local politician said: 
“The issue of language is a barrier to participation. With the language issue, it’s 
not like South Africans are doing it wittingly. People in meetings want to speak 
their local languages such as Sesotho and isiZulu” (Interview, Mpho: 
08/02/2011). 
He suggested: 
“As South Africans, as CPF in Yeoville, we should go out and speak to our 
fellow Africans to participate. CPF is supposed to be the eyes and ears of the 
community, so we need to attract the public. We also have a problem of 
language. Some people are French speaking and South Africa is English 
speaking, so it’s difficult to communicate. Some people speak in Sotho or 
Zulu, so some people should interpret or translate” (Interview, Mpho: 
08/02/2011). 
Practically, African immigrants were excluded because if they attended participatory 
spaces of security governance they were constantly reminded of their outsider status 
and had to sit through discussions in which they were scapegoated and criminalised 
during the drama of public participation. Linguistically, they were excluded as South 
Africans dominating these spaces preferred to speak their native languages, 
particularly isiZulu, isiXhosa and seSotho. Also, some “foreign nationals” were 
economically calculative and found no motivation to attend meetings leaving their 
economic activities. Hence the statements that it was a “waste of time” and that “I 
have no time for that (attending community meetings) because I came here to look 
for money”. In light of this, I conceptualise most African immigrants as having a 
habitus of profit, as opposed to a habitus of volunteerism.  
Recognising that ethno-nationality as a variable does not stand alone in explaining 
the dynamics of social exclusion or isolation of African immigrants in the field of 
community safety production, I use the section below to show the entwinement of 
ethno-nationality, age and gender in the construction of otherness. 
    
7.5. Concoction of ethno-national regionalism and other identities 
In light of the findings of previous research which examines crime, violence and fear 
and their governance as class-based, race-based, age-based and gendered issues, I 
show how these are entwined with ethno-nationality in influencing discourses and 
  165 
 
practices in community safety governance. I do not wish to parrot already existing 
accounts of how class, age and gender affect crime (and violence) profiling and 
governance (see Chapter 2). These accounts show that youth are a vilified category in 
discourses on criminogenesis, and women are a subaltern category, being considered 
as “defenceless victims of crime”. In this section, I selectively relate how security 
governance and criminogenic accounts conflate identities of youth and gender with 
ethno-nationality.  
 
7.5.1. Youth and crime (governance): ethno-nationalist politics  
Although there was a tendency to blame crime in Yeoville on the presence of non-
South African youth, the overall view from the attitude and opinion survey was that 
one cannot precisely connect the nationality of youths to criminality or violence (Box 
28).   
Box 28: “This is out of question  ...” 
Comment 
The majority of opinion and 
attitude survey participants 
(62.5%) believed that there was 
no link between the presence of 
non-South African youths and 
crime in Yeoville. 27.5% 
participants believed that that 
the presence of non-South 
African youths in Yeoville was 
related to increasing crime an in 
the area. 5% indicated that they 
had no idea and 5% did not 
respond to this question. 
However, it suffices to point out that this is reflection of the sample which was 57.5% non-
South African and 42.5% South African, not by design but by default (see Appendix C). 
Most non-South Africans saw no connection between youth nationality and criminality or 
violence, whilst quite a number of South Africans saw a connection. 
Selected quotes  
Yes, there is an effect: 
“Yes, I think the Zimbabwean youths and also those from Mozambique have 
increased the crime as they are involved in the stabbings, drugs and the muggings” 
(participant TB15). 
“Yes there is a strong link. Because those non South African youths come in south 
Africa with a huge hope to achieve their lives dreams. Once arrived in south Africa 
Figure 14: Is there a link between the presence of 
immigrant youth and criminality and violence? 
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most of the time things do know go in the expected way (e.g. unemployment), then 
they start to find any ways to survivor include committing crimes” (participant T34D). 
“Yes, because young non South African youths cannot get job easily in South Africa. 
Many of them are unemployed. When facing socio economic difficulties they can be 
led to commit crime and find money to survive” (participant T38D).  
No, there is no effect: 
“Uhhhmmm! I wouldn’t say that because they are very mixed and it’s difficult to 
determine where the South African youth is and where the non-South African is. 
Remember that they attend the same schools, they play together, they gather together 
…” (Participant T8A). 
“Naaaah! This is out of question. People are very mixed. How would you know that 
this is a South African youth and this is non-South African?” (Participant T9A). 
“No, both South African and non-South African living around are committing crime. 
The fundamental problem resides at the level of lack of job. They don`t like to do 
jobs like security, car watch, bouncer. South African youth committing crime around 
come from locations like Thembisa or Soweto. They commit crime around and go to 
hide in the location. Non South African youth who commit crime here don`t go to 
school” (Participant T26C).  
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
The reasons cited to sustain the view that non-South African youth were responsible 
for rising crime in Yeoville warrant attention here. The main reason was that non-
South African youths were perceived as generally unable to access the formal job 
market due to their immigrant status, and thereby liable to turning to crime for 
survival. They therefore, as suggested by this view, mainly belong to the underclass 
or at worst, “the precariate” (Standing 2011). The positioning of non-South African 
Black youth as precariates (Standing 2011) in the economic field also makes them urban 
outcasts (Wacquant 2008d) in the urban social field. This position is compounded by 
the tag of “other other” which they carry as a result of their non-South African 
nationality and blackness. This view, however, overlooks the non-criminal livelihood 
strategies and innovations of non-South African youths. In fact many have been able 
to crack into the labour market quite easily due to their sound qualifications or skills 
and the preference of non-South Africans by some employers. 
Now I turn to the entwinement of gender and ethno-nationality in community safety 
governance politics. 
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7.5.2. Local ethno-nationalist discourses on gender, violence and crime 
Non-South African women from other parts of Africa were described as the main 
victims of domestic violence in Yeoville. This description was based on the fact that 
most of the women who frequented the VEC in were African immigrants. In an 
interview, a VEC volunteer underscored:  
“Most of the victims of domestic violence and abuse that we attend to are 
Zimbabweans and Congolese. If they are South African, they are normally 
married to a foreigner. This is either because their men are more violent or 
because they do not have any other family support system. But we do not 
normally receive cases of abuse from Nigerian women or local women married 
to Nigerians. Nigerian men are gentlemen” (Interview, Dorcas: 22/09/2010). 
This statement rang in my mind not as a mere truth, but as an othering utterance. It 
was, to me, expected for the VEC to receive more cases of victimisation involving 
“foreign nationals” than South Africans in Yeoville because there is, as anecdotally 
believed, a higher non-South African population. So the statistics of the VEC are a 
reflection more of the population composition of Yeoville than a display of the semi-
civility or barbarism of non-South African men who abuse their spouses, sisters or 
daughters. Furthermore foreigners, more than South Africans are likely to rely on the 
support of such organisations because they mostly do not possess abundant social 
capital of family and other related kin-support systems. The statement by the VEC 
coordinator reflects common belief amongst many ordinary South Africans that 
cultures of African immigrants are “less civil” than South African cultures. Also 
consider this statement by a South African activist in Yeoville: 
“…In Yeoville we have people from all over Africa. Some of these people are 
very sexist [...] they are Muslims. One day we were in a meeting and there was a 
Moroccan Muslim guy. One of the participants who is Ivorian said this to him: 
‘Don’t talk like a woman’. The Moroccan became very angry. According to him 
that was the biggest insult” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010). 
The victimhood of non-South African Black women specifically is confirmed by the 
higher number of victims visiting the VEC in Yeoville, compared to South Africans. 
A key informant had this to say about victims visiting the VEC for help: 
“We mainly have Zimbabweans and Congolese and to a lesser extent 
Nigerians. The age is between 18 and 30 and mainly female [...], 99% female” 
(Interview, Dorcas: 22/09/2010). 
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It is however important to explore the reasons behind the bigger number of non 
South Africans visiting the VEC. A former volunteer at the VEC in Yeoville 
indicated: 
“When foreign nationals have problems, they really come to the VEC. This is 
because they do not have adequate family support systems. There are very few 
volunteers of foreign nationality that come to the VEC” (Interview, Evelyn: 
15/09/2010). 
Non-South African femaleness was therefore associated with vulnerability to abuse 
by non-South African Black men who are stereotypically considered as violent, 
rowdy and disrespectful of women. Non-South African masculinities are therefore 
pictured as problematic and as requiring taming by the South African law; a law 
considered as more progressive and liberating that the laws of countries from which 
these men came.      
How can one position ethno-nationality in the context of other identities in the 
making of the community security governance field of Yeoville? I deploy an analysis 
based on the notion of multiple subalternisms. In this case I conceptualise the othering 
of youth and females of foreign nationality in the security field as multilayered and 
complex. They suffer multilayered otherness in which their nationality, blackness, 
youthfulness or femaleness aggregately condemn them to criminal profiling, 
victimisation, and sympathy at once. The blaming of youth of foreign nationality as 
the prime criminals indicated that on top of suffering the enactment of criminal 
profiles on the basis of being young, this profiling is entrenched by their tag of 
foreign nationality. Women of foreign nationality were represented as the prime 
victims of domestic violence in Yeoville and were considered to be coming from 
societies where the rights of women are not respected and, if they are South African, 
to have a husband of foreign nationality who was violent and semi-civil.  
Below, I recapitulate the view that ethno-national regionalism is a “reality of community 
safety governance” in contexts characterised by sharp ethno-national diversities. 
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7.6. Ethno-national politics as a reality of community safety governance: 
conclusion 
This chapter, through the notion of ethno-national regionalism, suggests community 
safety governance is a field of “ethno-discourses”, “ethno-talks” and “ethno-
practices”73 through which ethno-national groups pursue and defend their interests. 
Overall, the chapter confirms the argument that xenophobia is a part of public 
culture in South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2010b); with the state being complicit in the 
generation and sustenance of this public culture (Neocosmos 2008). What is unique 
in the foregoing discussion is the observation that this public culture has percolated 
community safety initiatives in a multinational neighbourhood which never recorded 
a single fatality during the May 2011 xenophobic violence in South Africa. I therefore 
maintain that ethno-national regionalist perceptions are as important as ethno-
national regionalist actions or practices, in the making of dynamics of community 
safety initiatives in multinational contexts. I argue that the exclusion of African 
immigrants from spaces of participation in safety initiatives should not be taken as 
just a softer or symbolic version of xenophobia; but as potentially articulated to its 
more physical violence oriented versions.     
The imageries of African immigrants as major culprits in the genesis of local crime 
and disorder make Yeoville a neighbourhood that lives at the border of 
cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism (or counter-cosmopolitanism) – of peace 
and ethno-national conflicts. The criminalisation of (poor) African immigrants in 
Yeoville corresponds to Caldeira’s (2000:53) observation, in her Sao Paulo studies, 
that criminals are publicly represented as people “from the fringes of society, 
humanity and polity”. 
While poor African immigrants are represented as the scum of the city74, within the 
ranks of the criminalised scum of the city also, are the South African poor. Suffice to 
point out that the South African poor also inhabit the margins of the city, often in 
informal settlements with little or no basic services from government; and the 
                                                     
73 See Comaroff, John L, and Jean Comaroff. 2009. Ethnicity, Inc. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
74 I develop and modify this notion as adapted from Koestler, Arthur. 1968. Scum of the Earth. New 
York: Macmillan. 
  170 
 
wealthier South African population often encloses itself in gated communities and 
security villages. This process often takes a racial as well as a class twist.  
The linguistic market of the local security governance field in Yeoville is generally 
ethno-nationally exclusionary. The language used in spaces of participatory safety 
activism is unfriendly to African immigrants who could not fluently speak or 
adequately understand local South African native languages. When African 
immigrants attend community meetings on matters of security governance, they have 
to sit through discussions that stereotypically criminalise them and in which their 
contributions are not taken seriously. Therefore, in these meetings, when African 
immigrants participate, they tend to occupy a position of what I call the absent present -
as their presence is rarely appreciated or respected. When they do not attend, they 
still remain the subject of criminalising talk - occupying a position of what I refer to as 
the present absent. Spaces of deliberative community security governance can therefore 
be conceptualised as sites of performative symbolic violence against African immigrants. It 
is also important also to note that some African immigrants isolate themselves from 
participation in community safety activism because they see more value in pursuing 
their economic interests.   
    
Given the political dynamics of exclusionary ethno-nationalism in the community 
security governance field described above, one is bound to ask questions about the 
value, saleability or utility of this finding to those interested in urban security 
governance practice and theory. Safety governance in this context requires an 
appreciation and understanding of the role of social diversity on shaping or 
influencing participation or social group placing in the community security field. One 
has to be cognisant of the dynamics or potentialities of conflict and contradictions in 
such a context. An understanding of the anatomy of the social infrastructure of the 
neighbourhood – sometimes casted in the dichotomy between the “established” 
(insiders) and “outsiders” (Elias and Scotson 1994; Nyamnjoh 2006) - is an 
important first step for any intervention in or review of the security governance 
situation at a local level in situations characterised by migrancy and poor levels of 
collective efficacy and responsibility (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). Above 
all I stress, as an epilogue to this chapter, that a theorisation or understanding of 
social diversity is central to profitable scholarship on urban dynamics; especially in 
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cases of urban community mobilisation and organisation in response to urban 
challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  172 
 
8. Chapter Eight 
Territorial politics in community safety governance: 
Reflections from Yeoville 
 
“For the last ten years, people have been afraid to come to Rockey-Raleigh Street. This is an 
area where most violence was taking place. There was a shop that was selling babe clothes and 
it closed because of the fear of crime which undermined its potential customer base. We can’t 
sort out Yeoville without sorting out Rockey-Raleigh Street. We have to find ways of 
marketing the street …” (Speech, Maurice: 18/08/2010). 
 
8.1. Introduction            
In this chapter I argue that the micro-politics of community safety governance has 
a territorial dimension, just as crime and violence are authored in and also author 
territory or place (Springer 2011). This argument, as shown in Chapter 2, comes in 
the wake of an inadequate analysis of the spatio-social discourses, practices and 
tactics of or in community safety governance from a micro-political perspective. It 
comes against a background of the sectoral treatment of the social on the one hand 
(Bruce and Gould 2009; Palmary 2001) and the spatial on the other (Newman 1972; 
Pain 2000), in the analysis community safety governance dynamics (see Chapter 4). 
In this regard, this chapter embarks on an empirical and theoretical project of 
spatialising Bourdeusian “thinking tools”. 
I analyse narratives about place, crime and violence as emanating from community 
meetings, representatives of community organisations, social groups and individual 
residents in Yeoville. These narratives show how the micro-politics of community 
safety governance is informed by everyday experiences and perceptions about 
place, crime and violence. Place, in this study, is conceptualised as a territorial or 
spatial entity and as socio-politically relational, dynamic, fluid and amorphous. My 
conceptualisation of place is informed by Massey’s view that place is not dead, or 
fixed, but relational and highly political (Massey 2005)75. While place has physical 
attributes, it is not to be reduced to an objectified and fixed state because social 
relations, including violence, crime and socio-psychological perceptions such as 
fear are authored and inscribed in places. Daylight (2008:13) confirms this, arguing 
that “mutations in the built form have a more than interdependent relationship 
                                                     
75 Foucault earlier dismissed the idea of place or space as a fixed object, but as highly eclectic and this 
idea has been further propounded by scholars such as Soja and Massey amongst others. 
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with social forms and meanings”. I therefore maintain that the community security 
governance field is homological to the territorial field (Bourdieu 2005).  
The aim of the chapter is to give a spatio-relational76 account of practices, strategies 
and discourses in the community safety field. I interpret narratives about: i) 
community attempts at neighbourhood image (re)generation; ii) community 
governance of public places and; iii) community safety production through 
involvement in housing, land and environmental governance.   
 
8.2. “… a vision for the area …”?  
Some public perceptions of Yeoville portrayed the neighbourhood as a dangerous 
and homely place or space at once. Talking about the need to rehabilitate Yeoville’s 
image, a community activist said: 
“We need to look at development from a holistic perspective. We need to have 
a vision for the area. What do you want Yeoville to look like in a few years’ 
time? Yeoville has been reinventing itself. In the 1980s Yeoville was one of the 
most attractive areas to live in. It was a beautiful area, but now it has 
deteriorated. This area will be gentrified, but that will come with its own 
problems. The poor will be forced out. The city won’t care because that’s one 
way of dealing with the problem. And the private property developers won’t 
care because that’s one way of making money. Once the place is gentrified, the 
middle class will come in, because the place is strategically located. If this place 
was well run, they would come in” (Speech, Maurice: 18/08/2010). 
Given the myriad of challenges that Yeoville faced, there was a drive from city 
managers and residents to promote socio-economic and spatial regeneration. It was 
hoped that this would also address issues of crime, violence and fear, which were 
some of the major challenges facing the neighbourhood. 
  
8.2.1. “Bleeding community”? 
As a prologue to my exploration of territorial discourses, practices and strategies in 
community safety governance, I narrate a story of the “blatant and shocking” 
killing of a man in full view of the public one evening in Raleigh-Rockey Street 
(Box 29). 
 
                                                     
76 The concept of spatio-relationalism, as I coin it, reflects the idea that place is politically dynamic. 
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Box 29: Murder in Raleigh-Rockey Street: an observer's narration 
I went to Raleigh - Rockey Street 
at around 9 pm on the 11th of 
September 2011 in the company of 
a friend. I wanted to buy pizza for 
supper. When I reached Debonairs 
pizza on Rockey Street, I found 
that it was closed and there was a 
crowd of people in front of 
Shoprite. Somebody had been 
murdered there. The dead body 
was lying in front of Shoprite and 
police officers were attending to 
the scene.  
The murdered man was a young 
Zimbabwean street trader who 
used to trade in front of Shoprite. He used to register people’s mobile numbers there. 
People there said this guy was very good in fighting and used to beat people. They said that 
now the people he had beaten before ganged up to come and revenge. They then slit his 
throat with a knife and that is how he died. I had also previously seen this guy brutally and 
lethally beating someone in front of Shoprite.  
On the 29th of October 2011, I asked a Zimbabwean man, who was also a trader working 
in front of Shoprite and an eye witness of this incident, about the murder. He explained 
that the deceased had an altercation with some guys. He indicated that the deceased was 
drunk and the perpetrator was also drunk. He stated that the deceased had insulted the 
perpetrator using some obscene language. The perpetrator then went away and then came 
back with a knife and slit the throat of the deceased. 
 
The case was being investigated by police officers at Yeoville Police Station during the time 
of the research. This incident, coupled with many others that I heard about but never 
witnessed, raise questions about how (organised) community stakeholders in Yeoville and 
Bellevue manage its environment to reduce the occurrence of criminal incidents.  
Also, some police officers generally described Yeoville as violence and crime ridden. 
One senior police officer stated:  
“I am afraid that the community is becoming very violent. There is one case of 
a guy who was thrown from the second floor. He was cut by the glasses and he 
lost all his fingers. In some other case, a lady was thrown outside a flat and she 
is in hospital. For the month of October 2010 only, we have 61 assault GBH77 
cases, 34 cases of common assault, 15 cases of theft out of motor vehicles, 20 
housebreakings. At one point, the colonel was shouted at, at Province. In the 
whole of October, we had 187 recorded crimes, of these, sector 1 had 113. 
With 40 cases of assault GBH, 21 cases common assault, Sector 2 had 53 cases 
of crime and sector 3 only had 7 cases. If I am buying a house, I would go to 
sector 3. There were no cases of assault GBH and no robberies. In percentages 
we had 60% of crimes in sector 1, 28% in sector 2, and 12% in sector 3. Most 
                                                     
77
 Meaning assault with intend to cause grievous bodily harm. 
Photo 7: By-standers in front of Shoprite after the murder of a street 
trader 
@Katsaura 2011 
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of the crimes are happening on Saturdays, followed by Fridays and then 
Sundays. They normally happen between 14:00 hours and 00:00 hours. We 
need to deploy our officers strategically […]” (YCPF Broader Forum meeting, 
Col. Tshabalala, Yeoville SAPS: 03/11/2010). 
He depicted violence and crime as increasing phenomena: 
“One of my biggest problems is assault. This morning it was looking good. 
Today in the morning there were 7 cases, yesterday there were 14-15 cases.  
When I come Monday morning, Yeoville will be quiet, but crime stats will 
make me cry. One pregnant woman came to the police station after being 
stabbed. How on earth can someone do that? When someone is hurt, they rush 
to the police station. We are not doctors. I am not skilled in medicine. People 
should go the clinic or hospital first. We had one or two residential robberies”. 
(Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting, Col. Tshabalala: 17/02/2011). 
Organised crime was pointed out as a major challenge. A senior police officer 
described the problem of car-jacking in Yeoville: 
“Last week we had a case of a hijacked Toyota Condor which was brought to 
Yeoville. We found the suspects busy trying to remove the satellite tracking. 
We managed to arrest 3 suspects and two ran away. We need to work with the 
community. The community should be cooperative. We also recovered a truck 
that was hijacked elsewhere and brought to Yeoville. We caught them while 
trying to remove tracking system. We have another case of a large amount of 
ammunition that was confiscated. In both cases, suspects were arrested as a 
result of community members reporting” (YCPF Broader Meeting, Col. 
Mkulili: 13/07/2011). 
There was an urge for the community, in conjunction with the police, to take action 
to reduce crime and violence. A senior police officer expressed: 
“A happy couple makes a happy family and happy children and ultimately a 
happy community. We have a problem all over South Africa because of assault 
cases. Every Monday, when you look at the crime stats, assault is a big 
problem. It comes out that we are turning out to be a very violent community, 
which means we need people to look over us. We need street patrollers and 
police officers. I have had a case of a 13 year old girl whose mother 
complained that she is drinking and sleeping outside. I have a 13 year old boy 
and I said to his mother, if my boy does this, I will beat the hell out of him. In 
Soweto a 13 year old person cannot drink and do all sorts of things in front of 
a community member. They will report him or her to the parents. Here in 
Yeoville a 13 year old can go into Time Square and no one will come to 
interrogate her. We stay together but we don’t know each other’s children. The 
social issues here are more problematic [...]” (YCPF Public meeting, Col. 
Tshabalala: 09/04/2011). 
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This shows that reducing crime and violence is not simply a duty of the police 
service, but should start at the family level. The family constitutes what Hunter 
(1985) describes as the private sphere of social control. As a basic element of society, 
family could be the starting point for social control initiatives (Carr 2005; Hunter 
1985).  
About some of the social challenges in Yeoville, a local activist said: 
“At the moment, nobody knows how many people live here. We have 
situations where more than 20 people are living in a one house. We can have 
about 8 – 10 people living in a bachelors’ flat. If you have an entire family 
living in the same room and then the people are sharing the same toilet and 
bathroom, and we have a 15 year old girl and a young man or older man living 
in the same house: imagine what can happen. We need to specify the 
challenges in the area. We have public meetings frequently, and everybody says 
pretty the same thing every time. They talk about employment problems, 
housing problems and crime. Housing is a big problem here” (Tour, Maurice: 
17/08/2010). 
The ward councillor also noted: 
“The major development challenges in Yeoville include unemployment, 
housing shortage and crime. There is no space for social housing at all in 
Yeoville, it is overcrowded. The major crime problems include hijacking of 
houses, drug trafficking and so on” (Interview, Ward Councillor Noma: 
16/08/2010). 
The challenges of overcrowding, housing shortages and unemployment amongst 
others are therefore concocted with crime, violence and fear in generating and 
sustaining a package of urban disorders. 
In explaining the portrayal of Yeoville as a prototype of innercity disorders of crime 
and violence; I argue that crime, violence and fear have been habitualised, becoming 
part of everyday practices (de Certeau 1984) of humans as they struggle to survive in the 
economic, social, political and cultural fields of the city. 
In the economic field, there are struggles for access to or control of scarce resources – 
including houses, employment, property and basic needs (see Chapter 7). Struggles in 
social, political and cultural fields take the form of quests for social justice and assertions 
of belonging to South Africa (see Chapter 7). Unless the forces (housing shortage, 
unemployment, service delivery) behind these struggles are addressed, we are likely to 
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witness an escalation of violence and crime as means of self-expression and survival. 
Increasing crime, violence, fear and disorder would warrant the senior police officer’s 
description of Yeoville as a “bleeding” community - a “wounded neighbourhood” 
within a “wounded city” (Myers 2011). 
The situation in Yeoville is, however, not perceived by some residents, police officers 
and other stakeholders as entirely bleak. The spokesperson of Yeoville SAPS 
optimistically stated:  
“We do not have a very high rate of murder. We can get cases of 
murder…maybe one or two cases in three months. With the collaboration of 
community organisations and business, we are able to keep the crime levels as 
low as possible” (Constable Mbuli: 18/08/2010). 
Portraying Yeoville as a “safe” haven for immigrants, an immigrant indicated:  
“I heard that during the time of xenophobic violence, Yeoville was mainly safe 
for migrants and not for South Africans. South Africans feared for their lives 
and went out of Yeoville, while foreigners staying out of Yeoville came into 
Yeoville for safety. South Africans were afraid that they would be attacked” 
(Group interview with migrants, Jimija: 06/2011). 
Also, the spokesperson of Yeoville SAPS claimed: 
“Yeoville is one of the safest places that I would recommend for people to 
stay. One of the problem is that there is no that strict control of access to 
buildings by building managers. They just care about getting money. But 
generally speaking Yeoville is a safe place to stay” (Interview, Constable Mbuli: 
18/08/2010). 
Readings of Yeoville can be framed within a fear-safety continuum. Although Yeoville 
was sometimes described as a horrible place cluttered by crime, violence and urban 
decay, it is also described as a habitable, even safe place – a place where African 
immigrants were safer in the face of potential xenophobic violence (see Chapter 7).  
Confirming the fear-safety duality discourse, participants in the opinion and attitude 
survey projected a mix of feelings of fear and safety in describing their habitation of 
Yeoville (Box 30).  
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Box 30: “...you can feel a bit secure, but not at night” 
Comment 
42.5% of participants in the opinion 
and attitude survey indicated that they 
felt safer in Yeoville. On the same 
note, 42.5% indicated that they do not 
feel safer in Yeoville. 15.0% expressed 
mixed feelings of fear and safety and 
were not very sure if really they are safe 
or unsafe in Yeoville. 
Most of those who indicated that they 
felt safer in Yeoville based this on the 
fact that they have not yet suffered 
from any criminal activity in the 
neighbourhood and that Yeoville is 
much better than other neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow and Johannesburg Central. Such 
people indicated that the longevity of their stay in Yeoville and the nature of their daily 
activities have rendered them “streetwise” and sharpened their ability to avoid victimisation 
as they navigate the neighbourhood and more generally the city (Anderson 1995). Those that 
did not feel safer in Yeoville based their perception on the fact that they have suffered from 
crime in Yeoville before, or witnessed some criminal activities and that there were a lot of 
criminals living in the neighbourhood. Those who expressed mixed feelings about the 
security situation in Yeoville based their view mainly on the fact that in Yeoville they cannot 
really be sure about their safety, indicating that while during the day it looks safer, at night it 
turns out to be dangerous to be outdoor. 
Selected opinion and attitude survey quotes 
Feel safe. Why? 
“I feel safe because this has been my home since I came to Joburg and I feel like I 
know everything here in Yeoville. Maybe I also qualify to be the mayor of this place. 
Also Mandela and other big shots including Thabo Mbeki and Frazer Moleketi stay 
close to Yeoville only a kilometre away though their community in Houghton is 
heavily guarded with armed guards carrying machine guns. I have been a taxi driver 
and know all the things that go down in Yeoville since I usually get home around 1am, 
so I fear nothing here in Yeoville” (Participant T11B, 2011). 
 
Don’t feel safe. Why? 
“I don’t feel safe at all. For these few years I have been here in Yeoville, I have 
experienced very nasty things. Two of my friends were stabbed right in my street, one 
of them was stabbed a block away from my house, my neighbours were robbed not 
long ago as their house was broken into before they had erected this wall and put on 
the spikes and opposite my house in that flat over there a friend of mine had his 
house broken into and his property was stolen. Personally, I was mugged in my own 
street at corner St Georges and Raymond Street when a group of five guys asked me 
to give them money and when I said I didn’t have they held me and searched me, 
although I managed to get away without injuries but it was a nasty experience” 
(Participant T13B, 2011). 
 
Mixed feelings. Why? 
Figure 15: Do you feel safe living in Yeoville 
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“Yes now you can feel a bit secure, but not at night because criminals are always here 
and they attack people. Crime still continues. Even people who come from Soweto to 
work here are complaining about crime. Last month, a young lady on her way from 
work was attacked by a 2 young men daylight at 4pm just next Eckstein Street-Louis 
Botha. They took her cell phone and hand-bag in which she had R500 to pay her rent. 
I met her crying when I was coming back from work” (Participant T28C, 2011). 
There were perceptions that the neighbourhood’s safety situation has improved over 
the years. A community activist stressed: 
“Rockey-Raleigh Street soon after independence was inundated with high 
incidences of robbery by thugs using guns. I remember that the owner of a 
shop opposite to the park was shot dead by robbers. At that time we had a 
white police commander who was not too helpful…Now things have changed 
in Rockey-Raleigh Street. We have a better police commissioner. Sectoral 
policing has improved and street patrols were introduced. Street patrollers 
started doing random body searches and have confiscated dangerous weapons 
in the process. At some point the street patrollers got uniforms. There were 
however complaints of rough handling of community members by the street 
patrollers. There was also the establishment of the Victim Empowerment 
Centre for the Counselling of victims of crime and violence. The YSF has also 
launched a campaign against shebeens. We have also lobbied for the 
improvements of street lighting, pavements and the surface of the tarmac. 
These developments made Rockey-Raleigh Street more open. Despite these 
achievements, the police stations still has problems. There are no proper 
offices at the police station. There are makeshift structures. Even the station 
commander is housed in a makeshift structure. There are other crimes that are 
not taken seriously, for example those crime regarded as petty crimes” 
(Interview, Thabang: 2010).  
Although crime and violence were said to be reduced, their continued reduction was 
considered as key for socio-economic, spatial and infrastructural revival of the 
neighbourhood.   
Given the rampancy of fear of crime and violence in the neighbourhood, I find it 
important to explore the reasons people stayed in Yeoville. As read from results of 
the opinion and attitude survey, people’s reasons for staying in Yeoville included 
convenience, existent social networks, affordable rent, perceived relative safety and 
business opportunities (see Box 31).  
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Box 31: Reasons for living in Yeoville 
Convenience: Participants mentioned that they stay in Yeoville because it is located closer 
to their workplaces. These people mentioned that Yeoville is located closer to the 
Johannesburg CBD and generally has a good transport network than other places. 
Existent social networks: Most people indicated that they ended up in Yeoville through 
their connections to friends and family members. Those that migrate from other parts of 
Africa into South Africa come to Yeoville as an entry point to South Africa. Most however 
settle there for considerable durations of time because once there they feel safer and enjoy 
the comfort of being closer to their country people and people from other parts of Africa. It 
is in light of the multinational nature of the suburb and its domination by a huge cohort of 
non-South Africans that Yeoville is considered as a safer place, free of xenophobic violence. 
Affordable rent: Some participants indicate that they prefer to live in Yeoville because they 
can afford the rentals which they consider to be much more reasonable than rentals in other 
suburbs. 
Relative safety? Most participants in the opinion survey indicated that they view Yeoville as 
a much safer area than places such as Hillbrow and most of the Johannesburg townships. 
Business opportunities: Some participants indicated that they chose to stay in Yeoville 
because that is where they can operate their businesses vibrantly. Most such people were 
either shop owners or street traders. 
In an interview during the public opinion survey, one participant summarised his reasons for 
choosing to stay in Yeoville as follows: 
“I did choose to stay in Yeoville because I wanted to be close to people from my 
country. Yeoville is known as African multicultural area. And in addition, my children 
go to the schools in Yeoville and also my church is located in this area. So the greater 
part of my day life is in Yeoville” (Participant T31D, 2011). 
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
Some people were forced by circumstances while others claimed to have made a 
relatively deliberate choice to live in Yeoville. Those forced by circumstances 
indicated that they would opt to leave Yeoville if their economic situation improves. 
One man stated: 
“I would prefer to move to Sandton or Houghton Park if my financial 
situation improves. In those neighbourhoods I would feel much safer, unlike 
here where I am not sure about my safety” (Interview, Khumbula: 
06/03/2012).      
It therefore emerges that people’s positioning in the economic field corresponds to their 
positioning in the territorial field – that is their positioning in social space has 
homologies to their positioning in physical space (Bourdieu 1999a). Those with 
limited capital economically and socially find themselves “chained to place” 
(Bourdieu 1999a), as in the case of Khumbula who was tied to Yeoville despite 
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harbouring aspirations to live in the wealthier neighbourhoods of Sandton or 
Houghton Park. And, of course, each place or neighbourhood falls within a rank 
depending on its value - its spatial capital (Lars 2008), and consequently symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 1986). Neighbourhoods such as Yeoville are considered, in some ways, as 
places of “ruins” (Simone 2004a) or as waste lands inhabited by wasted lives (Bauman 
2004). Crime, violence, fear, urban decay and spatial disorder are therefore viewed as 
Yeoville’s trademarks, alongside other innercity neighbourhoods like Hillbrow, Berea, 
Joubert Park and townships such as Diepsloot and Alexandra (Murray 2011; Simone 
2004b). These are challenges that need to be addressed if there is going to be any 
spatial and socio-economic rehabilitation of such neighbourhoods. 
         
8.2.2. “If only you solve your crime problem …” 
There were attempts by community activists to rebuild the image of Yeoville through 
efforts at lobbying the municipality to help arrest creeping urban decay, reconstruct 
and improve the physical infrastructure. In public media, Yeoville was described as a 
rejuvenating area following the intervention of JDA. According to the homesgofast web 
page: 
“The Johannesburg suburbs of Yeoville and its neighbour Bellevue were, in 
times past, popular places to live that were rich in cultural life with restaurants, 
jazz bars, book stores and more for the residents of the area and city. The 
Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) is working to revive the area with a 
multi-million rand facelift and stimulus for new building and development 
[…].Community organizations are working to rebuild the area and drive new 
investment and capital into the long-popular suburb. The Yeoville Stakeholders 
Forum (YSF), a combination of interest groups that promotes change, 
development and quality of life in the Greater Yeoville area is one group that is 
working to help revitalize the area […].The JDA is upgrading Rockey-Raleigh 
Street, to make it once again an attractive, well-maintained and safe street 
offering a vibrant, mixed-use economy, according to the city. Also in the works 
are upgrades and renovates to the recreation centre, clinic, sport courts and 
relocation of the library to a new, larger space. The Yeoville Community Park 
has already been restored and welcomes residents and visitors”.78 
                                                     
78 http://south-africa.homesgofast.com/news/yeoville-south-africa-is-redeveloping-I816/: Accessed 
on 05/11/2011 
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Organisations such as the YBCDT played a role in attempts to socially and 
institutionally revitalise Yeoville. The YBCDT’s attempts were tailored to attract 
neighbourhood investment, arrest creeping urban decay, restore the value of the 
neighbourhood, improve property prices and consequently attract a middle class.  
Crime and violence reduction was part of the regeneration agenda in Yeoville. A local 
politician underscored: 
“For me personally, If only you solve your crime problem, the area will be 
stabilised and people will come and invest here. That is why I would like to 
focus on crime if I become Councillor. As long as you have invaded buildings, 
you will never address the problem of crime. The criminals stay there. The 
reason why some of my tenants were attacked is because we had a hijacked 
building next door. But now it’s no longer the case” (Interview, Mpho: 
08/02/2011). 
In similar breath, a local activist stressed:  
“Community stabilisation and neighbourhood investment will only happen if 
we deal with the issue of law enforcement. By-law enforcement I do not just 
mean criminal law, I mean by-law also. There should be a modus vivendi in 
Yeoville. Modus vivendi is about the basic principle about how people can 
live” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/2010). 
In this case, Maurice stressed the importance of the rule of law and “moral 
regeneration” (Rauch 2011) in attempts to reinvent and rebuild Yeoville. I 
conceptualise attempts to rejuvenate or improve the image of Yeoville as amounting 
to an imaginary territorial politics – a politics of nostalgia for a middle class past. This 
imaginary territorial politics is also reflected in perceptions and narratives about 
public space. 
 
8.3. Public space and community security governance  
I identify three forms of territorial practices, strategies and discourses in the 
community safety production arena, including i) neighbourhood protectionism; ii) 
street and park governance; and iii) governance of adult leisure and recreation.  
 
8.3.1. Protecting the neighbourhood from “potential threats” 
There was a tendency for residents of Observatory to distinguish themselves from 
those of Yeoville through spatio-social boundary maintenance and protection of their 
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spaces. In this case, Observatory residents have developed gated neighbourhoods 
such as Urania Village and employed private security – asserting their middle class 
identities against residents of Yeoville considered to be mainly working class or 
under class. Box 32 below details excerpts of an interview with a neighbourhood 
activist in Observatory. 
Box 32: “... a potential threat” 
OK: What initiatives are there in your neighbourhood to respond to fear of crime? 
Lloyd: People can create gated communities. Urania Village was created in accordance with 
the City Improvement Districts Provincial Policy. There are concerns about security in 
Observatory Park which is not used by any other community in the area. Observatory Park 
has the highest positioned Park in Johannesburg and has an Indian Monument. It has the 
highest panoramic view both North and South Johannesburg. 
OK: In your view, what are the social impacts of gating in Observatory given its positioning 
next to Bellevue which is a low income neighbourhood? 
Lloyd: Any community is diverse. There are a number of theories about a high level of civil 
awareness. For example, some people argue that CCTV impinges on civil rights. Anybody 
who doesn’t live in a particular neighbourhood is considered to be a potential threat. There is 
confusion between people who reside in their area in terms of perceptions of public space, 
compared to people who live in other spaces. People travelling through a specific area are 
perceived as a potential threat. It just tends to take a racial dimension in South Africa. 
Interview: Sector Crime Forum 3 chairperson (Also Urania Village Chairperson), 2011 
What can be observed in this case is a politics of territorial protectionism – also a politics 
of classist regionalism. In this case residents of observatory try to protect their 
neighbourhood from urban decay creeping from Yeoville and also from unwanted 
and potentially dangerous intruders. This is aimed at maintaining the value of the 
area; thus preserving its spatial capital and the associated symbolic capital; that is the 
prestige and honour associated with living in Observatory (cf. Bourdieu 1999). This, 
of course, is juxtaposed against the “shame” of living in the waste-land and ruins that 
Yeoville was considered to have become over the years. But how do those living in 
Yeoville view the neighbourhood? 
 
8.3.2. “I don’t feel safe …”: spatio-temporalities of fear  
In Yeoville streets and parks were considered to be the most dangerous spots. Fear 
in, or of, the streets and parks was heightened at night as shown by the results of the 
opinion and attitude survey (Box 33). 
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Box 33: “...I dont feel safe walking at night on the streets because there is too much 
crime” 
Comment 
The majority of respondents in the 
opinion and attitude survey 
indicated that the streets of Yeoville 
at night are particularly dangerous. 
Most of them indicated that they do 
not like walking on the streets of 
Yeoville at night. Asked about 
whether they felt safe in public 
spaces at night, 85 % of opinion and 
attitude survey participants indicated 
that they do not. 15.0% indicated 
that they feel safe being in public 
spaces at night in Yeoville.  
Most of those who indicated that they do not feel safe walking in Yeoville’s public spaces at 
night based their view on the perception that there is too much crime in Yeoville. Some 
indicated that they have heard a lot of stories about people being mugged in Yeoville, while 
others indicate that they have been victims of crime in Yeoville’s public spaces at night. 
Selected quotes from the opinion and attitude survey 
Unsafe:  
“No, I don’t feel safe walking at night on the streets because there is too much crime. 
Even those street patrollers don’t come to our streets. They only patrol on Rockey 
Street. Maybe if they can change these Yeoville police officers and bring other officers 
here” (Participant T2A, 2011). 
Safe:  
Much safe as I told you because I am more secured. I am not scared of anything. I can 
withdraw money at any ATM; I can answer my phone at any time I don’t worry about 
being robbed (Participant T3A, 2011). 
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
The opinion and attitude survey results show that during the day, there was a 
tendency for people to feel safer, although caution always had to be exercised in 
navigating Yeoville’s streets, parks and other public places (Box 34).  
Box 34: Safety during the day in Yeoville 
Comment 
Asked about whether or not they feel 
safe in the public spaces, 72.5 % of 
opinion and attitude survey 
participants indicated that they feel 
safe in Yeoville’s public spaces during 
the day. 12.5% indicated that 
sometimes they feel safe as much as 
they feel unsafe. 5.0% indicated that 
they do not feel safe at all during the 
day. Those who indicated that they 
feel safe based this on the view that 
Figure 16: Do you feel safe walking on the streets and parks 
of Yeoville at night? 
Figure 17: Do you feel safe in Yeoville's streets and parks 
during the day 
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during the day they feel safe because there are many people on public places and that reduces 
the chance of criminal victimisation. Some of these participants indicated that despite feeling 
safe during the day, they were selective about the public places they frequent. Some indicated 
that they feel much safer on the streets than in parks, because in parks there tend to be many 
people roaming around without specific activities they are doing. Such people are deemed 
dangerous. Those who indicated that they feel safe and unsafe at the same time depending 
on context based this view on the fact that crime can occur during the day as much as it 
occurs at night. Some indicated that they can walk during the day, but they avoid places such 
as parks and generally avoid overcrowded areas like the front of Shoprite in Raleigh Street, 
Yeoville.  
 
Selected quotes from opinion and attitude survey  
Safer: 
“Yes, if I want to walk during the day I would feel safe in the streets more than the 
parks. I say the streets more than the parks because of the people who are always in 
the parks most of whom are men who seem not to have anything to do” (Participant 
T14B, 2011). 
 
Not safe: 
“You cannot feel safe as long as I have the fear that the person next to you might just 
be thinking of mugging you or tricking you into falling into a trap. It’s like you have to 
be alert at all times be it in the evening or afternoon since the people around you all 
the time are the ones who are the potential muggers or robbers” (Participant T17B, 
2011). 
 
Cannot be sure: 
“Yes, I can walk around in the afternoon because most people will be moving around 
but will just make sure that I avoid overcrowded areas like Rockey and near Shoprite. 
If I am to be near those places I will have to be careful because you might be nicely 
asked for money or just end up without your wallet without even noticing how you 
lost it” (Participant T13B, 2011). 
Opinion and attitude: April-July 2011 
Assessing the safety situation in Yeoville’s public spaces at night, a local politician 
stated: 
“I think the streets and parks are relatively safe during day time, but then at 
night it’s totally different. If you are walking at night, you shouldn’t carry bags 
because they are assumed to be carrying valuables. It’s risky. If you walk at 
night you shouldn’t carry your cell phone. I had a tenant from Ghana. He used 
to move around at night. At some point he never came back home and we 
have never seen him again. It’s very strange. He left all his belongings. There 
are many maybes to this story. The police never took the case seriously because 
he was from Ghana, you know. So the streets are not safe. But myself as a 
motorist I have never been hijacked at night” (Interview: Sipho, 2011). 
Poor lighting of streets and parks at night made these spaces into zones liable to (fear 
of) instant terror and crime.   
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About the Yeoville Park, the Ward Councillor once lamented: 
“We had a very beautiful park, but today it looks bad. We have a big recreation 
centre and a spacious library. People say I don’t work, but I am very proud of 
what I have done for Yeoville. As far as I am concerned, ANC has done a lot 
in this area. I am representing ANC here, not Noma (ward councillor). The 
pavements in Yeoville have been well maintained. I had a meeting with street 
traders and they say they also want space on the pavements; they want to be 
recognised” (Ward Public Meeting, Noma: 13/11/2010). 
And a ward public meeting participant complained: 
“We are not happy about city parks. City Parks has not been maintaining the 
Park. We need lights for the park. By-laws are not being enforced. It’s not just 
about Region F. People are making fire on the pavements” (Ward Public 
Meeting participant: 09/10/2010). 
Streets and parks in Yeoville experienced decay. This resulted in them being publicly 
considered as spaces of safety that were endangered and become dangerous. Yet 
parks are supposed to be spaces where people can spend their leisure time without 
fear or exposure to dangerous criminal, illegal or drug sub-cultures. There were 
allegations that parks were spaces where illegal businesses took place. As we drove 
past the Yeoville Park in a YCPF executive member’s car, he claimed: 
“You see all these people sitting in the park. They are doing illegal business. 
They are selling drugs. There is even Home Affairs there…some of those 
people standing there produce forged IDs and passports. And the police don’t 
seem to be able to do anything about it. It’s bad. Where will our children play 
now?” (Conversation, Mduduzi: 16/08/2010) 
In Sector Crime Forums, community members discussed the most dangerous of 
spots in Yeoville’s public places and mooted possible reactive or proactive solutions. 
Stories about dangers in places in Yeoville played a big role in shaping the residents’ 
collective and individual spatio-temporal strategies of navigating the neighbourhood. 
Residents would avoid places tagged as dangerous; especially at night. In different 
but related contexts Caldeira (2000:310) posits that “as people move around the city, 
they use city spaces in individual and creative ways and as de Certeau reminds us, 
make fragmented trajectories that elude legibility”. In essence, inscribed in people’s 
minds – consciously or subconsciously – are mental maps  based on their physical 
and symbolic understanding of the city (Lynch 1960); as informed by good and bad 
experiences or hearsays about these spaces. 
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As much as open public spaces were considered as generating insecurity, spaces of 
entertainment and conviviality were also considered problematic. 
     
8.3.3. Nightlife and daylife socio-economies and public danger 
Spaces of entertainment and business including liquor outlets, guest houses and 
gambling houses were regarded as contributing to high incidences of crime and 
violence in Yeoville. In community meetings and daily discourses, participants 
underscored the significance of the linkage between liquor outlets, liquor abuse and 
violence. The ward councillor narrated: 
“One day I found someone with his intestines outside. He had been assaulted. 
If you have a business, it’s not just about making money; you need to make 
sure your customers are safe. He already said that people get drunk and 
commit crime. It’s your responsibility not to sell alcohol to people who are 
already drunk. I know that the tavern might be creating employment to 20 or 
so people, but it’s destroying the community. As a community, we have a right 
to reject any liquor outlet that we don’t want.  We don’t want to know about 
how much employment they are creating. Our focus is on the unlicensed; 
those that are licensed are okay. The other thing is that we don’t want to 
threaten your job; our concern is about the community. We see women and 
school kids being robbed. You hear them screaming” (Ward Public Meeting, 
Councillor Noma: 13/11/2010). 
About the connection between alcohol, crime and violence, a local activist said: 
“One serious contributing factor to crime is alcohol. Alcohol is socially 
attractive in this country. There is a belief that you can’t enjoy yourself if you 
are not drinking. There is an unhealthy preoccupation with alcohol in Yeoville 
Bellevue” (Interview, Maurice: 27/08/ 2010). 
Regarding one of the problematic liquor outlets, a local activist retorted: 
“I want to address my brother from Chez Mangiza here. That place is a 
problem. We came there with environmental specialist and we could not even 
get in. That place is a bad place. We see children drinking outside that place. 
People are being robbed around that place. What is the name of that shebeen? 
… The police confiscated all the liquor three months ago and they closed 
down that place. There were truckloads of beer at that place and this was more 
than the allowed stock for a shebeen. The majority of people who drink there 
urinate on the streets. There is a lot of public violence there; people are 
assaulting each other with bottles. There are a lot of broken bottles outside the 
place …” (Ward Public Meeting, Thabang: 13/11/2010). 
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Apart from this one “problematic liquor outlet” discussed here, there were 
complaints that Yeoville was overloaded with liquor outlets - creating serious social 
problems in the area. In 2011, the YBCDT estimated that there were 140 liquor 
outlets in Yeoville - an area of about 10 km2. Most of these liquor outlets were 
concentrated in or near Raleigh-Rockey Street79. The opinion and attitude survey in 
Yeoville sustained the view that there is a strong link between liquor abuse, liquor 
drinking places and crime or violence (Block and Block 1995), at least in public 
perceptions (Box 35). 
Box 35: Liquor and criminality or violence 
Comment 
Asked if there was any link 
between liquor abuse and crime 
and violence, 70.0% of opinion 
and attitude survey participants 
indicated that there is. 17.5% 
indicated that alcohol abuse does 
not necessarily lead to crime and 
violence. 12.5% did not respond to 
this question. Those who indicated 
that there is a link between alcohol 
abuse and crime and violence 
based this on the fact that alcohol 
abuse is associated with social crimes such as domestic violence and assault. Some indicated 
that there are criminals who use liquor as an inhibitor before committing criminal and violent 
acts. Liquor was also associated with addiction, including addiction to stronger drugs, which 
could lead people to commit crimes, such as property crimes (both petty and serious) to 
sustain their addiction. Liquor addicts are also characterised as easy prey for criminals, 
because when they are drunk they could be weak and might have poor judgement. Some 
people indicated that they generally feel unsafe around drunken people. Those who indicated 
that there is no link between criminality and violence and liquor abuse based their view on 
the idea that some people commit crimes although they do not take alcohol. An opinion and 
attitude survey participant maintains: 
“I don’t think that there is a link because people commit crime even they are not 
drunk. And one is drunk he become weak and he cannot do something that needs 
more power and energy, as is the case with certain types of crime” (Participant T35D, 
2011). 
Some indicated that a drunken person is normally weak and therefore cannot commit crimes 
that require power and strength. Some therefore emphasised that it depends on an individual 
and cannot be generalised. 
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
                                                     
79 Main business street in Yeoville 
Figure 18: Is there a link between alcohol abuse, liqour outlets 
and violence or crime in Yeoville? 
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Liquor outlets were therefore targeted by community crime and violence prevention 
practices and discourses. A local activist suggested: 
“We need to object to liquor licensing as an organisation. YSF is the right 
forum to do that. We need to object to both the gambling and liquor license 
applications. The problem in Yeoville is that we have too much alcohol and it’s 
not well managed. The problem is not alcohol per se” (YSF Meeting, Maurice: 
11/2010).   
The continued issuance of new liquor licences by the Gauteng Liquor Board was a 
source of contention involving Yeoville community activists, liquor traders and 
Gauteng Liquor Board. Community activists continually lobbied for the rejection of 
liquor license applications as a way of combating crime, violence and disorder in the 
Yeoville. An activist, who was one of the key players in the anti-liquor outlets 
initiative, explained: 
“We did a survey on legal and illegal outlets. This was discussed with Liquor 
Board. They told The CPF and Advocacy and Empowerment Committee that 
illegal places are responsibility of SAPS. They must be shut down without 
negotiation. The Liquor Board only has responsibility for those outlets that 
have legal licenses or shebeen permits. So if there are compliance issues with 
legal outlets, this must be reported to the CPF or the Advocacy Committee or 
directly to the Liquor Board” (YCPF Broader Forum meeting, Maurice 
Smithers: 13/07/2011).  
He described his strategy of monitoring new liquor trading, other business and land 
rezoning applications: 
“I monitor newspapers such as The Times, The Gazette and there are currently 
no new applications for liquor licenses or for any town planning approvals of 
building rezoning. Last week in Yeovue News, there was an announcement that 
someone had applied for a license of a gambling machine and there were 
notices of liquor license applications …” (YBCEC meeting, Maurice: 
25/05/2011). 
In attempts to deal with the increasing number of liquor outlets, corruption was cited 
as a stumbling block: 
“They pay to the Liquor Board. You cannot do anything. Yeoville is just a few 
square kilometres. How can we have this massive number of shebeens” (Sector 
Crime Forum 1 meeting, Maurice Smithers: 22/09/2010). 
One question, however, is on whether or not drinking places are inherently 
criminogenic and violence-inducing. Evidence presented here suggests that drinking 
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places generate violence and crime. However, there is a view to the contrary. In her 
study of drinking-houses in medieval England, Sagui (2007) argues: 
“If drinking-houses had simply been hotbeds of criminal activity, people would 
not have visited them and they certainly would not have paid more to drink 
there instead of purchasing cheaper ale on the street. People went to drinking 
establishments because they offered a convivial atmosphere …” (Sagui 2007: 
30-31)80.   
If anything, therefore, spaces of entertainment such as clubs do not necessarily 
spatter negative, criminogenic and violent energies, but are sociable spaces that are 
capable of generating social interaction and reduce social distance between different 
social groups. Such spaces could reduce mixophobic feelings81 between ethnically diverse 
people (Peters and de Haan 2011; Watt 2011), and therefore promote social tolerance 
- generating social capital rather than only violence, crime and other social vices. 
The generalised fear in and of public spaces evinces the liquidity of fear (Bauman 2006) 
and how this fear has been habitualised to the extent of also assuming the status of a 
liquid institution in itself (see Chapters 1 ,4). Negotiation of fear and anxieties by 
people transecting public spaces has become an everyday practice (de Certeau 1984), and 
a habit in its own right. Fear can be conceptualised as an institution because it is 
ontologically omnipresent, typified, shared and increasingly influencing everyday 
social discourses and practices. It is a reality sui generis (Charles 2006; Hilbert 1989; 
Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico 1982); imposing itself on the conscience of urbanites. 
Cities being spaces of uncertainty - or necropolises (Malaquais 2007) [places where the 
possibility of death is eminent] - inculcate a “culture of fear” (Tudor 2003). The 
consequence is the institutionalisation of this fear in various forms including 
community organisations and patterning of fear averting practices; amongst others 
(see Chapter Four). The city can therefore be conceptualised as abound with fear - 
formless and diffuse – “liquid fear” (Bauman 2006). 
As testimony to its liquidity, fear (of violence and crime) in Yeoville percolated 
discourses about houses, land and the environment. 
 
                                                     
80 See Sagui, Samatha. 2007. "Crime and conviviality: The social space of Urban Drinking - Houses in 
Medieval England." 
81 Feelings of fear or dislike of mixing with strangers or those perceived to be different. 
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8.4. The house, land, environment and community safety governance 
My findings reveal that housing space, public physical infrastructure, public waste 
management and noise control had direct and indirect (sometimes spurious) 
correlations with the propensity or non-propensity for public violence, crime and 
fear in Yeoville.  
 
8.4.1. The house and community safety production 
Housing in Yeoville was a sensitive issue with a potential to cause collective “anti-
foreigner” violence or service delivery protests by a disgruntled South African 
population (cf. Chapter 7, subtitle 7.2.2). A community activist: 
“I think the housing issue is an important one. It is raised in various public 
meetings. The issue of housing is a source of tension and conflict between 
South Africans and foreign nationals […]. We have areas in Yeoville which are 
in an advanced state of decay. The CPF has spent quite a lot of time over the 
past few years identifying hijacked buildings which are a source of tension in 
the community. We have identified 25 houses, in fact, close to 32 that have 
been hijacked. There is a house just around here. It is under the ownership of a 
Mauritian guy called Sumbion. I googled his name and found that this guy was 
arrested in 1988 on charges of drug trafficking. I also discovered that this 
house was bought about the same time. I talked to the guy staying at this 
building and he told me that the owner of this building disappeared saying he 
was going to Holland. What can we do about this house? Maybe we might 
need to set up a property trust to take control of the situation […]. There 
could be suspicion that some people might do a housing audit and then hijack 
houses. So we need to get a letter clearing us and authorising us to do the 
housing audit and track ownership. In Webb Street, there is a house that was 
abandoned 10 years ago” (YS-YBCDT meeting, Maurice: 2011).  
A researcher from Wits University described the criminogenic aspects of hijacked 
buildings as we passed by a former bad building during a tour with Wits University 
students: 
“This building had been hijacked before and had become a haven of criminals, 
but now it has been rehabilitated” (Tour: 19/08/2010). 
Along with being an object spattering ethno-nationalist sentiments (see Chapter 7), 
the house was an object of security concern in itself. According to results of the 
opinion and attitude survey, housing type had a bearing on occupants’ perceptions of 
their susceptibility to crime, violence and fear (Box 36). 
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Box 36: Housing and criminality or violence 
Comment 
72.5% of opinion and attitude survey 
participants indicated that housing 
type has a bearing on real security 
and fear or lack thereof. 20.0% 
believed that there is no link between 
housing type and security and fear. 
7.5% did not respond to the question 
pertaining to this issue.  
The 72.5% who indicated that there 
was a link between housing type and 
vulnerability to crime based this on 
the idea that different types of 
housing have different levels of security or guarantees thereof.  
There were competing perspectives, with some people saying that living in a free standing 
house is much safer than living in a house, while others claim that flats are much safer. Free 
standing houses were considered safer in that they are generally not as densely populated as 
flats and are of easily manageable sizes. It was made clear that those free standing houses 
that have security walls and gates and even manned by private security personnel are much 
safer than flats. At the same time some indicated that flats are generally much safer because 
they are almost always manned by private security guards. The 20.0% that believed that there 
is no link between housing type and security indicated so because they believe that any place 
can be secure or unsecure depending on the security measures that are put in place by those 
who live there or by owners. They also indicated that security of housing properties depend 
on where they are located. A house located in an area experiencing high levels of crime could 
be vulnerable irrespective of whether it is free standing or a flat.  
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
The house itself was considered a relatively safe haven. The majority of opinion and 
attitude survey participants indicated that they felt safe at their places of residence 
(Box 37). 
Box 37: Safety at residential places 
Comment 
Asked whether or not they felt safe in 
their residential places, 80% of 
opinion survey participants indicated 
that they feel safe. 12.5% stated that 
they do not feel safe. 7.5% did not 
respond to the question pertaining to 
this issue.  
 
Summary of responses 
Most of 80% of participants who 
indicated that they feel safe in their residential places indicated that they feel so because they 
have security measures such as wall, lockable gates and private security guarding among 
others. Some indicated that they feel safe because they have not been victims of crime yet. 
Figure 19: Does housing type affect or influence people's 
susceptibility to or protection against crime, violence or 
fear? 
Figure 20: Do you feel safe at your residential place in 
Yeoville? 
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Some indicated that they are now used to their neighbourhood and do not fear anything. 
Others indicated that they feel safe and in fact are safe because they avoid walking around at 
night. Of the 12.5% who indicated that they do not feel safe at all, some stated that it is 
because they stay in dangerous streets. Some indicated that they do not have security guards 
at their residential places. Some indicated that they do not feel safe because they have been 
attacked by criminals before. Others indicated that despite having high walls, they do not feel 
safe because criminals can still attack them.  
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
Housing ownership was viewed, by some, as enhancing the participation of resident 
owners in community safety initiatives; while absent owners remained problematic, 
being always absent from community meetings. A YCPF executive member stated: 
“Here in Yeoville, we have a problem, property owners do not show up for 
meetings. Perhaps, there are only 20% of people who would be the rightful 
owner of buildings. For example in Muller Street, from Joe Slovo to De La 
Rey, only 7 people could be the owners of those houses. That’s the problem in 
Yeoville. The property owners do not own up or come forward. Maybe they 
are afraid because they are not paying rent. What do we do now?” (People kept 
quiet) (Sector Crime Forum 2 meeting, Lehlonolo: 10/02/2011). 
The opinion and attitude survey which suggested a strong link between housing 
tenurial conditions and likelihood of people to participate in community safety 
governance initiatives (Box 38).  
Box 38: Housing tenure and effects on participation in community safety initiatives 
Comment 
57.5% of participants indicated that 
there is a link between housing 
ownership or tenurial types and 
likelihood and motivation of people 
to participate in local crime 
prevention initiatives. 22.5% indicated 
that there is no linkage. 5% claimed to 
have no idea regarding this issue. 15% 
did not respond to this issue. 
 
Summary of responses 
Those who indicated that there is a 
link between housing ownership and 
likelihood to be concerned about crime and participate in crime prevention based this on the 
fact that those who own houses are interested in protecting their properties and their 
neighbourhoods because they are key stakeholders.  In this regard, some noted that house 
owners are the ones that are most active in YCPF. Some home owners unequivocally stated 
that they do not accept criminals in their houses.  
 
For some, the link between housing ownership or tenure and likelihood to participate in 
crime prevention initiatives is negative. These participants pointed out that some people are 
not willing to participate because they consider themselves temporary in the neighbourhood. 
Figure 21: Is there a link between housing ownership or 
tenurial types and likelihood or motivation of people to 
participate in community crime prevention initiatives? 
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Those who indicated that there is no link between housing ownership or tenurial regimes 
and participation in crime prevention initiatives indicated that both tenants and property 
owners are affected by crime and all concerned about safety and therefore participate in local 
crime management initiatives. They indicated that even those people who do not own houses 
are concern about the security of their property and persons. Some indicated that most 
house owners do not stay in Yeoville, but in wealthier suburbs such as Sandton, Kensington 
and Observatory.  Those who indicated that they “did not know” never explained their 
views. 
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
The politics of housing casts itself as a politics of ethno-nationality - it is a source of tension 
between some South Africans and African immigrants. This happens against a 
backdrop of claims of entitlement to houses on the basis of South Africanness in a 
context of potential competition for housing space with an African immigrant 
population in Yeoville. Linked to house-associated ethno-national regionalist politics 
in the community safety governance field are regimes of land governance discussed 
below.  
 
8.4.2. Responding to illegal land rezoning  
There were attempts by some neighbourhood residents to participate in land 
rezoning initiatives, objecting to neighbourhood development proposals they did not 
like or which they perceive to endanger them and their habitat. Residents were legally 
expected to influence the trajectory of neighbourhood development, at least on 
paper. The reality was much more complex. One community church leader 
complained: 
“If there is going to be a rezoning of a residential area into commercial stand 
such as a guest house, it has to be approved with consultation with people… 
They (council/government) start by doing something first, then they start 
justification. Some of these places are operating without licences. They 
continue operating without our consent, despite our objections. These people 
pay police officers”. (Ward Public Meeting, Ntate Muruti: 11/09/2010). 
The same church leader complained about the prevalence of illegal land rezoning in 
Yeoville: 
“There is a lot illegal building happening in Yeoville, for example 11 Muller 
Street, 49 Francis Street, 52 Francis Street. There are 3 shops being opened at 
52 Francis Street. Most people doing this are not South Africans. If a South 
African does that, he will be squashed immediately” (YSF Meeting, Ntate 
Muruti: 16/09/2010). 
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Such illegal land rezoning was blamed for lawlessness and criminality.  
Guesthouses and liquor outlets in Yeoville, many of which were regarded as products 
of illegal land rezoning, were considered to be community endangering spaces. Other 
scholars have referred to such spaces as “socioscapes” (Jansson 2002), “playscapes” 
(Chatterton and Hollands 2002) or “consumptionscapes” (Venkatraman and Nelson 
2008). These spaces of pleasure were a source of community tension in Yeoville. The 
rezoning of residential places into guest houses in Yeoville was viewed by some 
residents as an elaborate example of criminogenic land rezoning. Most of the guest 
houses were suspected to be operating as “undercover” for criminal and clandestine 
activities, including drug dealing and prostitution. A police officer claimed:  
“Last year we found stolen cars in yards of guest houses. The car-jackers were 
from Durban and they had many stolen cars in this guest house. Even this 
issue of cocaine is being done in guest houses” (Sector Crime Forum 1 
meeting, Warrant Officer Mbaula: 02/06/2011).  
And a community activist emphasised: 
“There is too much complain about guest houses. There are little girls coming 
in at night and going out in the morning. There is a visible potential for 
prostitution. Guest houses should be little first item on agenda in the next 
meeting. On the 20th of November Yeoville studio will give feedback on 
studies on street trading. Today 21st October, street vendors met to organise 
themselves” (YSF Meeting, Thabang: 16/09/2010). 
Guest houses were suspected to be operating as brothels and to be spaces where 
sexual crimes were committed; what Gaissad (2005) calls “sexual territories”. These 
“sexual territories” constituted a vibrant “nightlife” (Gaussad 2005) social economy 
of Yeoville, as much as they were part of daylife. Some community members 
registered suspicion about guest houses. One echoed: 
“In the run up to the 2010, a lot of guest houses erupted. They are closed gates 
and you don’t know what is happening there” (Ward Public Meeting, 
Participant: 11/09/2010). 
The issue of illegal land rezoning was of concern to the YCPF. The YCPF 
chairperson stated: 
“As a CPF, we also have a challenge with these buildings. For us as a 
community, it is our duty to come together and solve our problems.  As Sector 
1, sector 2 and sector 3 have agreed that we should form street committees. At 
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every street we have a spaza shop” (YSF Meeting, Lehlonolo: [YCPF 
Chairperson], 16/09/2010). 
And the targeted illegal land rezoning practices were described as follows: 
“We need to create a database of liquor outlet ownership in this area. We also 
need to deal with schools operating on private house. It was stated that there 
was a school which accommodates about 450 pupils, yet it has only 2 toilets. 
They don’t have proper facilities. There is also a challenge of unlawful 
businesses. We need to deal with the owners of properties to deal with the 
establishment of spaza shops and businesses in residential places. We need to 
maintain the value of the area. This area is regarded as a suburb, not a 
township. So we need to deal with the illegal rezoning of buildings and illegal 
liquor outlets. We have a problem with both legal and illegal liquor outlets. 
Some legal liquor outlets do not comply with the requirement of their licenses” 
(Sector Crime Forum 1 meeting, Lehlonolo: 18/08/2011). 
Contestations over land rezoning could be interpreted as an incarnation of struggles 
in the territorial field (Bourdieu 2005). In this territorial field, there are struggles for 
appropriation of space for business or residential use, with conflict between the two 
as in this case. Here, there is tension between the business man possessing economic 
capital and a populace that desire to accumulate spatial capital by gaining access to 
decent accommodation. Another form of territorial contestation takes place in spaces 
of participatory local environmental governance. 
. 
8.4.3. Polluting the environment, violating communities?  
Responses to the question of whether there was a connection between 
environmental uncleanliness and crime or violence in Yeoville are summarised in Box 
39 below. 
Box 39: Link between lack of environmental cleanliness and crime or violence 
Comment 
30 % of participants indicated that 
there is a link between 
environmental (un)cleanliness and 
crime. 40% indicated that there is no 
linkage. 2.5% indicated they had no 
idea about the question. 27.5% did 
not respond to this question.  
 
Summary of responses 
Those participants who indicated 
that there is a link between dirtiness 
Figure 22: Is there a link between envronmental cleanliness 
and crime or violence? 
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and criminality based their view on the view that dirty places such as illegal dumping sites 
become hideouts for criminals. A clean environment is viewed as creating a convivial 
atmosphere and improves a sense of territoriality and belonging. Those in the opinion survey 
who indicated a link between environmental dirtiness and criminality based that on the view 
that criminals feel at ease committing crime in secluded and dirty places like rubbish dumps. 
Those opposed to this view believed that crime can occur even in cleaner places. See quotes 
below: 
“Yes I consider these spaces to be dirty and I say that there is a link with crime and 
violence incidences because for most of crime makers, such spaces are at their 
advantages, they can kill someone or rape a woman inside there because they are 
aware that none will go in as it is a dirty space” (Participant T22C, 2011). 
“Not at all. People steal anywhere regardless of the cleanliness of the area which is 
why security is everywhere including Observatory” (Participant T14B, 2011). 
 
Was Yeoville considered dirty or clean by its residents? While some opinion and attitude 
participants described Yeoville as relatively clean, others noted that it was dirty. 52.5% of 
participants indicated that Yeoville was clean. 32.5% claimed that it was unclean. 2.5% 
indicated that it could be cleaner. 2.5% declined to comment. 10% did not respond to this 
question. One participant in the opinion and attitude survey indicated: 
“Yeoville is dirty everywhere and in all ways. Nothing is done in terms of cleanliness. 
And also people need to be aware about cleanliness in this area because people leave 
rubbish anywhere they don’t know the importance of the dustbins implemented in the 
street” (Participant T32D, 2011). 
Opinion and attitude survey: April-July 2011 
Although the results (in Box 39) show that uncleanliness is criminogenic to some 
extent, they suggest that the connection between grime and crime is at best spurious. 
This is because most opinion and attitude survey participants suggested that there 
was no direct link between grime and crime; thus casting doubt on the 
presuppositions of the “broken windows theory” (Wilson and Kelling 1982). One 
could claim that not all unclean places are criminogenic and not all supposedly clean 
places repel crime and violence.  
Some salvation to the broken windows theory came from the finding that noise 
pollution was viewed as a public nuisance with potential to generate violence and 
criminality. In a Sector Crime Forum meeting, a participant complained: 
“We have problems with some churches making noise to people. We tried to 
talk to them nicely, but we can’t reach an agreement. These churches run from 
Monday to Sunday. They start making noise from 4 pm to 12 pm.  Our 
children cannot read. We have reported this to police, but it’s not helping. 
There is a church at Corner Muller Street and Joe Slovo. They don’t listen. 
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They are playing a money game” (Sector crime forum 1 meeting, participant: 
02/06/2011). 
Noise governance (associated with liquor outlets and churches) proved to be an 
important issue in order maintenance and security governance. The issue of noise 
was considered to be a serious one, with potential violent repercussions as spill-over 
effects.  
Community stakeholders, including the police, placed importance on maintenance of 
the environment as a way of governing local security.  A SAPS officer described the 
strategy for noise policing: 
“We talked about this matter in our previous SAPS – CPF meeting. We will 
deal with that with the Metro. We will try to help. We will confiscate the noise 
making equipment” (SCF1 meeting, Constable Phiri: 02/06/2011). 
Street guardianship, involving both police and civilians was deemed necessary for 
successfully purging the streets of hawkers; who were accused of littering Rockey-
Raleigh Street. It was noted:  
“The Street Ambassador programme has never been properly communicated 
so most people do not know about it. He said he had heard from the 
Department of Economic Development in the City of Joburg that even if they 
employed Yeoville Bellevue people, they will not deploy them in the area to 
avoid bribery and people not doing their work. He said that this issue must be 
solved by good management. It cannot be used as a reason not to deploy locals 
to do the work” (YCPF Broader Forum Meeting, Maurice: 13/07/2011).   
It was envisaged that street governance through civilian street guardianship, in which 
community members participate could help to effectively reduce littering of streets 
and other public spaces. However, it had potentials to heighten tensions between 
South Africans and non-South Africans; as those who would officially engage in 
street guardianship would be South Africans. Xenophobic tensions would be 
probable in an area like Yeoville, in which the majority of those to be policed by 
South African street ambassadors would be African immigrants.  
The issue of environmental governance evoked anger and xenophobic sentiments 
from sections of the South African public in Yeoville. The littering of streets and 
public open spaces was construed as acts of problematic African immigrant litterers 
(see Chapter 7, Box 24). African immigrants, were scapegoated in some South African 
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public discourses as coming from “unplanned and disorganised” African cities - 
hence their “perceived” lack of environmental consciousness (Majombozi 2010). 
Thus, environmental governance is an arena of ethno-national regionalist politics.  
   
8.5. On the centrality of territorial politics: concluding note 
As deriving from the foregoing, I observe that community safety governance is an 
arena spattering an imaginary and nostalgic territorial micro-politics. Such a politics is 
imaginary and nostalgic in that it is associated with organisational, individual and 
social group attempts to recreate the image of Yeoville - often taking the form of 
yearning for a middle-class past in a neighbourhood that faces urban decay, crime 
and violence. I depict two forms of territorial regionalist politics in the field of 
community safety production. Firstly, there is ethno-national territorial regionalism in 
which the occupancy of Yeoville by African immigrants is perceptively co-related to 
the onset and entrenchment of neighbourhood physical and moral decay. This 
ethno-national regionalism takes the form of a politics of exclusion of non-nationals 
from public participation in matters of community safety. It also takes the form of 
counter-otherisation practices and discourses by African immigrants resisting their 
scapegoating as causers of local social problems. These African immigrants also find 
themselves forming ethno-national enclaves that become protective sanctuaries in an 
environment muddled by fear of xenophobic violence. Secondly, there is classist 
territorial regionalism in which wealthier neighbourhoods and individuals protect their 
spaces against perceived creeping urban decay and intruders. 
Territorial regionalist politics also cascades into a politics of tension over the house, 
public land and public environment. In this case there were struggles to protect 
houses from break-ins. The politics of the house in Yeoville is specific in that there 
was tension over housing ownership and “hijacked buildings”. Again, this tension 
took an ethno-national regionalist dimension and in which the “criminal African 
immigrant” was perceived as the typical hijacker. The same anti African immigrant 
ethno-national regionalist politics pervaded discourses about the environmental 
litterer and noise polluter.  
The politics (spatial and administrative) of matters regarding land rezoning was 
institutionalised. Ideally, residents were expected to participate in public forums, 
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especially ward public meetings, to deliberate on applications to the City for land 
rezoning - wielding the right to object to or endorse applications. In this case 
applications for rezoning of houses into guest houses (considered as disguises for 
brothels) and for liquor outlet licences became highly politicised; generating tension.  
In the next chapter I condense my key arguments, concluding this thesis (Chapter 9). 
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9. Chapter Nine 
Consolidating a socio-spatial analysis of community safety 
governance 
 
9.1. Preamble 
Based on evidence presented and discussed in previous chapters, I reiterate the three 
arguments of this thesis. I maintain that community safety governance is i) a field of 
micro-politics involving community organisations, institutions, social groups and 
individuals in search of various species of capital (Chapter 6); ii) an arena of ethno-
national regionalist politics (Chapter 7); iii) a field of territorialised discourses, practices 
and strategies of stakeholders (Chapter 8).  
In sections below, I discuss the significance of my research findings and analysis and 
then conclude by pointing out a few areas for further thought and research. I start by 
summarising and re-examining the argument that community safety governance is an 
arena of stakeholder micro-politics.  
 
9.2. Community safety governance: a field of stakeholder politics 
This section nails the argument that community safety governance is a field of power 
politics involving community stakeholders (organisational, institutional, individual 
and social group). These stakeholders compete and coalesce for social, political, 
economic, and moral, among other resources or capitals at stake. I highlight my 
findings on the form and logic of contestation and coalition of these stakeholders 
and their practices in forums of deliberative community safety governance.  
 
9.2.1. The form and logic of contestation and coalition 
I maintain that community security governance is a field of micro-politics in which 
organisations, institutions, social (interest) groups or individuals compete and 
coalesce for political, moral, social, economic and cultural profit (Chapter 6). Chapter 
6 maps out the positionalities of community organisations, institutions, individuals 
and social groups involved in community safety governance in Yeoville; unpacking 
the ensuing contestation and coalition.  
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The micro-politics resulting from stakeholder interaction in the safety governance 
field, I argue, is about and goes beyond safety production. There are contestations 
for local socio-political influence – the production of safety being the springboard 
for power-seeking endeavours. In Yeoville, for example, I observed the domination 
of the local socio-political landscape by a few individual stakeholders from the 
YBCDT, YSF, Ward Committee, ADF and YCF. Sometimes, in this concentration 
of socio-political influence, there was duplication of effort and activities as 
organisations replicated one another. Complexifying this mix was the presence of 
government agents, such as SAPS, JMPD and Gauteng Department of Community 
Safety, all of which had stakes in the field of community safety governance.   
What I observed in Yeoville is that inter-stakeholder micro-politics, as much as it is 
geared for safety production, is also about gaining and retaining power. Some 
individuals seek to launch their political careers by getting involved in community 
safety activism. Some seek a livelihood (Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 2012). Safety 
production is therefore big business politically, economically, socially, morally and 
symbolically. 
Explaining my observations, I argue that stakeholders in the community safety 
governance field struggle to acquire, marshal and access political capital (power, 
legitimacy and recognition), symbolic capital (honour and prestige), economic capital 
(material resources), social capital (personal networks), cultural capital (in the form of 
knowledge among other forms), and moral capital (satisfaction emanating from selfless 
acts). These capitals are by and large conceptualised as the defining capitals of the 
community security governance field. To the extent that these capitals are not 
deployed perversely or corruptly82, I consider them as convertible to or as 
epitomising security capital or capital of security. Capital of security or security capital is 
any resource used to govern or reduce fear of real or imagined violence and crime. 
Observing the stakeholder contestation and coalition within the community safety 
governance field, I confirm Samara’s observation that the governance of security has 
become “central to urban politics” (Samara 2011: 13).   
                                                     
82  There are potentials for perverse use of these capitals. 
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Analysis of community security governance as a field of competition and coalition 
for access to and control of security capital and other capitals is not unproblematic. 
While the concept of capital are useful in understanding the logics and dynamics of 
the micro-politics of community security governance, it risks reducing an analysis of 
community security governance to an otherwise simplistic deductive understanding 
that unrelentingly uses an explicit or hidden language of profit. One would question 
the fact that community stakeholders working in the  community security governance 
field are inherently driven by a habitus of profit or habitus of homo economicus (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992); one of political, social, economic, cultural, moral and symbolic 
profit. This is because there could be other non-calculative or non-profit motives 
behind volunteering in the community security sector? 
In section below, I analyse the hidden or salient practices, strategies and interest in 
the arena of participatory safety governance.   
 
9.2.2. Stakeholder practices and discourses in participatory safety governance 
Some community safety governing organisations in Yeoville provided arenas of 
deliberative safety governance. These included the YCPF, YCF, YSF, Ward 
Committee and ADF, all concentrating on diverse mandates, including community 
safety. One of the main modes of operation of these entities was the holding of 
community meetings. I observe that more often than not, these meetings yielded no 
concrete resolutions, yet they continued to take place periodically. How could one 
explain this? 
Community meetings can be interpreted as epitomising a ritualisation and 
habitualisation of public behaviour and helping resolve local social dualisms and 
tensions (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Giddens 1991; Goffman 1963a). In 
Bourdieusian terms, such habitualisation or routinisation of public behaviour is a 
product of social practice (Bourdieu 1977). The more people attend meetings, the more 
meeting attendance as behaviour is inscribed into their temporal and spatial cognitive 
maps; constituting their habitus (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 2000b). 
Through creating an outlet for social frustrations, community meetings become a 
security governance strategy. Meetings play a dual role of both toning the probability 
of “perverse forms of social practices” against suspected criminals. 
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While meetings are an outlet for social anger, they could be arenas where social anger 
brews, with potential for generation of a socially perverse public habitus which often 
results in the stereotypical targeting of certain social groups, especially non-South 
Africans as criminals. Since the public “talk of crime” (Caldeira 2000) in meetings 
symbolically casts the non-South African and the youth as criminals, it creates a 
dangerous pathway which has potential to turn violent. Spaces of public participation 
in deliberations about local security are spaces in which both violent activities are 
mooted or toned down at the same time. CPFs and other local organisations in 
South Africa were implicated in the outburst of xenophobic violence in most places 
in South Africa (Misago 2011), yet at the same time they could play a significant role 
in managing local tensions, providing spaces for expression of social anger and 
reducing local violence.  
What is the role of state actors in the arena of participatory safety governance in 
Yeoville? My findings show that community security governance is an arena of 
cooperation and contestation between community organisations and the state 
(Chapter 6). I refer to community-state contestations in the field of community safety 
production as epitomising the “state-community security co-production polemic”. 
This depicts contradictions emerging in attempts by the SAPS (and other 
government departments) and community to work together to deliver local safety.  
Through Sector Crime Forums in Yeoville, SAPS officials attempted to engage in 
community-oriented policing. The Yeoville policing district was divided into three 
sectors, each under the management of a SAPS officer and a civilian Sector Crime 
Forum chairperson. All the three sectors, ideally, had police vans, with mobile 
numbers displayed on them, patrolling at any time of the day and night. Sectors are 
therefore sites of direct communication between SAPS officers and the public, 
through meetings and enablement of members of the public to report any cases or 
issues that SAPS officers were supposed to deal with.  
The introduction of sector policing in South Africa can be interpreted as signifying 
attempts by the state to reproduce its hegemony in the security governance field. By 
getting involved in policing at grassroots levels, the SAPs officials able to tap on local 
knowledges (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Sector crime forums (SCFs) are uncritically 
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viewed as sub-forums of the CPF (Steinberg 2005) , but in real terms they give some 
leverage to the SAPS in the processes or safety governance at local level. I observed 
that, in Yeoville, sector managers wielded more power than civilian sector 
chairpersons whose responsibilities and duties can be described as ceremonial. The 
Sector managers were responsible for calling meetings and setting the agenda for the 
meetings, while the civilian chairperson was responsible for chairing meetings. While 
Sector Crime Forums offer SAPS officials room to exert influence in the arena of 
community safety production, they are also spaces that allow members of the public 
to hold police officers accountable for their actions.  
Since police officers, in their interaction with the public, personify the state, such 
interaction enables the public not only to see, but “access” and dialogue with the 
state in some way (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011). SCFs provide a space for 
interaction between the public and SAPS officials. While SCFs are considered as 
spaces for community oriented democratic policing; they can be viewed sceptically as 
spaces in which police officers as lower level state officials “canvass information” 
about public frustration and anger for purposes of state intelligence that enables the 
state to manage this anger and frustration and thereby maintain, a perhaps 
undemocratic status quo (Katsaura 2012). 
The local political dynamics of security governance are inherently articulated to and 
reflective of “supra-local politics”. This supra-local politics largely aims at the 
sustenance of the “existing neoliberal political-economic configuration”, while 
promoting “impotent participation and consensual good techno-managerial 
governance” (Swyngedouw 2011: 371). The government’s drive to promote public 
participation is driven by the broader project of sustaining the status quo, rather than 
promoting radical socio-economic changes. I observe that government promotion of 
public participation in security governance is to some extent a part of the broader 
agenda of public pacification, and minimisation of government expenses by tapping 
on local labour and local knowledge, whilst still managing to govern local security 
from a distance. In this case, public participation can be interpreted as entrenching 
the symbolic domination of the state, exercised on citizens and residents - sustaining a 
statist order. Public participation, especially in invited spaces, can therefore be viewed 
as a strategy by government to police the public, “through canvassing of popular 
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views” (Swyngedouw 2011:372) and (devising strategies of) managing public 
discontent.  
I agree with Swingedouw’s (2011:373) view that politics is increasingly being reduced 
to policing of the public. Given this, one is tempted to concur with the view that we 
are now living in a post-political, post-democratic world in which there is an “erosion 
of democracy and squeezing of the public sphere” (Swyngedouw 2011: 370). 
Questions regarding the genuineness of participation can be asked as some dismiss it 
as tokenistic and parasitic (Arnstein 2011). 
Community safety governance should therefore be conceptualised as an arena of 
micro-politics if one is to capture the (hidden and open) social group, organisational 
and institutional dynamics there in. Ethno-national regionalist politics thickens fault 
lines in the field of community safety production. 
   
9.3. Ethno-nationalist dynamics in the community safety governance field 
Ethno-nationalist discourses in the broader social and political fields in South Africa 
tended to structure social relations at the local level of Yeoville; percolating local 
discourses and practices of safety governance. 
 
9.3.1. Ethno-national regionalist discourses  
This study suggests and proves that the social politics of community security 
governance in the context of Yeoville were characterised by ethno-national regionalist 
dynamics (Chapter 7). Ethno-national regionalist practices, perceptions and 
discourses seemed to be habitualised. This was observed in public meetings and 
other forums in which citizenship became a rule or guiding principle in the allocation 
of blame for local challenges of urban insecurity and disorder, including crime, 
violence and urban decay. In these discourses, there was a generalised perception of 
African immigrants as “criminals”, “invaders”, “job seizers” amongst others - all 
reinforcing the criminalisation of African immigrants. These views openly and subtly 
pervaded some of the practices in local organisations such as the YCPF and YCF. 
Facing this otherisation; African immigrants adopted counter-otherising strategies in 
groups and as individuals. This involved not attending local meetings (as silent 
protest), and creating their own forums to advance or protect their interests. I 
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consider activities of migrant organisations such as the ADF as falling in the ambit of 
counter-otherising regimes within the community security field of Yeoville.  
One has to be cautious in attributing xenophobic and other forms of violence in 
cities to ethno-national diversity or cultural difference. Does ethno-national 
difference necessarily account for violence? Myers and Murray warn against casual 
reasoning in explaining the relationship between cultural diversity and urban violence 
(Myers and Murray 2007). They argue that “cultural identities and assertions of 
difference do not necessarily result in urban conflict” (Myers and Murray 2007:11). 
There is increasing celebration of the formation of “post-border cities”; ones 
characterised by cultural hybridity, cosmopolitanism and diasporic transnational 
crossings (Malaquais 2007). However the idea of a harmonious cultural hybridity in 
cities is far-fetched, especially given the stark reality of violence, crime and fear which 
is heightening as cities grow fast. Massive immigration in the context of 
Johannesburg has generated a precarious social order; an order that is decorated by 
possibilities of imminent ethno-national regionalist violence and crime and associated 
fears. What we have seen in Johannesburg and other South African cities is the 
invocation of claims to autochthony (Geschiere and Jackson 2006), which has 
generated xenophobic violence and a xenophobic public culture (Neocosmos 2008; 
Neocosmos 2010).  
The findings of this thesis confirm the propensity of some South Africans to exclude 
African immigrants from political participation in local communities, and at the same 
time blame them when things go wrong. In fact, everyday violence (criminal and 
vigilante) and crime in South Africa can be interpreted as ritualistic and symbolic 
expressions. This, in some way, qualifies violence as part of cultural practice. Yet 
Springer (2011: 90) finds it difficult to accept the view that violence is integral to 
cultural practice, given the frivolous and undue depiction of non-Western cultures, 
such as those of African, Asian and Islamic societies, as supposedly having an 
inherent predilection towards violence. This, to him, is a question of “geopolitical 
hegemony”. At a global level, Springer’s views are convincing, but at a local level the 
stark reality of everyday violence and crime suggest that these have become a way of 
life - cultural practices.  
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I also show how ethno-nationalist discourses influence stakeholders’ strategies and 
practices in the community safety governance field.  
  
9.3.2. Ethno-national regionalist practices  
Ethno-nationalist regionalist practices and discourses against African immigrants 
constitute the exercise of symbolic violence against them. I argue, in this case, following 
von Holdt’s (2012c) observation in his studies of violence in South Africa, that there 
is a thin line dividing symbolic violence and physical violence. Threats of violence 
against African immigrants (or those breaking the law) are here analysed as 
constituting performative statements or rituals affirming their perceived illegitimacy 
and un-belonging to the South African polity. The statement to the state or 
government is that they should take measures to reduce crime by tightening 
migration policy to control the influx of African immigrants. It is also a clamour by 
some South Africans to citizenship benefits, such as access to socio-economic goods 
or services provided by government, ahead of non-South Africans perceived to be 
illegitimate intruders bringing unnecessary or unwanted economic and social 
competition. My observation coincides with Springer’s (2011:93) argument that 
contrary to the perception displayed in media, “violence is not senseless at all” and is 
rather “scheduled and programmed through rationality”. 
Stakeholder and ethno-nationalist politics associated with community safety 
governance is also performatively and symbolically expressed in perceptions of place 
and territory (nation, city, neighbourhood, streets, parks and houses etc.).  
       
9.4. Territory and micro-politics of community safety governance 
I argue, based on my findings, that community stakeholder and ethno-national 
regionalist politics in community safety governance is pregnant with discursive 
territorial politics - a politics of narratives about territory, place and space (Chapter 
8). Some of these narratives demonstrate a politics of nostalgia about perceived 
better and safer days and a politics of yearning for neighbourhood image 
regeneration or improvement. Also embedded in these narratives is territorial or 
spatial regionalist politics that is pampered by classism and ethno-nationalism.  
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9.4.1. Territorial imageries of fear and safety (production) 
Narratives from this study show that in the quest for safety production, some 
community stakeholders sought spatial or territorial image regeneration of the 
neighbourhood. The focus was on the transformation of Yeoville from an image of a 
neighbourhood i) fraught with social malaise such as crime and violence; and ii) 
suffering urban decay; to that of a more habitable neighbourhood (catering for the 
safety and other needs [of the middle class]). This came with efforts by local 
organisations such as the YBCDT to (claim to) promote the socio-economic and 
physical regeneration of the neighbourhood; amounting to attempts to (re)generate 
or raise spatial capital (Lars 2008). 
At a more miniature level, in the imageries of the neighbourhood expressed by 
residents walking the streets, using the parks and staying in houses everyday, there 
was a politics of fear of certain places. This fear was particularly heightened at night. 
However, people continued to stay in the neighbourhood for reasons of 
convenience, inability to afford other areas and sometimes to be close to relatives, 
friends and members of their own tribes or ethnic groups.   
 
9.4.2. Territorial regionalist practices 
There are two kinds of territorial regionalist politics observed in this study - 
territorialised class-based, individual and ethno-national regionalist politics. Classist 
politics as practiced territorially or spatially takes the form of neighbourhood or 
property protectionism by members of the middle class. In this case, I notice the 
development of road closure initiatives and gating of spaces in Observatory, arguably 
to “stop the creeping of urban decay” from Yeoville; and also to secure their spaces 
against crime. Road closures and “community gating” is tantamount to taking a 
classist position in the territorial field of the city. 
The same logic (although not necessarily classist) applies in cases (even in Yeoville) 
where individuals protect their housing spaces (private spaces) through walling or 
fencing. That can be analysed as a case of individualist or family or household based 
territorial regionalism – akin to taking and maintaining a spatial or territorial position in 
the territorial field of a neighbourhood. 
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Ethno-nationalised politics reflected on (and resulted from) the fear or contempt of 
social groups perceived as not belonging to the South African polity. Ethno-national 
regionalism is expressed and reinforced in everyday practices and public discourses - 
consequently becoming publicly habitualised. Such discourses and practices 
expressively percolate and are churned out in public forums such as the YCPF, YCF 
and ward public meetings (Benit-Gbaffou and Mkwanazi 2011). In the context of 
Yeoville, such discourses performatively otherised African immigrants; creating, 
generating and maintaining a platform for ethno-national polarisation. These 
discourses took the form of blaming of African immigrants for local problems - 
crime, violence and urban decay. An environment that was created was one in which 
African immigrants adopted counter-otherisation practices and discourses, 
individually or in organisations (such as ADF).  
In light of all this, what are the key lessons of this study? What issues deserve further 
research and thought? Below, I wrap up with these questions in mind. 
 
9.5. Recapitulation and openings for further research  
In light of the foregoing, I propose a serious consideration of a socio-spatial agenda in 
professional urban practice and scholarship. This agenda transcends the spatialism and 
physicalism characteristic of mainstream urban professional practice and the sociologism 
that tends to characterise urban sociological thought. Neither approach, on its own, 
is profitable in urban safety governance, urban governance or urban planning. 
Physical infrastructures in a city should be squarely aligned to the city’s social 
infrastructures or social structures.  
Urban thought and professional planning practice needs to appeal to diverse 
socialities within the city, including the needs of the poor or the margizens 
(Schuilenburg 2008) - what Greed calls “social town planning” (Greed 1999). “Social 
town planning may broadly be defined as any movement to introduce policies that 
take into account more fully the needs of the diversity of human beings who live in 
our towns and cities (which, many would argue, mainstream town planning has failed 
to do)”, writes Greed (1999:4).  
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In light of the practicalities and rationalities of urban safety governance I deal with 
here, I wrap up by asking: from this research whereto and so what? My brief 
response is futuristic. I note that, despite being a prominent social thinker of the 20th 
century, Bourdieu’s social thought is marginally integrated into urban thought. This 
thesis has attempted to redeem Bourdieu’s “lost urban sociology” (Savage 2012) and 
invoke Bourdieusian ideas in urban safety governance thought. 
There is still a need for a sustained search for knowledge and for “thinking tools” to 
explain urban challenges and crises - including urban violence and crime. African 
cities, given their constellation of urban challenges, could be laboratories for 
developing new criminological, sociological, urban planning, geographical, 
anthropological and other theoretical insights about order and social control in 
contemporary cities. Even if western theories are invited to understand these issues, 
African cities can provide laboratories in which these can be tested, refuted and 
repackaged for rethought. This task requires more serious consideration by urban 
scholars; especially those in Africa or interested in understanding African cities.  
Through this research, I open a vein for further research. As much as I integrate 
gender into my ethno-nationality oriented analysis, it would be interesting in the 
future to explore in detail the role of women in spaces of participatory safety 
governance. The positioning of youths in the community security governance matrix 
also deserves further analysis in a context of their “advanced marginalisation” 
(Wacquant 1993; Wacquant 2008d) in city economies and polities. Also important is 
a study of the role of faith-based organisations and their practices and discourses in 
the politics of urban community safety production.  
On a conclusive note, I reiterate that the production of safety at a neighbourhood 
level is a social, political, symbolic, moral and economic business in which micro-
politics is played out by involved collective and individual stakeholders. Any policy 
intervention at this level should, therefore, appreciate the miniature political 
economy of this business if it is to succeed. However, in conceptualising community 
safety governance through this lense, one has to be cautious with the use of the 
language of profit.  
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11. Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Definitions and short discussions of some key concepts 
Community organisations: are non-profit civil society organisations operating within a territorial unit, 
otherwise referred to as neighbourhood or loosely as community83. The concept of community is a fluid 
and amorphous one (Suttles 1972; Thorns 2002); and communities can be conceptualised as 
‘imagined’ entities (Bauman 2002).84 In this study, I focus mainly on communities-of-place and 
communities of interest - groups of people living within or transecting the same geographical 
boundaries or bound by commonalities in interests (Vergunst 2006). 
Community politics (sometimes used interchangeably with local politics): refers to action to deal with issues 
at the micro-level of neighbourhood and it also depicts the various constellations of local interests 
(Katsaura 2012). Micro-politics refers to the formal and informal power-seeking and power deployment 
as well as (often hidden) miniature processes of interaction within/between groups or by individuals 
within and outside (community) organisations (Barnes et al. 2004; McAreavey 2006).  
Community security governance or community safety governance: depicts practices through which organised 
communities or social groups protect themselves and their spaces from violence, crime and fear 
thereof.85 In this case, I adopt the definition of governance as ‘self-organising, inter-organisational 
networks’ which ‘complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively 
allocating resources and exercising control and coordination’ (Rhodes 1996: 652). In this case I focus 
on residents’ efforts at organising and coordinating themselves for the production of safety – a form 
of micro-governance of  safety (Jentoft 2007; Kempa et al. 2002).  
Cultural capital: comes in the form of cultural goods or knowledge (Bourdieu 1986). 
Economic capital : is embodied in (and cashable as) material resources (Bourdieu 1986).  
Ethno-nationalism: refers the allocation of differences, based on ethnic and/or national origin of a 
person or social group (Nederveen 1996; Nederveen 2007) – otherwise referred to as ethnopolitics 
(Fumagalli 2007; Jamal 2007).  
Fear: is the anxiety experienced in anticipation of real or imagined danger; and it can be concrete 
(linked to real danger), formless (generalised feeling of being in danger) or diffuse (rooted in the social 
and economic context) (Bannister and Fyfe 2001; Silverman and Della-Giustina 2001). On the other 
hand, security, although it is a broad concept, is defined here as freedom from (the thought of) 
victimisation or fear.86     
Moral capital: is the moral prestige, whether of an individual, an organisation, emanating from a cause 
in useful service; not necessarily driven by self-interest (Casey 2005; Kane 2001). 
Moral economy: is a concept that describes practices which purport to advance the values of 
virtuousness, fairness and justice, amongst others (Bowles and Gintis 1998) – perhaps selflessly 
contributing to the production of public safety. 
Political capital:  is defined in terms of access to power and useful political networks (Bourdieu 1986).  
                                                     
83
 This is an operational definition that I adopt for the purpose of this paper and I do not have space 
here to engage in a debate about definitions of community organisations, community and 
neighbourhood. 
84 I have no space to engage in a detailed debate of what ‘community’ is. 
85 This conceptualisation of ‘community security governance’ draws on the work of Totikidis, Vicky, 
Anona F Armstrong, and Ronald D Francis. 2005a. "The concept of community governance: A 
preliminary review." in Refereed paper presented at the Govnet Conference, Monash University, Melbourne 28th - 
30th November, 2005: Centre for International Corporate Governance Research, Faculty of Business 
and Law, Victoria University. 
86 The opposite of which is insecurity. 
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Political economy is, here, used to review the material logic behind power struggles, contestation and 
coalition of stakeholders engaged in community safety production (Sayer 2000). 
Social capital is defined in terms of benefits that can accrue to an individual or group by virtue of being 
linked in particular networks or engaging in particular social relations (Bourdieu 1986).  
Social economy, here, refers to activities of community stakeholders (organisational, institutional, social 
group or individual) working for, or at least claiming to work for, the public good (Kay 2006) - 
producing community safety in this case. 
Socio-spatial politics: refers to the dialectical interweaving of social dynamics and spatial dynamics87. 
Through this concept I capture the manifestation and dramatisation of the interlacing of social space 
and physical space in the micro-politics of community safety governance. 
Spatial capital:  is a concept that captures the idea of value or saleability and utility of land and of place 
or physical space as it were (Lars 2008). 
Symbolic capital : is defined in terms of honour and prestige accrued within a specific field (Bourdieu 
1986). 
Violence and Crime: While analytical definitions of violence vary, I define it here as the ‘use of forceful 
acts motivated by the conscious or unconscious desire to obtain or maintain political, economic or 
social power’ (MacIliwaine and Moser 2004). I resort to a conceptual continuum that distinguishes 
between social, political and economic violence (Moser and MacIliwaine 2001). I note that concepts of 
violence and crime should not be used interchangeably as not all violent acts are criminal and not all 
criminal acts are violent (Moser and MacIliwaine 2004; Pillay 2008). Crime can be defined as behaviour 
that violates codified law (McLaughlin and Muncie 2001). Crime is ‘not a self-evident and unitary 
concept’, but a contested one (McLaughlin and Muncie 2001: 59). Its constitutions and definitions are 
diverse and historically, contextually, theoretically contingent (Ibid: 59).     
 
Appendix B: Summary of fieldwork activities 
Research Method Frequency of 
deployment of 
method 
Description of participants/ activity 
Participant observation and direct 
observation:  
Observation of community  
90+ community 
meetings 
Meeting s of CPF, SCFs, YSF, YCF, 
ADF, and YBCEC were attended. 
 
Key informant interviews: one on 
one and group interviews 
60 interviews Community leaders: Leaders of 
organisations including CPF, YSF, 
YBCDT, YCF, SCFs, Youth Desk, 
Victim Empowerment Centre, ADF, 
YBCEC 
Group interviews 2 interviews One group interview was conducted with 
migrants and another one with members 
of street patrollers 
Semi-structured interviews : 
Qualitative Opinion and attitude 
survey – Conducted by 4 research 
assistants 
42.5% were 
South Africans 
and 57.5%  
were non-South 
Africans 
n = 40 
Done with members of  the generality of 
the population  
Yeoville and Bellevue were divided into 
four block and each on my research 
assistants used snowballing techniques to 
identify participants for interviews.  Forty 
people were interviewed. 
Walks in the neighbourhood/ city Almost 
everyday 
The main aim was to observe various 
forms of interaction and practices. 
                                                     
87 This definition benefits from the work of  Soja, Edward W. 1980. "The socio‐spatial dialectic." 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 70(2):207-25. 
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activity 
Documentary analysis: 
Yeovue News, government policy 
documents 
Full collection 
of Yeovue News 
dating back to 
November 
2009; national 
and city policy 
documents and 
research reports 
All the relevant documents that I came 
across were pulled together and analysed. 
The most important was Yeovue News, 
which is the community Newsletter for 
Yeoville and Bellevue. 
 
Appendix C: Nationality composition of opinion abd attitude survey participants 
 
